From info at arin.net Mon Mar 3 13:41:02 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Mon, 03 Mar 2008 13:41:02 -0500 Subject: [ppml] =?windows-1252?q?ARIN_XXI=3A_It_Won=92t_Be_The_Same_Withou?= =?windows-1252?q?t_You!?= Message-ID: <47CC463E.9070609@arin.net> We are looking forward to the ARIN XXI Public Policy and Members Meeting, taking place 6-9 April 2008, in Denver, Colorado, and we hope you are too. Come be a part of the community in action, and don?t let your voice go unheard! Register today to take advantage of the early registration fee of $100. It increases to $150 on 24 March. The meeting will take place at the Grand Hyatt Denver. ARIN XXI attendees are eligible for a special room rate of $189 (USD), based on availability, if reservations are made before 14 March. In addition to the Public Policy and Members Meeting, there will be a number of informative events, including a session on Sunday, 6 April entitled ?Understanding ARIN?s Legacy Registration Services Agreement? presented by ARIN General Counsel Steven M. Ryan. Other Sunday activities include a luncheon for first time ARIN meeting attendees, the Open Policy Hour, and the 9th Annual Foosball Tournament. Immediately preceding the Open Policy Hour, there will also be a brief session offering an introduction to the ARIN policy development process. Hotel and travel information, meeting registration, and an agenda overview are available through http://www.arin.net/ARIN-XXI/. A more detailed agenda will be posted as we get closer to the meeting. As always, please contact ARIN Member Services at info at arin.net with any questions. We look forward to seeing you in Denver! Regards, Member Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) From info at arin.net Tue Mar 4 11:06:51 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 11:06:51 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-3: Community Networks IPv6 Allocation Message-ID: <47CD739B.3060905@arin.net> On 21 February 2008, the ARIN Advisory Council (AC) concluded its review of "Community Networks IPv6 Allocation" and accepted it as a formal policy proposal with the condition that the policy text be revised by the author so that it can be put into the ARIN Number Resource Policy Manual. The author submitted a revised version of the proposal. The proposal is designated Policy Proposal 2008-3: Community Networks IPv6 Allocation. The proposal text is below and can be found at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/2008_3.html All persons in the community are encouraged to discuss Policy Proposal 2008-3 prior to it being presented at the upcoming ARIN XXI Public Policy Meeting. Both the discussion on the Public Policy Mailing List and at the Public Policy Meeting will be used to determine the community consensus regarding this policy proposal. The ARIN Internet Resource Policy Evaluation Process can be found at: http://www.arin.net/policy/irpep.html ARIN's Policy Proposal Archive can be found at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/proposal_archive.html Regards, Member Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) ## * ## Policy Proposal 2008-3 Community Networks IPv6 Allocation Author: Joshua King Proposal Version: 1 Date: 4 March 2008 Proposal type: new Policy term: permanent Policy statement: [Add Section 2.8 to the NRPM.] 2.8 Community Network A community network is a generic reference to any network that is operated by a group of people living in a particular local area organized for the purposes of delivery or provision of network services to the residents of an incorporated or unincorporated regional municipality, city, town, village, rural municipality, township, county, district or other municipality or other such geographic space, however designated. [Modify 6.5.8.1b as follows.] b. qualify for an IPv4 assignment or allocation from ARIN under the IPv4 policy currently in effect or be a Community Network as defined in Section 2.8. Rationale: There are currently a number of projects globally that aim to develop community network infrastructure and related technologies. These are usually coordinated by volunteer-run, grassroots organizations which lack many of the resources of traditional internet service providers and other network operators. They have diverse goals, including public policy, software development, and implementation of community services and resources. Many of them provide services free of charge, and thus lack any paying user base. However, in order to create and maintain community networks that are often composed of hundreds if not thousands of inexpensive, commodity hosts and devices, a significant amount of address space will be required. Current-generation workarounds to this problem, such as NAT, not only make it difficult to develop next-generation decentralized network technology by segmenting the community's architecture from the Internet as a whole, but will cease to be as viable a stopgap as the Internet moves towards IPv6 integration. Even now, common community networking software solutions such as CUWiNware (http://www.cuwin.net) and Freifunk (http://www.freifunk.at) have nascent IPv6 addressing support, but participating organizations lack the address space for widespread testing or adoption. As such, it is necessary to implement an procedure as soon as possible for these segregated networks to acquire address space. These organizations do not meet the criteria traditionally defined for LIR's, and thus cannot acquire address allocations through existing templates. By establishing a procedure by which these organizations can seek to acquire the resources they require for further development, ARIN can reach out to this active community and establish a small but definite space for them in the future of Internet. Timetable for implementation: Immediate. From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 4 11:49:29 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 08:49:29 -0800 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal Message-ID: <47CD7D99.9000108@internap.com> Jim Weyand wrote (in a message not posted to PPML): > My real concern is that the community has not considered the costs > associated with the proposed constraints. I can dream up a number of > scenarios that may occur. > > > > Scenario 1 > > An ISP has a /16 but determines they really only need a much smaller > block - maybe a /20. They look at the market price for a /16 and > determine that it is a high enough price to put up with the pain of > moving all of their addresses to new space. In an unrestricted market a > /16 is probably worth more than an equivalent number of /20s so the ISP > would be motivated to transfer out the whole /16 and transfer in a /20. > > > > The problem is, under ?Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy > Proposal?, our ISP cannot acquire new addresses. So, to make the sale, > the /16 gets broken up into pieces and all parties are net losers. The > seller was unable to maximize their profit, the original buyer was > unable to participate in this transaction (because they are prequalified > for a /16) and the routing table is increased. > > > > Scenario 2 > > Our ISP with the /16 thinks they only need a /17. They look at the > market rate for the remaining /17 and think, ?hmmm? that?s pretty > good?. The ISP reasons that they can get cash now and, if they really > need it, they can go buy more addresses later. > > > > The ISP is pretty excited about this idea and investigates what is > involved with transferring out IP Address space under ARIN?s new rules. > They read the rules and realize, down in the fine print, that they can?t > get any more IP Address space for another two years. The risk is too > great and the ISP decides not to transfer out any addresses and the > market price of a /17 is artificially inflated. > > > > The constraints will have real costs ? probably not the kind of costs > that will make the front page of the Wall Street Journal but nonetheless > real costs that will affect ISPs. I agree completely. Perhaps one way to address your concerns would be to look to NRPM section 4.6 Amnesty Requests (http://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#four6), and include text in the transfer policy to accomplish similar objectives. But the more I look at it, the more I wonder if the same objective could be accomplished more simply by striking the words ", or through this Simple Transfer policy" from the condition that "The transferor may not request any IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN (through ordinary allocations or assignments, or through this Simple Transfer policy) within the subsequent 24 months." Under the standard transferee conditions, any subsequent requests to receive IPv4 addresses through this Simple Transfer policy would have to be justified and pre-qualified, just as with any other potential transferee. The only thing this doesn't address is the desire to allow someone to get and renumber into a smaller block (say /20) and then transfer their larger block (say /16). Under the current proposed policy, such an organization would be able to keep the first or last /20 out of their /16, and transfer the remaining /17, /18, /19, and /20. While I could see a renumbering being slightly better, I think the existing policy is adequate, so I'm not sure if we need to allow people to renumber into a completely different block, and deal with all the complexities of timing that entails. > I have struggled to fully understand the latter part of Scott?s second > paragraph: > > > > > but that further restricting transferors from > > deaggregating to meet legitimate demand from pre-qualified transferees > > will have a negative effect of increasing the price of small blocks > > while decreasing the price (and supply) of larger blocks. > > > > As I understand this if we make it too difficult to split a block we could: > > 1) Artificially raise the price of smaller blocks since there may be > demand for smaller blocks that cannot be met while there are larger > blocks that sit unused. Yes, that is my main concern. > 2) Unintentionally decrease the supply of larger blocks because a > buyer will look at the lower price of the larger blocks and lobby for an > exemption to the pre-qualification requirement. I hadn't thought of that aspect of it, but yes, that would be another negative consequence of not allowing enough deaggregation. > Do I understand this correctly? > > Assuming I do, isn?t this another argument for not introducing any > market constraints other than minimum block size? Or at least for reducing the number of market constraints. As I outlined above, and in a separate proposed modification under discussion (to allow ARIN discretion to allow enough deaggregation to ensure adequate supply of smaller blocks), I'm open to reconsidering any aspects of the policy that might do more harm than good, and either eliminating or changing those aspects, or introducing compensatory language to deal with the negative side effects. Do you have any feedback on any of the proposals above, or any other suggested improvements? The 30-day cutoff for submissions of revised proposals for Denver is fast approaching. Thanks, Scott > *From: *"Jim Weyand" > > > *Date: *February 29, 2008 9:14:04 AM PST (CA) > > *To: *"arin ppml" > > > *Subject: **Re: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy > Proposal* > > > > Does our economist monitor this list? There is a lot of language in the > rationale section that says that many of the restrictions on trade are > designed to limit speculation. Is speculation worse than living with > the restrictions imposed by this proposal? > > For example one restriction is that if you transfer address space to > another party you may not receive address space for another 24 months. > This means that if you have a nice large block you are prevented from > transferring the entire block to another party and getting a more > suitable block in return. > > This restriction will also artificially increase the "market price" of a > block of addresses since I will only take the risk of running out of > addresses in next 24 months if it is very rewarding. > > I'd like to hear our economist's (Ben?) comments on the cost to the > community of the restrictions v. speculation. > > Even with these restrictions I can support this policy, however I think > it is worthwhile to consider the "hidden" costs associated with these > restrictions. > > -Jim Weyand > > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of > Leo Bicknell > Sent: Friday, February 29, 2008 10:50 AM > To: arin ppml > Subject: Re: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy > Proposal > > In a message written on Fri, Feb 29, 2008 at 10:27:02AM -0500, Cliff > Bedore wrote: > > I think we need to make sure the ARIN attorneys look at this from the > >> standpoint of "How can I beat the system". I expect they are >> > honorable and > > above board and that's probably a disadvantage when trying to ensure > > all the > > i's are dotted and the t's are crossed and the vultures are kept at > > bay. > > The ARIN AC has worked closely with both Steve Ryan, ARIN Council > and Ben Edelman, who many saw at the last meeting for his Economics > background, but in addition to his PhD in economics also has a J.D. > from Harvard Law and is admitted to the Massachusetts Bar. They > both provided significant input that the AC used to better craft > the policy language to strengthen ARIN's legal position were this > policy to be adopted. > > That's not to say they don't have some concerns. Nothing is 100% > in law, particularly when there is limited case law on the subject. > I believe both will be at the Denver meeting able to answer questions > about legal risk. As with all policies, ARIN Council will generate > a legal review of the policy prior to the meeting which should both > be posted to PPML and reviewed at the meeting. > > I strongly urge anyone with legal concerns to either come to Denver, > or participate remotely. > > -- > Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - > CCIE 3440 > PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net ). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net > if you experience any issues. > > > From owen at delong.com Tue Mar 4 12:27:09 2008 From: owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong) Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 09:27:09 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF Message-ID: As most of you already know, members of the ARIN AC conducted a BoF session at NANOG 42 to try and gather additional community feedback about IPv4 Exhaustion, and, specifically, the AC Authored IPv4 transfer policy. Due to last minute scheduling, the BoF was held at a time which conflicted with the Peering BoF and the IPv6 Tutorial. Despite these conflicts, the BoF was surprisingly well attended and we were able to have a good and productive discussion. Early in the discussion, it was discovered that most present had not come to a clear understanding of the Transfer Policy Proposal. Some explanation and clarification was provided by various members of the AC. Some key provisions that were discussed were: + Requirement for both parties in a transfer to sign an RSA This is in keeping with preserving contractual parity in the transfer process. + Intent of the listing service The details of the listing service were omitted from the policy proposal due to time constraints and to preserve some flexibility to work with ARIN staff on the design and criteria to fully meet the needs of ARIN and the community. Generally, the expectation is that the listing service data will be as open and public as possible with the intent of allowing as much information as possible to potential transferors/transferees prior to engaging in the process. + Effects on Current policy Current merger/acquisition/divestiture policy remains unchanged. The proposed re-titling of the policy focused on merger/acquisition merely as an oversight, not in an intent to change the handling of such transfers. Hopefully this will be addressed in the next revision of the policy proposal. + Implementation date IANA Free pool runout was chosen because it is objectively factual. ARIN runout will be staggered with ARIN unable to issue larger blocks before it runs out of smaller ones. Additionally, using IANA runout allows the policy and associated market to kind of spin up and gain some experience before ARIN runs out. + Potential Legal Issues Nobody present at the BoF was prepared or qualified to speak on behalf of ARIN from a legal perspective. As a result, questions regarding legal ramifications were deferred as out of scope for the BoF session. ARIN Counsel will present a review of the proposed policy at the ARIN meeting in Denver. It will also be posted to the PPML. In general, the idea of a transfer policy was received with a neutral to positive response. There were no strong negative reactions expressed. There were several questions about likely efficacy and whether this policy would actually accomplish anything. Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. With this proposal, there's at least the possibility if folks can come to agreement on the subject. Thanks to everyone who attended the BoF. Your input was very useful to the AC. I encourage anyone interested in further participating in the policy process to subscribe to the ARIN PPML (http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml) and post your comments there. Respectfully submitted, Owen DeLong ARIN AC From cliffb at cjbsys.bdb.com Tue Mar 4 14:04:12 2008 From: cliffb at cjbsys.bdb.com (Cliff Bedore) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 14:04:12 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47CD7D99.9000108@internap.com> References: <47CD7D99.9000108@internap.com> Message-ID: <47CD9D2C.3090201@cjbsys.bdb.com> Scott Leibrand wrote: > Jim Weyand wrote (in a message not posted to PPML): > > >> My real concern is that the community has not considered the costs >> associated with the proposed constraints. I can dream up a number of >> scenarios that may occur. >> >> >> >> Scenario 1 >> >> An ISP has a /16 but determines they really only need a much smaller >> block - maybe a /20. They look at the market price for a /16 and >> determine that it is a high enough price to put up with the pain of >> moving all of their addresses to new space. In an unrestricted market a >> /16 is probably worth more than an equivalent number of /20s so the ISP >> would be motivated to transfer out the whole /16 and transfer in a /20. >> >> >> >> The problem is, under ?Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy >> Proposal?, our ISP cannot acquire new addresses. So, to make the sale, >> the /16 gets broken up into pieces and all parties are net losers. The >> seller was unable to maximize their profit, the original buyer was >> unable to participate in this transaction (because they are prequalified >> for a /16) and the routing table is increased. >> Perhaps the wording should be changed to allow a three-way (n-way?) trade where several transactions can be made at one time and only count as one transaction.i.e. A sells the /16 to B and buys the /20 from C. Like data base changes, it would be an atomic action and would be considered either all completed or nothing completed. Kind of like some of the sports team trades you read about >> >> >> Scenario 2 >> >> Our ISP with the /16 thinks they only need a /17. They look at the >> market rate for the remaining /17 and think, ?hmmm? that?s pretty >> good?. The ISP reasons that they can get cash now and, if they really >> need it, they can go buy more addresses later. >> >> >> >> The ISP is pretty excited about this idea and investigates what is >> involved with transferring out IP Address space under ARIN?s new rules. >> They read the rules and realize, down in the fine print, that they can?t >> get any more IP Address space for another two years. The risk is too >> great and the ISP decides not to transfer out any addresses and the >> market price of a /17 is artificially inflated. >> >> >> >> The constraints will have real costs ? probably not the kind of costs >> that will make the front page of the Wall Street Journal but nonetheless >> real costs that will affect ISPs. >> This seems to me to be in the area of business decisions and I'm not sure if ARIN should be responsible for someone's bad business decisions. The sale is being made for a profit and the risks and benefits of that sale should be weighed by the company before they make that sale. Having said that, maybe the benefits to ARIN of letting sales take place more often outweigh the problems. Perhaps there could be higher fees for excess transactions to cut down on trading too often. Like broker fees tend to keep most people from trading all the time. I.e. One transaction per 24 (x?) months is free, the second one is $xxxx, the third is 2 * $xxxx and so on. This would put a damper on churning of addresses while allowing those who really need to get more within a 24 month (or other) period to do so at some increased cost. And of course there may not be enough trading to make this worth worrying about. :-) But I guess better safe than sorry. Cliff > > I agree completely. Perhaps one way to address your concerns would be > to look to NRPM section 4.6 Amnesty Requests > (http://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#four6), and include text in the > transfer policy to accomplish similar objectives. > > But the more I look at it, the more I wonder if the same objective could > be accomplished more simply by striking the words ", or through this > Simple Transfer policy" from the condition that "The transferor may not > request any IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN (through ordinary > allocations or assignments, or through this Simple Transfer policy) > within the subsequent 24 months." Under the standard transferee > conditions, any subsequent requests to receive IPv4 addresses through > this Simple Transfer policy would have to be justified and > pre-qualified, just as with any other potential transferee. > > The only thing this doesn't address is the desire to allow someone to > get and renumber into a smaller block (say /20) and then transfer their > larger block (say /16). Under the current proposed policy, such an > organization would be able to keep the first or last /20 out of their > /16, and transfer the remaining /17, /18, /19, and /20. While I could > see a renumbering being slightly better, I think the existing policy is > adequate, so I'm not sure if we need to allow people to renumber into a > completely different block, and deal with all the complexities of timing > that entails. > > > > >> I have struggled to fully understand the latter part of Scott?s second >> paragraph: >> >> >> >> >>> but that further restricting transferors from >>> deaggregating to meet legitimate demand from pre-qualified transferees >>> will have a negative effect of increasing the price of small blocks >>> while decreasing the price (and supply) of larger blocks. >>> >> >> >> As I understand this if we make it too difficult to split a block we could: >> >> 1) Artificially raise the price of smaller blocks since there may be >> demand for smaller blocks that cannot be met while there are larger >> blocks that sit unused. >> > > Yes, that is my main concern. > > >> 2) Unintentionally decrease the supply of larger blocks because a >> buyer will look at the lower price of the larger blocks and lobby for an >> exemption to the pre-qualification requirement. >> > > I hadn't thought of that aspect of it, but yes, that would be another > negative consequence of not allowing enough deaggregation. > > >> Do I understand this correctly? >> >> Assuming I do, isn?t this another argument for not introducing any >> market constraints other than minimum block size? >> > > Or at least for reducing the number of market constraints. As I > outlined above, and in a separate proposed modification under discussion > (to allow ARIN discretion to allow enough deaggregation to ensure > adequate supply of smaller blocks), I'm open to reconsidering any > aspects of the policy that might do more harm than good, and either > eliminating or changing those aspects, or introducing compensatory > language to deal with the negative side effects. > > Do you have any feedback on any of the proposals above, or any other > suggested improvements? The 30-day cutoff for submissions of revised > proposals for Denver is fast approaching. > > Thanks, > Scott > > > >> *From: *"Jim Weyand" > > >> >> *Date: *February 29, 2008 9:14:04 AM PST (CA) >> >> *To: *"arin ppml" > >> >> *Subject: **Re: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy >> Proposal* >> >> >> >> Does our economist monitor this list? There is a lot of language in the >> rationale section that says that many of the restrictions on trade are >> designed to limit speculation. Is speculation worse than living with >> the restrictions imposed by this proposal? >> >> For example one restriction is that if you transfer address space to >> another party you may not receive address space for another 24 months. >> This means that if you have a nice large block you are prevented from >> transferring the entire block to another party and getting a more >> suitable block in return. >> >> This restriction will also artificially increase the "market price" of a >> block of addresses since I will only take the risk of running out of >> addresses in next 24 months if it is very rewarding. >> >> I'd like to hear our economist's (Ben?) comments on the cost to the >> community of the restrictions v. speculation. >> >> Even with these restrictions I can support this policy, however I think >> it is worthwhile to consider the "hidden" costs associated with these >> restrictions. >> >> -Jim Weyand >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of >> Leo Bicknell >> Sent: Friday, February 29, 2008 10:50 AM >> To: arin ppml >> Subject: Re: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy >> Proposal >> >> In a message written on Fri, Feb 29, 2008 at 10:27:02AM -0500, Cliff >> Bedore wrote: >> >> I think we need to make sure the ARIN attorneys look at this from the >> >> >>> standpoint of "How can I beat the system". I expect they are >>> >>> >> honorable and >> >> above board and that's probably a disadvantage when trying to ensure >> >> all the >> >> i's are dotted and the t's are crossed and the vultures are kept at >> >> bay. >> >> The ARIN AC has worked closely with both Steve Ryan, ARIN Council >> and Ben Edelman, who many saw at the last meeting for his Economics >> background, but in addition to his PhD in economics also has a J.D. >> from Harvard Law and is admitted to the Massachusetts Bar. They >> both provided significant input that the AC used to better craft >> the policy language to strengthen ARIN's legal position were this >> policy to be adopted. >> >> That's not to say they don't have some concerns. Nothing is 100% >> in law, particularly when there is limited case law on the subject. >> I believe both will be at the Denver meeting able to answer questions >> about legal risk. As with all policies, ARIN Council will generate >> a legal review of the policy prior to the meeting which should both >> be posted to PPML and reviewed at the meeting. >> >> I strongly urge anyone with legal concerns to either come to Denver, >> or participate remotely. >> >> -- >> Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - >> CCIE 3440 >> PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ >> _______________________________________________ >> PPML >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >> ARIN Public Policy >> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net ). >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net >> if you experience any issues. >> >> >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > > From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 4 14:13:27 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 19:13:27 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > Generally, the expectation is that the listing > service data will be as open and public as possible > with the intent of allowing as much information as > possible to potential transferors/transferees prior > to engaging in the process. Will this be a real-time listing service to minimise the risk that an insider would have access to data about available blocks before the general public? If so, then that is considered to be an OTC (Over-The-Counter) bulletin board and it may be subject to SEC regulation, depending on just what is being traded. It seems to me that the IP address contracts being traded might be considered to be some kind of OTC derivative. Since the traders in this market would not be considered to be sophisticated investors by the SEC, this could fall under one of the Congressional Acts that regulate trading under the jurisdiction of the SEC. > Nobody present at the BoF was prepared or qualified > to speak on behalf of ARIN from a legal perspective. Is ARIN Counsel qualified to speak about the legal ramifications as far as the SEC are concerned? Not all lawyers deal with all areas of law. > There were several questions about likely efficacy and > whether this policy would actually accomplish anything. Indeed! > Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or > something like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 > runout. That's funny, I though that change was the only constant in our universe. Now you want to convince me that IPv4 runout is such a momentous event that it will change the laws of the universe!? > Haves have and have nots have not and there's no way > for that to change. Companies will build out IPv6 networks and eventually begin retiring their IPv4 addresses. And as far as the "have nots" are concerned, there is no law preventing them from simply carving up 126/8, a large block that was given to a Japanese cable company. Or any other large block that seems relatively unused on the North American Internet. --Michael Dillon From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 4 14:22:42 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 11:22:42 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: >> Generally, the expectation is that the listing >> service data will be as open and public as possible >> with the intent of allowing as much information as >> possible to potential transferors/transferees prior >> to engaging in the process. > > Will this be a real-time listing service to minimise the risk > that an insider would have access to data about available blocks > before the general public? > > If so, then that is considered to be an OTC (Over-The-Counter) bulletin > board and it may be subject to SEC regulation, depending on just > what is being traded. It seems to me that the IP address contracts > being traded might be considered to be some kind of OTC derivative. > Since the traders in this market would not be considered to be > sophisticated > investors by the SEC, this could fall under one of the Congressional > Acts > that regulate trading under the jurisdiction of the SEC. > >> Nobody present at the BoF was prepared or qualified >> to speak on behalf of ARIN from a legal perspective. > > Is ARIN Counsel qualified to speak about the legal ramifications > as far as the SEC are concerned? Not all lawyers deal with all > areas of law. I personally am confident that ARIN Counsel will be able to speak to this issue. If the individual lawyers we've been dealing with so far (Steve and Ben) don't deal with that area of law, I know they have the resources to engage someone who does. > Companies will build out IPv6 networks and eventually begin > retiring their IPv4 addresses. And as far as the "have nots" > are concerned, there is no law preventing them from simply > carving up 126/8, a large block that was given to a Japanese > cable company. Or any other large block that seems relatively > unused on the North American Internet. There is no law preventing them from utilizing addresses uniquely registered to another party, but there is pretty strong policy in place that will prevent them from being able to announce a route covering those addresses into the DFZ. That basically makes such addresses equivalent to RFC 1918 space. If you think additional private IPv4 space is needed, there was a policy proposal in APNIC to reserve a /8 for shared use by LIRs that is being taken to the IETF. But the problem we're trying to solve with transfer policy is different: providing for the continued availability of unique global IPv4 addresses after free pool exhaustion. -Scott From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 4 15:46:02 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 20:46:02 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> Message-ID: > I personally am confident that ARIN Counsel will be able to > speak to this issue. If the individual lawyers we've been > dealing with so far (Steve and Ben) don't deal with that area > of law, I know they have the resources to engage someone who does. I doubt that they have the resources to engage someone else. My understanding is that lawyers do not work for free, they charge their clients more-or-less on a time and materials basis. Therefore, if the client (ARIN BoT and President) do not ask ARIN's counsel to look into the possibility that these transfer plans are stepping into the area regulated by the SEC, then they won't engage someone to look into that. So far, from the discussion that I have seen, it does not appear that anyone seriously considered the possibility that the IP address market proposals are getting rather close to the territory that the SEC regulates. That's why I'm raising the issue here, in hopes that some of the people on this list will discuss it with the BoT, and with some sort of legal advisor who has expertise in the right area of law. It could be the current counsel or some other lawyer. That is up to the BoT. > > Companies will build out IPv6 networks and eventually begin > retiring > > their IPv4 addresses. And as far as the "have nots" > > are concerned, there is no law preventing them from simply > carving up > > 126/8, a large block that was given to a Japanese cable company. Or > > any other large block that seems relatively unused on the North > > American Internet. > > There is no law preventing them from utilizing addresses > uniquely registered to another party, but there is pretty > strong policy in place that will prevent them from being able > to announce a route covering those addresses into the DFZ. And just what policy is that? We regularly see incidents where organizations announce addresses into the DMZ that are not registered to the organization. If you talk to the operational folks you will learn that it is not a simple matter to figure out whether a particular route announcement is proper or not. > That basically makes such addresses equivalent to RFC 1918 > space. Tell that to the people who couldn't get to YouTube a week ago. Now imagine what would have happened if Pakistani Telecom made a typo and accidentally announced address space used by a German ISP for their modem dial customers. Instead of knocking out a high traffic site due to blocking their nameservers, it would cause intermittent outages to a few customers, many of whom would redial and solve the problem. The fact is that there are big impact address blocks and small impact address blocks. Not all are equal in their importance to North American ISPs. --Michael Dillon From drc at virtualized.org Tue Mar 4 16:01:23 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 13:01:23 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> Hi, On Mar 4, 2008, at 9:27 AM, Owen DeLong wrote: > Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something > like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves > have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their requirements. With a transfer policy, ARIN _may_ retain some relevance as a source of "title" information, but a lot depends on the restrictions ARIN attempts to impose. Make the policy too restrictive, and people will go elsewhere. In the end, with or without a transfer policy, you're still out of "free" IPv4 addresses and businesses will do what they feel is necessary to get around unenforceable bureaucratic rules. Regards, -drc From iljitsch at muada.com Wed Mar 5 04:31:17 2008 From: iljitsch at muada.com (Iljitsch van Beijnum) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:31:17 +0100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> On 4 mrt 2008, at 22:01, David Conrad wrote: >> Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something >> like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves >> have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. > To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. Your bluntness is duly noted. > Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant > as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their > requirements. Let me try to be blunt as well: Who the **** cares what happens when we're out of IPv4 space? Because then we'll be out of IPv4 space, and the if THAT isn't enough to get people to adopt IPv6, we might as well all go home and read up on the X.25 specs because this internet thing will be over and done with very quickly. There is one message and one message only: IPv6. Learn it. Love it, don't love it, but either way, make sure you RUN it 4 years from now if there is even the slightest chance that you may need new IP addresses after that. > With a transfer policy, ARIN _may_ retain some relevance as a source > of "title" information, but a lot depends on the restrictions ARIN > attempts to impose. Make the policy too restrictive, and people will > go elsewhere. The part that I'm still waiting to see answered is how the rest of the world gets access to the excess IPv4 legacy space that exists in the ARIN region. A policy that only allows transfer of space between entities in the ARIN region certainly won't fly with the likes of the WTO. From michael.dillon at bt.com Wed Mar 5 07:47:53 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 12:47:53 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> Message-ID: > The part that I'm still waiting to see answered is how the > rest of the world gets access to the excess IPv4 legacy space > that exists in the ARIN region. Just take it. If you have no need to communicate with North American sites, then just use whatever addresses you want. It would be a good idea to first make sure that you don't see any regional traffic to the address range that you pick, and that the range does not contain some internationally important hosts like, for instance, the DNS servers of a major video hosting site. Outside of the former British colonies, there is less and less interest in exchanging traffic with North America. The needs of travellers and emigrant communities are not big enough for EVERY foreign ISP to maintain universal connecity. In fact, it's not really possible to measure how universal your connectivity is so we don't even know how many ISPs already survive quite well without it. Even in such a fundamental category as search engines, French, Germans and Russians are more likely to use www.voila.fr, www.abacho.com and www.rambler.ru than they are to use www.google.fr, www.google.de and www.google.ru. If people find that there is value in prolonging the life of the IPv4 Internet in order to delay deploying IPv6, then it will not be the IPv4 Internet as we know it from the 1990s. It will be a more fragmented Internet, but still increasingly useful to the individual users who depend on it. > A policy that only allows > transfer of space between entities in the ARIN region > certainly won't fly with the likes of the WTO. In Europe, all of the largest ISPs are members of an organization called ETNO, and they are unanimous that there should be no IP marketplace. Here is what they presented at RIPE 55 No IP Marketplace - ETNO believes that a marketplace in IP addressing is contrary to the principles of fair play and conservation through which IP addresses have been allocated in the past - Development of a market for IP addresses should be strongly discouraged - Legal, informal and illegal trading of IP addresses should be strongly discouraged - RIPE - as well as its membership - should identify strategic actions that would help meet this goal If ARIN allows transfer of address blocks for money, it will likely be the only RIR to do so. --Michael Dillon From iljitsch at muada.com Wed Mar 5 09:35:32 2008 From: iljitsch at muada.com (Iljitsch van Beijnum) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 15:35:32 +0100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CE98E6.3080606@ttec.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> <47CE98E6.3080606@ttec.com> Message-ID: <3C4726EC-678E-4D89-AAD8-D9362AFC04E1@muada.com> On 5 mrt 2008, at 13:58, Joe Maimon wrote: >> Who the **** cares what happens when we're out of IPv4 space? >> Because then we'll be out of IPv4 space, and the if THAT isn't >> enough to get people to adopt IPv6, we might as well all go home >> and read up on the X.25 specs because this internet thing will be >> over and done with very quickly. > Yes, that was the prevailing group-think after the whole "we will > build it and they will migrate" thing didnt work out. So what are you saying here? That IPv6 is never going to fly, because if it would, it had done so immediately after its creation? > ipv4 will "run out" and the whole world will wake up the next > morning and mass migrate to ipv6. This is your viewpoint, one you > have been consistent about. > This is a pipe dream. Or a nightmare. Or a pipe nightmare. If it happens when you're awake it's generally not a dream or a nightmare. People who have all the IPv4 address space they need won't be doing much around the time we run out. But those who need an influx of new address space to keep their business running (i.e., ISPs) and those who want to start something new will have to do something different than they've been doing so far. If that something is not IPv6, that means the something won't be sustainable in the long run. > Here is another viewpoint. > ipv4 wont run out. It will just become scarce (and scarcer), and > resultingly, valuable (and more valuable). Sure, if you want to have a service hosted, you only need a few IP addresses, which you'll be able to get one way or another. However, we just saw pretty pictures that indicate 83% of all ARIN IPv4 address space is held by 1% of the ARIN members. Those few dozen organizations use up millions of addresses each year. They pay less than a cent per address per year for that now. For them, the prospect of having to pay (say) $1/address the first year after the v4 exhaustion will be an unattractive one, but then having to work harder and pay more each year is what makes this completely unworkable. So either they'll collapse their existing address space by putting more users behind a single address, or they'll go to IPv6. > Nobody will mass migrate to ipv6 because: > - it doesnt work well enough for their needs > - they dont understand it > - they cant afford the equipment forklifts > - they cant support it > - they cant afford to support it > - its a network without anything compelling on it > The last point is the one that makes or breaks. These are all things that can only be attributed to IPv6 AS IT IS TODAY. They are not inherent properties of the protocol. At some point, we'll need to jump over our own shadow and stop demanding that IPv6 has the same usefulness as IPv4 from the very first day it's adopted. (That is not to say that ARIN shouldn't fix its IPv6 path MTU discovery and routing issues...) I've written enough on why trading address space is a bad idea, but I also wrote a lot about why PI for IPv6 was a bad idea, and that went through anyway. So I'm not wasting my time trying to convince the unconvincable. But to the would-be IPv4 traders: depending on how exactly this happens, it can be merely a waste of time and money, or it can blow up in our collective faces. Please make sure you get it right. From jmaimon at chl.com Wed Mar 5 09:56:11 2008 From: jmaimon at chl.com (Joe Maimon) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 09:56:11 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <3C4726EC-678E-4D89-AAD8-D9362AFC04E1@muada.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> <47CE98E6.3080606@ttec.com> <3C4726EC-678E-4D89-AAD8-D9362AFC04E1@muada.com> Message-ID: <47CEB48B.9000001@chl.com> Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote: > On 5 mrt 2008, at 13:58, Joe Maimon wrote: > > > So what are you saying here? That IPv6 is never going to fly, because > if it would, it had done so immediately after its creation? ipv6 will fly when it has wings that can carry the weight people will want to place on it. > People who have all the IPv4 address space they need won't > be doing much around the time we run out. But those who need an influx > of new address space to keep their business running (i.e., ISPs) and > those who want to start something new will have to do something > different than they've been doing so far. If that something is not > IPv6, that means the something won't be sustainable in the long run. The long run might be a long time off, and we need a plan for the short run. > > However, we just saw pretty pictures that indicate 83% of all ARIN > IPv4 address space is held by 1% of the ARIN members. Those few dozen > organizations use up millions of addresses each year. They pay less > than a cent per address per year for that now. For them, the prospect > of having to pay (say) $1/address the first year after the v4 > exhaustion will be an unattractive one, but then having to work harder > and pay more each year is what makes this completely unworkable. So > either they'll collapse their existing address space by putting more > users behind a single address, or they'll go to IPv6. Or they will do both. Which means they will be able to reuse 30-60% of ipv4 space they use currently. Nice room for network growth. Or they can sell it. New revenue stream. So long as somebody is willing to pay for the addresses they have decided they need, it is completely workable. > > > These are all things that can only be attributed to IPv6 AS IT IS > TODAY. And possibly things that can be attributed to ipv6 as it will be when ipv4 "runs out", so relying on everybody to mass-migrate over a few months or even a year or two is most likely out of tune with reality. > > They are not inherent properties of the protocol. At some > point, we'll need to jump over our own shadow and stop demanding that > IPv6 has the same usefulness as IPv4 from the very first day it's > adopted. (That is not to say that ARIN shouldn't fix its IPv6 path MTU > discovery and routing issues...) Its the people who we want to use it who demand it, not neccessarily the engineers who designed it. Thats actually the cause for its failure to be mass adopted as of yet. > > I've written enough on why trading address space is a bad idea, but I > also wrote a lot about why PI for IPv6 was a bad idea, and that went > through anyway. People who you want to use it want to use it that way. > So I'm not wasting my time trying to convince the > unconvincable. But to the would-be IPv4 traders: depending on how > exactly this happens, it can be merely a waste of time and money, or > it can blow up in our collective faces. Please make sure you get it > right. It will happen with or without the registries, so ignoring it or "outlawing" it are exactly the wrong courses of action. Doesnt mean the current attempt of not ignoring it is the correct one, but at least it is an attempt. From dlw+arin at tellme.com Wed Mar 5 12:12:11 2008 From: dlw+arin at tellme.com (David Williamson) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 09:12:11 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> On Tue, Mar 04, 2008 at 01:01:23PM -0800, David Conrad wrote: > Hi, > > On Mar 4, 2008, at 9:27 AM, Owen DeLong wrote: > > Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something > > > like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves > > have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. > > To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. > > Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant > as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their > requirements. > > With a transfer policy, ARIN _may_ retain some relevance as a source > of "title" information, but a lot depends on the restrictions ARIN > attempts to impose. Make the policy too restrictive, and people will > go elsewhere. > > In the end, with or without a transfer policy, you're still out of > "free" IPv4 addresses and businesses will do what they feel is > necessary to get around unenforceable bureaucratic rules. Let me clarify the context of the "set in stone" comment, since I was involved in that discussion. At IPv4 runout in the ARIN region, the world does not get set in stone, but ARIN's records become set in stone, since there is, at present, no way to transfer those records between parties. Since there will clearly be transfers, regardless of what ARIN policies exist, it would be very poor stewardship of the IPv4 space. Availability of new space, or the lack thereof, does not terminate ARIN's responsibility to this community, nor does it end the stewardship role. I entirely concur that businesses will do what they need to do. I think it is up to us to make it easy for businisses to do what they need to do, so that the Right Thing naturally occurs. More specifialy, I support this policy as written. I think there are some flaws in it, but those can be corrected as the actual implementation time approaches, and before demand gets very large. We need some sort of transfer policy that balances corporate needs with the tendency towards a speculative market. This might be a good start at that. -David From jcurran at istaff.org Wed Mar 5 12:27:45 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 12:27:45 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> Message-ID: At 8:46 PM +0000 3/4/08, wrote: > >So far, from the discussion that I have seen, it does not appear that >anyone seriously considered the possibility that the IP address >market proposals are getting rather close to the territory that the >SEC regulates. That's why I'm raising the issue here, in hopes that >some of the people on this list will discuss it with the BoT, >and with some sort of legal advisor who has expertise in the right >area of law. It could be the current counsel or some other lawyer. >That is up to the BoT. It has been raised as an issue and discussed. At first review by our counsel, there does not appear to be an issue here. The Board will ask for a more formal opinion of the legal ramifications (as we always do) if/when a recommendation for new policy comes before it. /John Chair, ARIN Board of Trustees From raul at lacnic.net Wed Mar 5 14:08:19 2008 From: raul at lacnic.net (Raul Echeberria) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 16:08:19 -0300 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> At 06:01 p.m. 04/03/2008, David Conrad wrote: >Hi, > >On Mar 4, 2008, at 9:27 AM, Owen DeLong wrote: > > Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something > > > like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves > > have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. > > >To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. > >Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant >as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their >requirements. Or they adopt IPv6. Which are the factors that will make take one decision or other is an interesting discussion. Ra?l >With a transfer policy, ARIN _may_ retain some relevance as a source >of "title" information, but a lot depends on the restrictions ARIN >attempts to impose. Make the policy too restrictive, and people will >go elsewhere. > >In the end, with or without a transfer policy, you're still out of >"free" IPv4 addresses and businesses will do what they feel is >necessary to get around unenforceable bureaucratic rules. > >Regards, >-drc > >_______________________________________________ >PPML >You are receiving this message because you are >subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy >Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help >Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > > >-- >No virus found in this incoming message. >Checked by AVG Free Edition. >Version: 7.5.516 / Virus Database: 269.21.4/1310 >- Release Date: 04/03/2008 08:35 a.m. From sleibrand at internap.com Wed Mar 5 13:12:48 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 10:12:48 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> Message-ID: <47CEE2A0.1080806@internap.com> Raul Echeberria wrote: >> Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant >> as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their >> requirements. > > Or they adopt IPv6. > Which are the factors that will make take one > decision or other is an interesting discussion. Don't forget that, until the entire rest of the world adopts IPv6, organizations doing so will still need IPv4 addresses/connectivity to run dual-stack or some sort of (yet to be standardized or commercialized) protocol translation. If nothing else, a legitimate market for IPv4 transfers will ensure that new entrants can get the IPv4 addresses they need to support whatever technology they choose to use to communicate with the rest of the IPv4 Internet. -Scott From drc at virtualized.org Wed Mar 5 13:34:17 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:34:17 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <6430B9BE-E8DA-4DDE-B5B2-5A6A45DB6CD7@muada.com> Message-ID: Iljitsch, On Mar 5, 2008, at 1:31 AM, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote: > Who the **** cares what happens when we're out of IPv4 space? You seem to answer your own question: > The part that I'm still waiting to see answered is how the rest of > the world gets access to the excess IPv4 legacy space that exists in > the ARIN region. A policy that only allows transfer of space between > entities in the ARIN region certainly won't fly with the likes of > the WTO. (I agree that the focus should be on moving to IPv6) Regards, -drc From drc at virtualized.org Wed Mar 5 13:59:52 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 10:59:52 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> Message-ID: Raul, On Mar 5, 2008, at 11:08 AM, Raul Echeberria wrote: >> > like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves >> > have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. >> To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. >> >> Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant >> as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their >> requirements. > > Or they adopt IPv6. Ah, if it were only that easy... :-) More seriously, as can be seen from some of the discussion here, it isn't clear to me that there is consensus within the RIR membership that this is the right way to go. It seems some feel IPv4+NAT(+NAT+NAT +...) is a reasonable model for the future of the Internet. In such a world, making the assumption that "the world becomes set in stone" after the last unallocated address is allocated just seems crazy to me. But perhaps I'm confused. > Which are the factors that will make take one decision or other is > an interesting discussion. Indeed. However past discussions appear to have established that "good stewardship" does not include taking _active_ steps in encouraging one technology or the other, so the role of the RIRs is quite limited... Regards, -drc From JBallerini at copsmonitoring.com Wed Mar 5 14:21:39 2008 From: JBallerini at copsmonitoring.com (John Ballerini) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 14:21:39 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> Message-ID: <47CEAC70.EF1A.0093.0@copsmonitoring.com> Hi...anyone out here know the ATT AS? Thanks, John From kkargel at polartel.com Wed Mar 5 14:48:02 2008 From: kkargel at polartel.com (Kevin Kargel) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 13:48:02 -0600 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CEAC70.EF1A.0093.0@copsmonitoring.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org><7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> <47CEAC70.EF1A.0093.0@copsmonitoring.com> Message-ID: <70DE64CEFD6E9A4EB7FAF3A0631410660104F41F@mail> Which one? They have many.. You can go to ARIN and look it up.. > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of John Ballerini > Sent: Wednesday, March 05, 2008 1:22 PM > To: Raul Echeberria; David Conrad > Cc: Public Policy Mailing List > Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF > > Hi...anyone out here know the ATT AS? Thanks, John > > > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From BillD at cait.wustl.edu Wed Mar 5 14:54:28 2008 From: BillD at cait.wustl.edu (Bill Darte) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 13:54:28 -0600 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CEE2A0.1080806@internap.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org><7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> <47CEE2A0.1080806@internap.com> Message-ID: > > Raul Echeberria wrote: > >> Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes > irrelevant > >> as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to > meet their > >> requirements. > > > > Or they adopt IPv6. > > Which are the factors that will make take one decision or > other is an > > interesting discussion. > > > Don't forget that, until the entire rest of the world adopts > IPv6, organizations doing so will still need IPv4 > addresses/connectivity to run dual-stack or some sort of (yet > to be standardized or > commercialized) protocol translation. If nothing else, a > legitimate market for IPv4 transfers will ensure that new > entrants can get the IPv4 addresses they need to support > whatever technology they choose to use to communicate with > the rest of the IPv4 Internet. > > -Scott Well, we'd like to think that such market would 'ensure' that they would get the addresses they 'need'. I'd say that this may be probable, but uncertain.... bd From michael.dillon at bt.com Wed Mar 5 14:57:07 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 19:57:07 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> Message-ID: > At IPv4 runout in the ARIN region, the world does not get set > in stone, but ARIN's records become set in stone, since there > is, at present, no way to transfer those records between > parties. Give your head a shake... At present there are two mechanisms that are regularly used to transfer ARIN records between two parties. The most common one is acquisition, where one company buys all or part of another company. The second mechanism, is where a company returns unneeded IP addresses to ARIN, who then pass them on to someone who needs them. This last mechanism is not broken and can be expected to be used more frequently as IPv6 deployment picks up steam. Before that point in time, I can't see why any organization would want to sell address blocks to someone else, and after that point in time I can't see why anyone would want to buy address blocks. How are you gonna have a market when you start with zero supply and then suddenly shift to zero demand when the supply begins to appear. Futures contracts? If so then you are smack dab in SEC regulatory territory. > More specifialy, I support this policy as written. I think > there are some flaws in it, but those can be corrected as the > actual implementation time approaches, and before demand gets > very large. We need some sort of transfer policy that > balances corporate needs with the tendency towards a > speculative market. No, we don't need a transfer policy. We need to make it clear that IPv4 addresses have no value except when used in the network, and that as the global free pool nears exhaustion, so does the supply of unused IPv4 adddresses. When we run out of free addresses for ARIN to allocate, then nobody else will have any addresses to spare. Unless, of course, some of the AC members or BoT members have legacy allocations that they don't actually need. Given that this transfer policy only benefits the legacy holders whose allocations are not technically justified, I think that it is time for ARIN AC members and ARIN BoT members to come clean, and individually, one by one, issue public statements as to whether or not they hold legacy allocations, either directly or indirectly through corporate ownerships. Also, whether or not their employer holds such legacy blocks, directly or indirectly. --Michael Dillon From michael.dillon at bt.com Wed Mar 5 14:59:42 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 19:59:42 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CEAC70.EF1A.0093.0@copsmonitoring.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org><7.0.1.0.1.20080305153724.03a022a0@lacnic.net> <47CEAC70.EF1A.0093.0@copsmonitoring.com> Message-ID: > Hi...anyone out here know the ATT AS? Thanks, John Yes, ARIN does. Both of them. You can too if you use the tools provided. --Michael Dillon P.S. Give a man a fish... From sleibrand at internap.com Wed Mar 5 15:12:13 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 12:12:13 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> Message-ID: <47CEFE9D.5020307@internap.com> michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: > This last mechanism is not broken and can be expected to be used > more frequently as IPv6 deployment picks up steam. Before that > point in time, I can't see why any organization would want to > sell address blocks to someone else, and after that point in time > I can't see why anyone would want to buy address blocks. There's this concept called an incentive, and in our capitalist economy one of the most common and effective incentives is a monetary one. If an organization can get paid to renumber out of some of their address space and transfer it, that is a good incentive to do so. > How are you gonna have a market when you start with zero supply > and then suddenly shift to zero demand when the supply begins to > appear. Again, there's an economic concept of a supply curve and a demand curve that pertain here. Right now, supply is zero because the price is zero. As price start to rise, supply will increase and demand will decrease, it's just a question of how much, and at what price they'll reach equilibrium. > Futures contracts? If so then you are smack dab in SEC > regulatory territory. I don't see how futures contracts would be useful in this kind of market. >> More specifialy, I support this policy as written. I think >> there are some flaws in it, but those can be corrected as the >> actual implementation time approaches, and before demand gets >> very large. We need some sort of transfer policy that >> balances corporate needs with the tendency towards a >> speculative market. > > No, we don't need a transfer policy. We need to make it clear that > IPv4 addresses have no value except when used in the network, and > that as the global free pool nears exhaustion, so does the supply > of unused IPv4 adddresses. When we run out of free addresses for > ARIN to allocate, then nobody else will have any addresses to > spare. Yes, free (as in $$) addresses will run out. But I can assure you that if they can make a profit doing so, many businesses will find that they can do without some of their IPv4 addresses, perhaps as part of a transition to IPv6, and/or by using NAT for remaining IPv4 connectivity. Therefore, addresses can remain available: they just won't be free. > Unless, of course, some of the AC members or BoT members have legacy > allocations that they don't actually need. Given that this transfer > policy only benefits the legacy holders whose allocations are > not technically justified, I think that it is time for ARIN AC > members and ARIN BoT members to come clean, and individually, one > by one, issue public statements as to whether or not they hold legacy > allocations, either directly or indirectly through corporate ownerships. > Also, whether or not their employer holds such legacy blocks, directly > or indirectly. I don't believe that any of the advocates of this proposal are doing so out of any interest in selling off their own IPv4 address holdings. I personally do not hold any IP addresses. My employer is an LIR, holds a number of non-legacy allocations from ARIN, and continues to receive additional allocations to support continued growth. If I have any personal interest in an IPv4 transfer market, it is in ensuring that companies with continued need for IPv4 addresses will be able to continue obtaining them after free pool exhaustion. I believe that this is a shared interest of most of ARIN's membership and the wider community. -Scott From drc at virtualized.org Wed Mar 5 15:42:57 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 12:42:57 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> Message-ID: <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> Michael, On Mar 5, 2008, at 11:57 AM, wrote: > How are you gonna have a market when you start with zero supply > and then suddenly shift to zero demand when the supply begins to > appear. It doesn't appear you've been paying attention. The discussions about "transfers" are between folks who have IPv4 addresses and don't need them (the "supply") and those who need them but can't get them because the IPv4 free pool has been emptied (the "demand"). In the ideal world, if you had IPv4 addresses and didn't need them, you'd return them to the RIR. Alternatively, you could just turn on IPv6 and be done with it. However, we don't live in the ideal world last I checked. The folks who have IPv4 addresses but don't need them currently have no incentive to do anything with those addresses. If "transfers" were liberalized, these folks could have an incentive (e.g., cash, services, cattle, whatever) to transfer those addresses to those folks who continue to need IPv4 addresses. If the incentive is high enough, folks who have addresses but are using them inefficiently could see it in their best interests to increase utilization efficiency and offer the recovered address space to those who need it. On the other side, if the cost gets too high to continue obtaining IPv4 addresses, it may be easier to justify the costs of migrating to IPv6. Currently, there are "transfer" policy proposals in 3 RIRs. They range from the APNIC proposal which I would characterize as imposing minimal constraint/regulation to the ARIN proposal which I would say has maximal constraint/regulation. From my personal perspective, I would imagine the APNIC model could result in attempts by some folk to "corner the market" while the ARIN model (in particular, the restriction against subdividing) could result in the creation of more liberal alternative registries, further eroding the role ARIN plays in its role within the addressing community. Much of the discussion to date has been the equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. IPv4 is sinking. Fast. You can create a fractal maze in front of people trying to get to lifeboats (the ARIN model) or you can facilitate a stampede (the APNIC model). If the goal is to get folks to use IPv6, the APNIC model has certain advantages. If the goal is to encourage the creation of alternative registries, the ARIN model has certain advantages. However, it should be noted that in either case, the core aspect of the end result is the same: people are going to be fighting for seats on lifeboats and the ship will be on the bottom of the ocean. Regards, -drc From drc at virtualized.org Wed Mar 5 15:46:19 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 12:46:19 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> Message-ID: <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> Scott, On Mar 4, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > There is no law preventing them from utilizing addresses uniquely > registered to another party, but there is pretty strong policy in > place > that will prevent them from being able to announce a route covering > those addresses into the DFZ. Like the strong policy that prevented Pakistan Telecom from announcing Youtube's /24. There are conventions and practices that most ISPs abide by most of the time, all essentially outside the realm of ARIN policies. > But the problem > we're trying to solve with transfer policy is different: providing for > the continued availability of unique global IPv4 addresses after free > pool exhaustion. This isn't quite accurate (at least from the empirical evidence). What you appear to be attempting to do is to maintain the policy status quo in the face of a different source of supply of addresses. It isn't clear to me that this is actually all that desirable, particularly since the main beneficiaries of the current policy (the large ISPs) aren't actually going to be helped that much -- their consumption rate is too high. Regards, -drc From sleibrand at internap.com Wed Mar 5 15:54:35 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 12:54:35 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> David Conrad wrote: > Scott, > > On Mar 4, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Scott Leibrand wrote: >> There is no law preventing them from utilizing addresses uniquely >> registered to another party, but there is pretty strong policy in place >> that will prevent them from being able to announce a route covering >> those addresses into the DFZ. > > Like the strong policy that prevented Pakistan Telecom from announcing > Youtube's /24. Or at least, the policies that prevented them from continuing to do so... But I take your point. >> But the problem >> we're trying to solve with transfer policy is different: providing for >> the continued availability of unique global IPv4 addresses after free >> pool exhaustion. > > This isn't quite accurate (at least from the empirical evidence). What > you appear to be attempting to do is to maintain the policy status quo > in the face of a different source of supply of addresses. I don't know if I'd call it empirical evidence, but I think your perception is also a fairly accurate one. > It isn't clear to me that this is actually all that desirable, > particularly since the main beneficiaries of the current policy (the > large ISPs) aren't actually going to be helped that much -- their > consumption rate is too high. Do you have any suggestions for how we can improve the policy proposal to eliminate unnecessary restrictions while avoiding the negative impacts likely from a completely unrestricted transfer policy? Thanks, Scott From drc at virtualized.org Wed Mar 5 18:02:20 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 15:02:20 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> Message-ID: Scott, On Mar 5, 2008, at 12:54 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > Do you have any suggestions for how we can improve the policy > proposal to eliminate unnecessary restrictions while avoiding the > negative impacts likely from a completely unrestricted transfer > policy? What are 'negative impacts'? I have a couple more fundamental questions: a) What is the overarching goal the transfer policy is trying to achieve? b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable time/ resources) to enforce that policy? The answers to these questions would shape my answer. A couple of observations: - the 6 month restriction could force folks to go outside the policy in desperation (e.g., the amount of address space available via transfers is likely to be hard to predict. You could be in a situation where at one point in time, the only option is a small block even though you know it won't last 6 months. What option do you have?) - restrictions on sub-division beyond what is imposed within the routing system are unlikely to be effective Regards, -drc From sleibrand at internap.com Wed Mar 5 18:29:23 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 15:29:23 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> Message-ID: <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> David Conrad wrote: > Scott, > > On Mar 5, 2008, at 12:54 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: >> Do you have any suggestions for how we can improve the policy proposal >> to eliminate unnecessary restrictions while avoiding the negative >> impacts likely from a completely unrestricted transfer policy? > > What are 'negative impacts'? I think you outlined a few of them earlier today, but they would include the results of a number of different types of speculation (unnecessary volatile prices, scarcity, etc.), hoarding of addresses for various reasons (speculation, attempts to starve out competitors, etc.), and unnecessary deaggregation. > I have a couple more fundamental questions: > > a) What is the overarching goal the transfer policy is trying to achieve? If there were just one goal, this would be easy. We're trying to ensure the continued availability of IP resources after IPv4 free pool exhaustion, minimizing disruption, minimizing unnecessary deaggregation, preserving some level of fairness, etc... > b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable > time/resources) to enforce that policy? The main tool is that, as the recognized authority in registration of IPv4 addresses in North America, recognition as valid of any transfers by ARIN has considerable value to both transferors and transferees. > The answers to these questions would shape my answer. > > A couple of observations: > > - the 6 month restriction could force folks to go outside the policy in > desperation (e.g., the amount of address space available via transfers > is likely to be hard to predict. You could be in a situation where at > one point in time, the only option is a small block even though you know > it won't last 6 months. What option do you have?) You could get PA space from your ISP or another LIR. The intent of a the transfer policy is that it would ensure the availability of blocks of all sizes legitimately demanded by transferees. Therefore, if we do it right, there should always be an appropriately sized block available at some price. > - restrictions on sub-division beyond what is imposed within the routing > system are unlikely to be effective It is not our intention to prevent advertisements of deaggregates within the routing system, as people do today down to /24, regardless of the size of their allocation/assignment. Rather, we hope to prevent the transfer of large numbers of small blocks when a larger one would do, as we don't want networks to be cobbling together their IP space from multiple sources and then being forced to announce extra routes for all the different blocks. FYI, we'll be posting version 1.1 of this policy shortly, which IMO includes some improvements on this front. -Scott From jcurran at istaff.org Wed Mar 5 19:02:30 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 19:02:30 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> Message-ID: At 7:57 PM +0000 3/5/08, wrote: > >Unless, of course, some of the AC members or BoT members have legacy >allocations that they don't actually need. Given that this transfer >policy only benefits the legacy holders whose allocations are >not technically justified, I think that it is time for ARIN AC >members and ARIN BoT members to come clean, and individually, one >by one, issue public statements as to whether or not they hold legacy >allocations, either directly or indirectly through corporate ownerships. >Also, whether or not their employer holds such legacy blocks, directly >or indirectly. Michael - Board members complete such statements (which are reviewed with the rest of the Board). This information is used to avoid Conflict of Interest situations, so that Board members recuse themselves at appropriate times (e.g. this has happened recently with respect to Legacy RSA discussions). Public disclosure of this information for Board or AC members has not been required in the past, but could be made a requirement if desired by the community. This would be a very good item to discuss at the upcoming Denver public meeting, as it would be a material change in expectations for those running for the AC or Board. /John P.S. I am not a holder of any legacy address space, either directly or indirectly. I don't believe that my employer (ServerVault) is a holder of any legacy assignments either (and I am precluded from SV's interactions with ARIN due to my position as Chair). From randy at psg.com Wed Mar 5 20:57:35 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2008 17:57:35 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> Message-ID: <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> > a) What is the overarching goal the transfer policy is trying to > achieve? dunno. but, imiho, what it should be is a few things o allow newcomers into the game, albeit probably at a higher cost than the early entrants o flush out underutilized space o see that space migrates to what is termed 'best use' > b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable time/ > resources) to enforce that policy? what is needed? in talking to economics and market folk these last days, i got no clear indication of "must haves." i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would have a signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some fashion. randy From bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com Wed Mar 5 23:28:53 2008 From: bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com (bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 04:28:53 +0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> Message-ID: <20080306042853.GA26365@vacation.karoshi.com.> >On Wed, Mar 05, 2008 at 03:29:23PM -0800, Scott Leibrand wrote: > > David Conrad wrote: > > Scott, > > > > I have a couple more fundamental questions: > > > > a) What is the overarching goal the transfer policy is trying to achieve? > > If there were just one goal, this would be easy. We're trying to ensure > the continued availability of IP resources after IPv4 free pool > exhaustion, minimizing disruption, minimizing unnecessary deaggregation, > preserving some level of fairness, etc... Scott: er... thats a list of goals :) how about... "maintaining the stewardship role for IP space". > > b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable > > time/resources) to enforce that policy? David: are you refering to the proposed policy in the ARIN region on transfers? if so, whats wrong with the existing tools? > > A couple of observations: > > > FYI, we'll be posting version 1.1 of this policy shortly, which IMO > includes some improvements on this front. this is useful and productive dialog, helping to refine the proposal. thanks. --bill From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 6 01:43:58 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 17:43:58 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> > Currently, there are "transfer" policy proposals in 3 RIRs. They > range from the APNIC proposal which I would characterize as imposing > minimal constraint/regulation to the ARIN proposal which I would say > has maximal constraint/regulation. The RIPE policy proposal is very similar to APNIC in terms of the constraints applied to the parties of a transfer. > From my personal perspective, I > would imagine the APNIC model could result in attempts by some folk to > "corner the market" while the ARIN model (in particular, the > restriction against subdividing) could result in the creation of more > liberal alternative registries, further eroding the role ARIN plays in > its role within the addressing community. I have wondered about "cornering the market", and I suspect that there are a number of views of the future that may incent certain behaviours. Some folk may be of the view that IPv4 + NATs is a long term viable proposition, and may believe that in such a long term scenario the value of IPv4 addresses may rise steadily over time. Others may be of the view that one of the major elements in an IPv6 transition is the incentive to stop deploying IPv4 and that may well be based in an escalating value of IPv4 addresses, which would increasingly provide economic incentives for entities to deploy IPv6 as their mainstream technology base with minimal IPv4 translation services. The diversity of views abot scenarios and timings will drive different behaviours - some entities may act on the view that once the shock of exhaustion wears off and the related market price has factored in scarcity premiums as well as the initial shock, the drive to IPv6 will assume a new level of momentum, and the IPv4 demand will drop, and with declining demand so will market prices - i.e. some folk would see no value in hoarding and believe that maximal value will be seen in the initial operation of short term market that will be overtaken by IPv6 relatively quickly. Other entities may be of the view that the inertia of this industry is sufficiently large, and the capability of dense NAT deployments sufficiently tenable that an IPv4 market may be used for a long period. If this is accompanied by a view that demand will continue to outpace supply then an escalating price is an obvious outcome. Personally, I would tend to the first view - that escalating price in an Ipv4 address market would rapidly drive the industry into IPv6. This tends to gather its own momentum given the observation that while initial Ipv6 deployments have the added cost imposition of also having to provide mechanisms to access IPv4 networks, as the mass of the Ipv6 deployment increases there is a natural cost transfer and it would be likely that we see a tipping point whereby Ipv6 deployments could be undertaken with no legacy access provisions, thereby effectively transferring the burden of translation to the legacy IPv4 network. In either case the major benefit of this approach of leaving this to the actions of the market itself is that it does not require oracle-like behavior of regulators or even industry players - rather than attempting to drive the industry to certain outcomes, with an historical success rate that one could only describe as stunningly poor (remember GOSIP, remember X.25, remember even QoS...) such an approach of exposing potential suppliers and recipients to each other in the context of an open competitive market place essentially allows each actor to make their own decisions as to technology choices based on their own guesses about the future. > Much of the discussion to date has been the equivalent of rearranging > deck chairs on the Titanic. IPv4 is sinking. Fast. You can create a > fractal maze in front of people trying to get to lifeboats (the ARIN > model) or you can facilitate a stampede (the APNIC model). Firstly I have to say that the combination of references to fractal mazes, lifeboats and stampedes all crammed into one sentence is an achievement all of its own. Well done! :-) I'd hardly characterize the APNIC policy proposal in such dramatic terms. The APNIC model as it stands leaves the operation of any associated market to the industry players themselves. If such a market forces prices up to astronomical heights then the incentive to head immediately to IPv6 becomes all the greater, and the prospects of any Ipv4 address market quickly losing relevance also becomes greater, simply because the industry has been forced to undertake a transition that it has been deferring previously. For many such a long anticipated outcome of actual transition rather than oblique lip service to a token IPv6 effort is not exactly a disaster. Some would say its a fine outcome as long as you're not part of any collateral damage in the associated blame game in the aftermath. So its not as if there is absolutely no alternative here. And its not as if such forms of market outcomes spell doom and disaster of an out of control stampede. This is not quite the wild days of 2000 and the GSM auction debacle appears to have hosed down some of the more insane players in this industry. This is a relatively low margin commodity business down at the plumbing side and it may well be that market pricing may well be influenced by the limited amounts of capital that are within the industry these days. One could say that the ARIN model attempts to constrain demand, and in so doing one possible interpretation is that such a degree of externally imposed constraint effectively lengthens the pain of attempting to stretch IPv4 well beyond its originally assumed deployment scope. This may not be the wisest course of action if you want to provide some form of natural incentives to get over this somewhat strange and distorted scenario of IPv4 address exhaustion tht we are facing. > If the > goal is to get folks to use IPv6, the APNIC model has certain > advantages. If the goal is to encourage the creation of alternative > registries, the ARIN model has certain advantages. > > However, it should be noted that in either case, the core aspect of > the end result is the same: people are going to be fighting for seats > on lifeboats and the ship will be on the bottom of the ocean. Hmm - lets see, on this topic we've now gone through airplane crashes, steam train wrecks, stampedes and now sinking ships. What next? Meteor strike? :-) Geoff From tony.li at tony.li Thu Mar 6 03:47:58 2008 From: tony.li at tony.li (Tony Li) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 00:47:58 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> Message-ID: <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would have a |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some |fashion. If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), speculative trading is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a buffer for supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really detect and avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be bad. Tony From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 09:21:42 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 06:21:42 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: <50D4EA12-F786-49CD-A4BC-6F8D65F22851@pch.net> On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: > |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would > have a > |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some > |fashion. > > If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), speculative > trading > is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a > buffer for > supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really > detect and > avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be bad. > > Tony Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true unless/ until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for both existing and aspiring number resources users. Until then any "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to sell the same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price tomorrow, and also that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need the IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might contribute to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of truly idled address space) are going to network operators that know they'll never need more IPv4 ever again. For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing competitors by making essential inputs available is going to provide an additional gating factor influencing number and length of prefixes offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the market for dark fiber). Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be seeing this for the second time. TV Begin forwarded message: > From: Tom Vest > Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST > To: nanog at merit.edu > Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch van Beijnum > , David Conrad , Brandon > Galbraith > Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit > > It's good that this discussion is happening now. > To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's probably a > good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. > We all know what "market" means -- but in all likelihood many of > the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably > mutually contradictory. > > If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any validity, > it comes from the assumption that making them subject to "market > pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current surplus > holders to make that surplus available to would-be buyers. > > In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market pricing > and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the revealed > price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of making it > are motivated to make more, or to jump into the market for the > first time. In other commodity markets, that motivation is bounded > by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the impracticality of > hoarding, and by the inability of the potential seller to use more > of the commodity directly. In other words, the existence or > potential emergence of alternative producers/suppliers tends to > discourage hoarding to maximize prices (because there's no > guarantee that prices will stay high, much less go even higher), > and the lack of direct "use value" reduces any countervailing > incentive that the prospective seller to just hold the assets in > perpetuity, until they can be used in-house. > > In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding conditions > apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and they're almost > certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use value, at least > for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least a decade or > more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is > shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be > higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day before the > last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means hoarding is going > to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus > holders -- even those that no longer have any Internet-related ops > or business interests. > > This countervailing incentive is much stronger for surplus holders > that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 addresses > that they might need in the future will certainly cost more (maybe > lots more) than whatever price they could command for surplus IPv4 > today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the > salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 > continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input for certain > kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of > competition from existing or hypothetical future competitors will > be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. > For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to competitors is a > perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. > > An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any meaning > of that term. Get over it. From info at arin.net Thu Mar 6 09:27:15 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 09:27:15 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Lame Delegations Message-ID: <47CFFF43.5080608@arin.net> ARIN has elected to remove the Lame Delegation identification and notification software from production. Following several months of periodic issues, ARIN determined it is best to take the software offline, review, and retest several components. One recent problem resulted in blank e-mail messages being sent to approximately one hundred organizations. We apologize for this inconvenience. The software is expected to be back online in early April 2008. If you have any further questions or comments, please contact info at arin.net. Regards, Mark Kosters Chief Technology Officer From jweyand at computerdata.com Thu Mar 6 10:54:37 2008 From: jweyand at computerdata.com (Jim Weyand) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 10:54:37 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF Message-ID: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> Tom- This is an interesting example, but instead of using a market of a produced commodity like grain or steel do the same thought experiment with a market for something fixed like farmland in Iowa. It isn't a perfect analogy but it eliminates the producer incentive. Tony- I agree 100%, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, we need speculators in this market. Hopefully we can attract a reasonable number of speculators that will compete with one another and actually deliver lower prices. In an active, vibrant market the price for a block of addresses will be quickly and fairly determined. It is my belief that open market with minimal constraints will result in the best balance and fairness between sellers and buyers of address space. That said I continue to support Scott's proposal, Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal with its constraints and the resulting additional costs because that may prove to be more politically acceptable. Even a constrained market is far better than no market at all. -Jim Weyand > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of > Tom Vest > Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 9:22 AM > To: tony.li at tony.li > Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' > Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF > > > On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: > > > |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would > > have a > > |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some > > |fashion. > > > > If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), speculative > > trading > > is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a > > buffer for > > supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really > > detect and > > avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be bad. > > > > Tony > > Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true unless/ > until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for both > existing and aspiring number resources users. Until then any > "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to sell the > same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price tomorrow, and also > that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need the > IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might contribute > to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of truly idled > address space) are going to network operators that know they'll never > need more IPv4 ever again. > > For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing competitors > by making essential inputs available is going to provide an > additional gating factor influencing number and length of prefixes > offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the market for dark fiber). > > Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be > seeing this for the second time. > > TV > > Begin forwarded message: > > From: Tom Vest > > Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST > > To: nanog at merit.edu > > Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch van Beijnum > > , David Conrad , Brandon > > Galbraith > > Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit > > > > It's good that this discussion is happening now. > > To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's probably a > > good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. > > We all know what "market" means -- but in all likelihood many of > > the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably > > mutually contradictory. > > > > If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any validity, > > it comes from the assumption that making them subject to "market > > pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current surplus > > holders to make that surplus available to would-be buyers. > > > > In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market pricing > > and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the revealed > > price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of making it > > are motivated to make more, or to jump into the market for the > > first time. In other commodity markets, that motivation is bounded > > by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the impracticality of > > hoarding, and by the inability of the potential seller to use more > > of the commodity directly. In other words, the existence or > > potential emergence of alternative producers/suppliers tends to > > discourage hoarding to maximize prices (because there's no > > guarantee that prices will stay high, much less go even higher), > > and the lack of direct "use value" reduces any countervailing > > incentive that the prospective seller to just hold the assets in > > perpetuity, until they can be used in-house. > > > > In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding conditions > > apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and they're almost > > certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use value, at least > > for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least a decade or > > more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is > > shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be > > higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day before the > > last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means hoarding is going > > to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus > > holders -- even those that no longer have any Internet-related ops > > or business interests. > > > > This countervailing incentive is much stronger for surplus holders > > that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 addresses > > that they might need in the future will certainly cost more (maybe > > lots more) than whatever price they could command for surplus IPv4 > > today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the > > salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 > > continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input for certain > > kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of > > competition from existing or hypothetical future competitors will > > be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. > > For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to competitors is a > > perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. > > > > An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any meaning > > of that term. Get over it. > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN > Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you > experience any issues. From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 12:07:25 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:07:25 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> Message-ID: On Mar 6, 2008, at 7:54 AM, Jim Weyand wrote: > Tom- > > This is an interesting example, but instead of using a market of a > produced commodity like grain or steel do the same thought experiment > with a market for something fixed like farmland in Iowa. It isn't a > perfect analogy but it eliminates the producer incentive. > > Tony- Hi Jim, Thanks for the response. Neither Iowa farmland, nor farmland nor land more generally are good analogies, at least not in the present age. Unless you postulate a situation in which potential buyers and sellers are (almost) completely immobile -- e.g., in the pre-modern era -- all of the above are "substitutable" -- i.e., you can still be an agro producer without it, you can still be an agro consumer without it. And unless you postulate a time in which land had some unique, extra-economic significance -- e.g., in the pre-modern era -- then possession of it doesn't confer any special significance that is not substitutable with some other economic asset/activity. In the end, if landowners in Iowa have to compete for investment dollars with landholders (and other asset owners) elsewhere, then that puts an upper bound on the demand, and hence the price, and hence the appeal of hoarding rather than immediately selling, for Iowa land. On the other hand, if Iowa land was the last land on Earth, and not completely substitutable for any aspiring agro producer or consumer on Earth, then you'd probably rarely see it on the market, and never see it at all at a price or in tracts big enough to permit new farmers to enter the market. Making this even worse, if you happened to know that agro production would be getting much more efficient in the near future, so that smaller and smaller parcels might be economically viable (and hence marketable), you'd be even less likely to sell at any price now. (we actually covered this in the course of the NANOG thread -- apologies again for duplication) TV > I agree 100%, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, we need > speculators in > this market. Hopefully we can attract a reasonable number of > speculators that will compete with one another and actually deliver > lower prices. In an active, vibrant market the price for a block of > addresses will be quickly and fairly determined. > > It is my belief that open market with minimal constraints will > result in > the best balance and fairness between sellers and buyers of address > space. > > That said I continue to support Scott's proposal, Policy Proposal > 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal with its constraints and the > resulting additional costs because that may prove to be more > politically > acceptable. Even a constrained market is far better than no market at > all. > > -Jim Weyand > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf > Of >> Tom Vest >> Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 9:22 AM >> To: tony.li at tony.li >> Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' >> Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF >> >> >> On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: >> >>> |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would >>> have a >>> |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some >>> |fashion. >>> >>> If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), speculative >>> trading >>> is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a >>> buffer for >>> supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really >>> detect and >>> avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be > bad. >>> >>> Tony >> >> Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true unless/ >> until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for both >> existing and aspiring number resources users. Until then any >> "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to sell the >> same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price tomorrow, and also >> that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need the >> IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might contribute >> to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of truly idled >> address space) are going to network operators that know they'll never >> need more IPv4 ever again. >> >> For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing competitors >> by making essential inputs available is going to provide an >> additional gating factor influencing number and length of prefixes >> offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the market for dark fiber). >> >> Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be >> seeing this for the second time. >> >> TV >> >> Begin forwarded message: >>> From: Tom Vest >>> Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST >>> To: nanog at merit.edu >>> Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch van Beijnum >>> , David Conrad , Brandon >>> Galbraith >>> Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit >>> >>> It's good that this discussion is happening now. >>> To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's probably a >>> good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. >>> We all know what "market" means -- but in all likelihood many of >>> the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably >>> mutually contradictory. >>> >>> If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any validity, >>> it comes from the assumption that making them subject to "market >>> pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current surplus >>> holders to make that surplus available to would-be buyers. >>> >>> In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market pricing >>> and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the revealed >>> price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of making it >>> are motivated to make more, or to jump into the market for the >>> first time. In other commodity markets, that motivation is bounded >>> by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the impracticality of >>> hoarding, and by the inability of the potential seller to use more >>> of the commodity directly. In other words, the existence or >>> potential emergence of alternative producers/suppliers tends to >>> discourage hoarding to maximize prices (because there's no >>> guarantee that prices will stay high, much less go even higher), >>> and the lack of direct "use value" reduces any countervailing >>> incentive that the prospective seller to just hold the assets in >>> perpetuity, until they can be used in-house. >>> >>> In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding conditions >>> apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and they're almost >>> certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use value, at least >>> for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least a decade or >>> more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is >>> shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be >>> higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day before the >>> last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means hoarding is going >>> to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus >>> holders -- even those that no longer have any Internet-related ops >>> or business interests. >>> >>> This countervailing incentive is much stronger for surplus holders >>> that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 addresses >>> that they might need in the future will certainly cost more (maybe >>> lots more) than whatever price they could command for surplus IPv4 >>> today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the >>> salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 >>> continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input for certain >>> kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of >>> competition from existing or hypothetical future competitors will >>> be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. >>> For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to competitors is a >>> perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. >>> >>> An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any meaning >>> of that term. Get over it. >> _______________________________________________ >> PPML >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN >> Public Policy >> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if > you >> experience any issues. From sleibrand at internap.com Thu Mar 6 12:11:08 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 09:11:08 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> Message-ID: <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> In the past I've used the analogy of Manhattan real estate: it's definitely unique, and has only imperfect substitutes elsewhere, as IPv4 is unique, with its own unique demand, and IPv6 is an imperfect substitute. -Scott Tom Vest wrote: > On Mar 6, 2008, at 7:54 AM, Jim Weyand wrote: > >> Tom- >> >> This is an interesting example, but instead of using a market of a >> produced commodity like grain or steel do the same thought experiment >> with a market for something fixed like farmland in Iowa. It isn't a >> perfect analogy but it eliminates the producer incentive. >> >> Tony- > > Hi Jim, > > Thanks for the response. > Neither Iowa farmland, nor farmland nor land more generally are good > analogies, at least not in the present age. > Unless you postulate a situation in which potential buyers and > sellers are (almost) completely immobile -- e.g., in the pre-modern > era -- all of the above are "substitutable" -- i.e., you can still be > an agro producer without it, you can still be an agro consumer > without it. And unless you postulate a time in which land had some > unique, extra-economic significance -- e.g., in the pre-modern era > -- then possession of it doesn't confer any special significance that > is not substitutable with some other economic asset/activity. > > In the end, if landowners in Iowa have to compete for investment > dollars with landholders (and other asset owners) elsewhere, then > that puts an upper bound on the demand, and hence the price, and > hence the appeal of hoarding rather than immediately selling, for > Iowa land. On the other hand, if Iowa land was the last land on > Earth, and not completely substitutable for any aspiring agro > producer or consumer on Earth, then you'd probably rarely see it on > the market, and never see it at all at a price or in tracts big > enough to permit new farmers to enter the market. Making this even > worse, if you happened to know that agro production would be getting > much more efficient in the near future, so that smaller and smaller > parcels might be economically viable (and hence marketable), you'd be > even less likely to sell at any price now. > > (we actually covered this in the course of the NANOG thread -- > apologies again for duplication) > > TV > >> I agree 100%, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, we need >> speculators in >> this market. Hopefully we can attract a reasonable number of >> speculators that will compete with one another and actually deliver >> lower prices. In an active, vibrant market the price for a block of >> addresses will be quickly and fairly determined. >> >> It is my belief that open market with minimal constraints will >> result in >> the best balance and fairness between sellers and buyers of address >> space. >> >> That said I continue to support Scott's proposal, Policy Proposal >> 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal with its constraints and the >> resulting additional costs because that may prove to be more >> politically >> acceptable. Even a constrained market is far better than no market at >> all. >> >> -Jim Weyand >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf >> Of >>> Tom Vest >>> Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 9:22 AM >>> To: tony.li at tony.li >>> Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' >>> Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF >>> >>> >>> On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: >>> >>>> |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would >>>> have a >>>> |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in some >>>> |fashion. >>>> >>>> If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), speculative >>>> trading >>>> is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a >>>> buffer for >>>> supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really >>>> detect and >>>> avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be >> bad. >>>> Tony >>> Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true unless/ >>> until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for both >>> existing and aspiring number resources users. Until then any >>> "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to sell the >>> same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price tomorrow, and also >>> that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need the >>> IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might contribute >>> to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of truly idled >>> address space) are going to network operators that know they'll never >>> need more IPv4 ever again. >>> >>> For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing competitors >>> by making essential inputs available is going to provide an >>> additional gating factor influencing number and length of prefixes >>> offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the market for dark fiber). >>> >>> Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be >>> seeing this for the second time. >>> >>> TV >>> >>> Begin forwarded message: >>>> From: Tom Vest >>>> Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST >>>> To: nanog at merit.edu >>>> Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch van Beijnum >>>> , David Conrad , Brandon >>>> Galbraith >>>> Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit >>>> >>>> It's good that this discussion is happening now. >>>> To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's probably a >>>> good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. >>>> We all know what "market" means -- but in all likelihood many of >>>> the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably >>>> mutually contradictory. >>>> >>>> If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any validity, >>>> it comes from the assumption that making them subject to "market >>>> pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current surplus >>>> holders to make that surplus available to would-be buyers. >>>> >>>> In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market pricing >>>> and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the revealed >>>> price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of making it >>>> are motivated to make more, or to jump into the market for the >>>> first time. In other commodity markets, that motivation is bounded >>>> by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the impracticality of >>>> hoarding, and by the inability of the potential seller to use more >>>> of the commodity directly. In other words, the existence or >>>> potential emergence of alternative producers/suppliers tends to >>>> discourage hoarding to maximize prices (because there's no >>>> guarantee that prices will stay high, much less go even higher), >>>> and the lack of direct "use value" reduces any countervailing >>>> incentive that the prospective seller to just hold the assets in >>>> perpetuity, until they can be used in-house. >>>> >>>> In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding conditions >>>> apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and they're almost >>>> certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use value, at least >>>> for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least a decade or >>>> more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is >>>> shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be >>>> higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day before the >>>> last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means hoarding is going >>>> to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus >>>> holders -- even those that no longer have any Internet-related ops >>>> or business interests. >>>> >>>> This countervailing incentive is much stronger for surplus holders >>>> that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 addresses >>>> that they might need in the future will certainly cost more (maybe >>>> lots more) than whatever price they could command for surplus IPv4 >>>> today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the >>>> salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 >>>> continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input for certain >>>> kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of >>>> competition from existing or hypothetical future competitors will >>>> be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. >>>> For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to competitors is a >>>> perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. >>>> >>>> An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any meaning >>>> of that term. Get over it. >>> _______________________________________________ >>> PPML >>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN >>> Public Policy >>> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >>> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >>> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >>> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if >> you >>> experience any issues. > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From jweyand at computerdata.com Thu Mar 6 12:21:44 2008 From: jweyand at computerdata.com (Jim Weyand) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 12:21:44 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal Message-ID: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61C@cliff.cdi.local> Scott- Sorry about the delay, I know you are under time pressure. This is in response to your post on Tuesday, 03-04-08. > I agree completely. Perhaps one way to address your concerns would be > to look to NRPM section 4.6 Amnesty Requests > (http://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#four6), and include text in the > transfer policy to accomplish similar objectives. > > But the more I look at it, the more I wonder if the same objective could > be accomplished more simply by striking the words ", or through this > Simple Transfer policy" from the condition that "The transferor may not > request any IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN (through ordinary > allocations or assignments, or through this Simple Transfer policy) > within the subsequent 24 months." Under the standard transferee > conditions, any subsequent requests to receive IPv4 addresses through > this Simple Transfer policy would have to be justified and > pre-qualified, just as with any other potential transferee. As I understand you this will at least allow an ISP that sold address space and then found themselves short, to buy more. If that is your intent then I believe this is a very good idea. > > The only thing this doesn't address is the desire to allow someone to > get and renumber into a smaller block (say /20) and then transfer their > larger block (say /16). Under the current proposed policy, such an > organization would be able to keep the first or last /20 out of their > /16, and transfer the remaining /17, /18, /19, and /20. While I could > see a renumbering being slightly better, I think the existing policy is > adequate, so I'm not sure if we need to allow people to renumber into a > completely different block, and deal with all the complexities of timing > that entails. OK, it is probably more of a technology issue and I really brought it up as an example of the unintended consequences of the proposed market constraints. Once again thank you for your patience and taking on a leadership role in this discussion. -Jim Weyand From bicknell at ufp.org Thu Mar 6 12:20:59 2008 From: bicknell at ufp.org (Leo Bicknell) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 12:20:59 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> Message-ID: <20080306172059.GA46497@ussenterprise.ufp.org> In a message written on Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 09:11:08AM -0800, Scott Leibrand wrote: > In the past I've used the analogy of Manhattan real estate: it's > definitely unique, and has only imperfect substitutes elsewhere, as IPv4 > is unique, with its own unique demand, and IPv6 is an imperfect substitute. While we're tossing out all of our analogies, I think a better one is Super Bowl tickets. Some people get in early at relatively low prices, as the big day gets closer the prise rises, scalpers appear, etc. Once the kick off starts any tickets still in your hands are worthless. IPv4 is fixed like the number of seats. Once most of the Internet is on IPv6 it will be worthless. In the mean time the price, white, grey, or black market will continue to rise bounded only be the desire to "be there." That desire has little to do with policy; a popular team, network, or application could all drive demand. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: not available URL: From drc at virtualized.org Thu Mar 6 12:32:10 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 09:32:10 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: Tony, On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: > Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really detect and > avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be bad. It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN case) we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some debate. For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is that hoarding? Regards, -drc From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 13:29:30 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 13:29:30 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080306172059.GA46497@ussenterprise.ufp.org> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> <20080306172059.GA46497@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Mar 6, 2008, at 9:20 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote: > In a message written on Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 09:11:08AM -0800, > Scott Leibrand wrote: >> In the past I've used the analogy of Manhattan real estate: it's >> definitely unique, and has only imperfect substitutes elsewhere, >> as IPv4 >> is unique, with its own unique demand, and IPv6 is an imperfect >> substitute. > > While we're tossing out all of our analogies, I think a better one > is Super Bowl tickets. Some people get in early at relatively low > prices, as the big day gets closer the prise rises, scalpers appear, > etc. Once the kick off starts any tickets still in your hands are > worthless. > > IPv4 is fixed like the number of seats. Once most of the Internet > is on IPv6 it will be worthless. In the mean time the price, white, > grey, or black market will continue to rise bounded only be the > desire to "be there." > > That desire has little to do with policy; a popular team, network, > or application could all drive demand. Hi Leo, That's somewhat better, but still incomplete and more than a bit misleading IMHO. Consider: First of all, a scalper can only use one ticket her/himself, and there's only one game to see, so there's no upside to her/him to holding the surplus tickets forever. Not so in this case. Second, what if the timing of the kickoff and the status of the next season is uncertain, and the scalpers know that they might have some influence on what happens? Would they have any interest in getting the game started quickly, and guaranteeing the next season (when they may or may not have tickets to scalp), or would they prefer to hold out as long as possible to squeeze every possible penny out of every seat now? If people are really desperate, maybe they could multiplex the tickets, selling each to groups that are willing to sit on each others' laps... Finally, what if the people without tickets knew that buying off the scalpers today could disrupt the scheduling and pricing model of future games? How much are tickets to this one game really worth? TV > -- > Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 > PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net > if you experience any issues. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin) iD8DBQFH0DgKUHTO4sHEFsERArxMAKCkxqr2b2LssowbcpTDxAuaUWGX1ACfXvN5 gQYj+UwV0OLz4thcUpgOf7o= =Vkq5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tony.li at tony.li Thu Mar 6 13:31:22 2008 From: tony.li at tony.li (Tony Li) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 10:31:22 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> |It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN case) |we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free |pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some |debate. | |For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is |that hoarding? Of course not. But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every prefix, drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that would distort the market. Tony From BillD at cait.wustl.edu Thu Mar 6 13:42:10 2008 From: BillD at cait.wustl.edu (Bill Darte) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 12:42:10 -0600 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com><47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com><000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of David Conrad > Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 11:32 AM > To: tony.li at tony.li > Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' > Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF > > Tony, > > On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: > > Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really detect and > > avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space > would be bad. > > It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the > ARIN case) we're talking about life after the exhaustion of > the IANA IPv4 free pool. The definition of "hoarding" will > likely be subject to some debate. > > For example, there is a well known university sitting on a > /8. Is that hoarding? Yes! > > Regards, > -drc > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 13:56:12 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 13:56:12 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> On Mar 6, 2008, at 1:31 PM, Tony Li wrote: > > > |It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN > case) > |we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free > |pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some > |debate. > | > |For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is > |that hoarding? > > > Of course not. But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every > prefix, > drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that would > distort the market. You seem to be postulating a market, and a market norm, and an ethic which does not exist in the absence of "effective" rules. If the largest ISPs rush out and buy up as much IPv4 as they can today, in anticipation of "need" they know they'll have in the future -- but also thereby get out ahead other operators that also have "need" today -- isn't that a kind of hoarding? When any buying today exceeds "need" today, it has a distorting -- inflationary and anticompetitive -- effect regardless of whether that was the primary goal or just a convenient side-effect. Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets absolutely inevitable, should also assume that hoarding for profiteering or simply to keep down the competition will be the norm. Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets absolutely inevitable, should also assume that any countervailing rules that can be easily bypassed without consequence (i.e., "ineffective" rules) will be ignored. (that's not being critical of operators, just being internally consistent with assumptions) TV From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 14:33:50 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:33:50 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local> <47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> Message-ID: Hi Scott, I agree that you got the substitutability comparison right -- the same could be said about real estate in any one place that you really cared about -- but it's a trivial comparison. Manhattan real estate is not really essential to anything important. Even a diehard New Yorker couldn't credibly claim that living/working in NYC is equivalent in importance to preserving/growing the Internet through a difficult transition. However, if everyone strongly disagrees I imagine we could get Donald Trump to help refine the transfer proposal ;-) TV On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:11 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > In the past I've used the analogy of Manhattan real estate: it's > definitely unique, and has only imperfect substitutes elsewhere, as > IPv4 is unique, with its own unique demand, and IPv6 is an > imperfect substitute. > > -Scott > > Tom Vest wrote: >> On Mar 6, 2008, at 7:54 AM, Jim Weyand wrote: >>> Tom- >>> >>> This is an interesting example, but instead of using a market of a >>> produced commodity like grain or steel do the same thought >>> experiment >>> with a market for something fixed like farmland in Iowa. It isn't a >>> perfect analogy but it eliminates the producer incentive. >>> >>> Tony- >> Hi Jim, >> Thanks for the response. >> Neither Iowa farmland, nor farmland nor land more generally are >> good analogies, at least not in the present age. >> Unless you postulate a situation in which potential buyers and >> sellers are (almost) completely immobile -- e.g., in the pre- >> modern era -- all of the above are "substitutable" -- i.e., you >> can still be an agro producer without it, you can still be an >> agro consumer without it. And unless you postulate a time in >> which land had some unique, extra-economic significance -- e.g., >> in the pre-modern era -- then possession of it doesn't confer any >> special significance that is not substitutable with some other >> economic asset/activity. >> In the end, if landowners in Iowa have to compete for investment >> dollars with landholders (and other asset owners) elsewhere, then >> that puts an upper bound on the demand, and hence the price, and >> hence the appeal of hoarding rather than immediately selling, for >> Iowa land. On the other hand, if Iowa land was the last land on >> Earth, and not completely substitutable for any aspiring agro >> producer or consumer on Earth, then you'd probably rarely see it >> on the market, and never see it at all at a price or in tracts >> big enough to permit new farmers to enter the market. Making this >> even worse, if you happened to know that agro production would be >> getting much more efficient in the near future, so that smaller >> and smaller parcels might be economically viable (and hence >> marketable), you'd be even less likely to sell at any price now. >> (we actually covered this in the course of the NANOG thread -- >> apologies again for duplication) >> TV >>> I agree 100%, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, we need >>> speculators in >>> this market. Hopefully we can attract a reasonable number of >>> speculators that will compete with one another and actually deliver >>> lower prices. In an active, vibrant market the price for a block of >>> addresses will be quickly and fairly determined. >>> >>> It is my belief that open market with minimal constraints will >>> result in >>> the best balance and fairness between sellers and buyers of address >>> space. >>> >>> That said I continue to support Scott's proposal, Policy Proposal >>> 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal with its constraints and the >>> resulting additional costs because that may prove to be more >>> politically >>> acceptable. Even a constrained market is far better than no >>> market at >>> all. >>> >>> -Jim Weyand >>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On >>>> Behalf >>> Of >>>> Tom Vest >>>> Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 9:22 AM >>>> To: tony.li at tony.li >>>> Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' >>>> Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: >>>> >>>>> |i would be interested in hearing if speculative purchasing would >>>>> have a >>>>> |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in >>>>> some >>>>> |fashion. >>>>> >>>>> If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), >>>>> speculative >>>>> trading >>>>> is actually beneficial to the market in that it helps provide a >>>>> buffer for >>>>> supply. Hoarding is the behavior that we would want to really >>>>> detect and >>>>> avoid. Someone trying to corner the market in v4 space would be >>> bad. >>>>> Tony >>>> Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true >>>> unless/ >>>> until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for both >>>> existing and aspiring number resources users. Until then any >>>> "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to sell the >>>> same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price tomorrow, and also >>>> that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need >>>> the >>>> IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might contribute >>>> to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of truly idled >>>> address space) are going to network operators that know they'll >>>> never >>>> need more IPv4 ever again. >>>> >>>> For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing >>>> competitors >>>> by making essential inputs available is going to provide an >>>> additional gating factor influencing number and length of prefixes >>>> offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the market for dark fiber). >>>> >>>> Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be >>>> seeing this for the second time. >>>> >>>> TV >>>> >>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>> From: Tom Vest >>>>> Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST >>>>> To: nanog at merit.edu >>>>> Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch van Beijnum >>>>> , David Conrad , Brandon >>>>> Galbraith >>>>> Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit >>>>> >>>>> It's good that this discussion is happening now. >>>>> To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's probably a >>>>> good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. >>>>> We all know what "market" means -- but in all likelihood many of >>>>> the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably >>>>> mutually contradictory. >>>>> >>>>> If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any >>>>> validity, >>>>> it comes from the assumption that making them subject to "market >>>>> pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current surplus >>>>> holders to make that surplus available to would-be buyers. >>>>> >>>>> In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market >>>>> pricing >>>>> and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the revealed >>>>> price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of making it >>>>> are motivated to make more, or to jump into the market for the >>>>> first time. In other commodity markets, that motivation is bounded >>>>> by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the impracticality of >>>>> hoarding, and by the inability of the potential seller to use more >>>>> of the commodity directly. In other words, the existence or >>>>> potential emergence of alternative producers/suppliers tends to >>>>> discourage hoarding to maximize prices (because there's no >>>>> guarantee that prices will stay high, much less go even higher), >>>>> and the lack of direct "use value" reduces any countervailing >>>>> incentive that the prospective seller to just hold the assets in >>>>> perpetuity, until they can be used in-house. >>>>> >>>>> In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding conditions >>>>> apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and they're almost >>>>> certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use value, at least >>>>> for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least a >>>>> decade or >>>>> more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is >>>>> shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be >>>>> higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day before the >>>>> last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means hoarding is going >>>>> to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus >>>>> holders -- even those that no longer have any Internet-related ops >>>>> or business interests. >>>>> >>>>> This countervailing incentive is much stronger for surplus holders >>>>> that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 addresses >>>>> that they might need in the future will certainly cost more (maybe >>>>> lots more) than whatever price they could command for surplus IPv4 >>>>> today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the >>>>> salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 >>>>> continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input for certain >>>>> kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of >>>>> competition from existing or hypothetical future competitors will >>>>> be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. >>>>> For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to competitors >>>>> is a >>>>> perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. >>>>> >>>>> An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any >>>>> meaning >>>>> of that term. Get over it. >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> PPML >>>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >>>> ARIN >>>> Public Policy >>>> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >>>> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >>>> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >>>> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at >>>> info at arin.net if >>> you >>>> experience any issues. >> _______________________________________________ >> PPML >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >> ARIN Public Policy >> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net >> if you experience any issues. From kkargel at polartel.com Thu Mar 6 15:08:08 2008 From: kkargel at polartel.com (Kevin Kargel) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:08:08 -0600 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE61A@cliff.cdi.local><47D025AC.4040708@internap.com> Message-ID: <70DE64CEFD6E9A4EB7FAF3A0631410660104F430@mail> But if it is known that the real estate in Manhatten is going to be abandoned because a new island with much better real estate popped up out of the ocean and nobody is going to live in Manhatten anymore and we aren't going to talk to anyone there anymore do we really care if anyone hoards the Manhatten real estate? Wouldn't it even be more ecologically feasible if some hanger on continued to upkeep the old real estate? Would we even care or notice if it went in to disrepair? > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Tom Vest > Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 1:34 PM > To: Scott Leibrand > Cc: Randy Bush; Public Policy Mailing List > Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF > > Hi Scott, > > I agree that you got the substitutability comparison right -- > the same could be said about real estate in any one place > that you really cared about -- but it's a trivial comparison. > Manhattan real estate is not really essential to anything > important. Even a diehard New Yorker couldn't credibly claim > that living/working in NYC is equivalent in importance to > preserving/growing the Internet through a difficult transition. > > However, if everyone strongly disagrees I imagine we could > get Donald Trump to help refine the transfer proposal ;-) > > TV > > On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:11 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > > > In the past I've used the analogy of Manhattan real estate: it's > > definitely unique, and has only imperfect substitutes elsewhere, as > > IPv4 is unique, with its own unique demand, and IPv6 is an > imperfect > > substitute. > > > > -Scott > > > > Tom Vest wrote: > >> On Mar 6, 2008, at 7:54 AM, Jim Weyand wrote: > >>> Tom- > >>> > >>> This is an interesting example, but instead of using a > market of a > >>> produced commodity like grain or steel do the same thought > >>> experiment with a market for something fixed like > farmland in Iowa. > >>> It isn't a perfect analogy but it eliminates the producer > incentive. > >>> > >>> Tony- > >> Hi Jim, > >> Thanks for the response. > >> Neither Iowa farmland, nor farmland nor land more > generally are good > >> analogies, at least not in the present age. > >> Unless you postulate a situation in which potential buyers and > >> sellers are (almost) completely immobile -- e.g., in the > pre- modern > >> era -- all of the above are "substitutable" -- i.e., you > can still be > >> an agro producer without it, you can still be an agro consumer > >> without it. And unless you postulate a time in which land > had some > >> unique, extra-economic significance -- e.g., in the > pre-modern era > >> -- then possession of it doesn't confer any special > significance that > >> is not substitutable with some other economic asset/activity. > >> In the end, if landowners in Iowa have to compete for investment > >> dollars with landholders (and other asset owners) > elsewhere, then > >> that puts an upper bound on the demand, and hence the price, and > >> hence the appeal of hoarding rather than immediately > selling, for > >> Iowa land. On the other hand, if Iowa land was the last land on > >> Earth, and not completely substitutable for any aspiring agro > >> producer or consumer on Earth, then you'd probably rarely > see it on > >> the market, and never see it at all at a price or in tracts big > >> enough to permit new farmers to enter the market. Making > this even > >> worse, if you happened to know that agro production would > be getting > >> much more efficient in the near future, so that smaller > and smaller > >> parcels might be economically viable (and hence > marketable), you'd be > >> even less likely to sell at any price now. > >> (we actually covered this in the course of the NANOG thread -- > >> apologies again for duplication) > >> TV > >>> I agree 100%, as counter-intuitive as it sounds, we need > >>> speculators in > >>> this market. Hopefully we can attract a reasonable number of > >>> speculators that will compete with one another and > actually deliver > >>> lower prices. In an active, vibrant market the price for > a block of > >>> addresses will be quickly and fairly determined. > >>> > >>> It is my belief that open market with minimal constraints will > >>> result in > >>> the best balance and fairness between sellers and buyers > of address > >>> space. > >>> > >>> That said I continue to support Scott's proposal, Policy Proposal > >>> 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal with its constraints and the > >>> resulting additional costs because that may prove to be more > >>> politically > >>> acceptable. Even a constrained market is far better than > no market > >>> at all. > >>> > >>> -Jim Weyand > >>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > >>>> Behalf > >>> Of > >>>> Tom Vest > >>>> Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 9:22 AM > >>>> To: tony.li at tony.li > >>>> Cc: 'Randy Bush'; 'Public Policy Mailing List' > >>>> Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Mar 6, 2008, at 12:47 AM, Tony Li wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> |i would be interested in hearing if speculative > purchasing would > >>>>> have a > >>>>> |signature we could detect and use to ameliorate speculation in > >>>>> some > >>>>> |fashion. > >>>>> > >>>>> If I remember my econ classes (from oh so long ago ;-), > >>>>> speculative trading is actually beneficial to the > market in that > >>>>> it helps provide a buffer for supply. Hoarding is the behavior > >>>>> that we would want to really detect and avoid. Someone > trying to > >>>>> corner the market in v4 space would be > >>> bad. > >>>>> Tony > >>>> Hoarding in the behavior you should expect. This will be true > >>>> unless/ until IPv6 is actually fully substitutable for IPv4, for > >>>> both existing and aspiring number resources users. > Until then any > >>>> "rational" IPv4 seller will know that they'll be able to > sell the > >>>> same, if not a shorter prefix at a higher price > tomorrow, and also > >>>> that they will have to pay even more if they find they they need > >>>> the > >>>> IPv4 back again after that. So the only people who might > contribute > >>>> to IPv4 liquidity (i.e., after the first/last sale of > truly idled > >>>> address space) are going to network operators that know they'll > >>>> never need more IPv4 ever again. > >>>> > >>>> For them however, the prospect of empowering new/existing > >>>> competitors by making essential inputs available is going to > >>>> provide an additional gating factor influencing number > and length > >>>> of prefixes offered, as well as asking price (c.f., the > market for > >>>> dark fiber). > >>>> > >>>> Reposting below from NANOG, with apologies to those who will be > >>>> seeing this for the second time. > >>>> > >>>> TV > >>>> > >>>> Begin forwarded message: > >>>>> From: Tom Vest > >>>>> Date: February 18, 2008 9:26:03 PM PST > >>>>> To: nanog at merit.edu > >>>>> Cc: Rod Beck , Iljitsch > van Beijnum > >>>>> , David Conrad > , Brandon > >>>>> Galbraith > >>>>> Subject: Re: IPV4 as a Commodity for Profit > >>>>> > >>>>> It's good that this discussion is happening now. > >>>>> To make the discussion as productive as possible, it's > probably a > >>>>> good idea to clarify assumptions and terms. > >>>>> We all know what "market" means -- but in all > likelihood many of > >>>>> the things we all "know" do not overlap, and some are probably > >>>>> mutually contradictory. > >>>>> > >>>>> If thinking about IPv4 addresses as a "commodity" has any > >>>>> validity, it comes from the assumption that making them > subject to > >>>>> "market pricing" will increase supply, i.e., incentive current > >>>>> surplus holders to make that surplus available to > would-be buyers. > >>>>> > >>>>> In other "commodity" markets, the connection between market > >>>>> pricing and increased supply is *production* -- i.e., when the > >>>>> revealed price of a commodity goes up, those who are capable of > >>>>> making it are motivated to make more, or to jump into > the market > >>>>> for the first time. In other commodity markets, that > motivation is > >>>>> bounded by the threat of alternative suppliers, by the > >>>>> impracticality of hoarding, and by the inability of the > potential > >>>>> seller to use more of the commodity directly. In other > words, the > >>>>> existence or potential emergence of alternative > >>>>> producers/suppliers tends to discourage hoarding to maximize > >>>>> prices (because there's no guarantee that prices will > stay high, > >>>>> much less go even higher), and the lack of direct "use value" > >>>>> reduces any countervailing incentive that the > prospective seller > >>>>> to just hold the assets in perpetuity, until they can be used > >>>>> in-house. > >>>>> > >>>>> In the case of IPv4 addressing, none of these bounding > conditions > >>>>> apply. No more IPv4 addresses can be produced, and > they're almost > >>>>> certain to have unique (if not irreplaceable) use > value, at least > >>>>> for some classes of ISPs that exist today, for at least > a decade > >>>>> or more (or as long as those kinds of ISPs exist, whichever is > >>>>> shortest). That means the potential price is always going to be > >>>>> higher tomorrow than it is today, right up to the day > before the > >>>>> last day that IPv4 becomes useless. Which means > hoarding is going > >>>>> to continue to be the most sensible behavior for all surplus > >>>>> holders -- even those that no longer have any > Internet-related ops > >>>>> or business interests. > >>>>> > >>>>> This countervailing incentive is much stronger for > surplus holders > >>>>> that *do* still have such interests. Knowing that IPv4 > addresses > >>>>> that they might need in the future will certainly cost > more (maybe > >>>>> lots more) than whatever price they could command for > surplus IPv4 > >>>>> today, growing ISPs are not likely to contribute much to the > >>>>> salable, "liquid" address pool. Worse still, so long as IPv4 > >>>>> continues to be a non-substitutable, must-have input > for certain > >>>>> kinds of ISPs, ISPs like that will know that the threat of > >>>>> competition from existing or hypothetical future > competitors will > >>>>> be absolutely limited by the availability of IPv4 address space. > >>>>> For them, making IPv4 address space unavailable to > competitors is > >>>>> a perfectly sensible "use", and one with quite a lot of value. > >>>>> > >>>>> An unmediated market is not going to "work", for almost any > >>>>> meaning of that term. Get over it. > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> PPML > >>>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > >>>> ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > >>>> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > >>>> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > >>>> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net > >>>> if > >>> you > >>>> experience any issues. > >> _______________________________________________ > >> PPML > >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed > to the ARIN > >> Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if > >> you experience any issues. > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From martinw at mvssol.com Thu Mar 6 15:30:32 2008 From: martinw at mvssol.com (Martin Wills) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 15:30:32 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Abuse address Message-ID: <004301c87fc8$edad6650$5b01a8c0@mvs1domain.mvssol.com> I know this has been discussed before, but I notice Arin still does not enforce the use of an Abuse address. I administer the email in my company and periodically - usually when I get annoyed at too many spam and phishing messages from an ISP - send a report to their abuse address. This works fine with many companies and most other registrars. Why does Arin not insist on some address showing up in a Whois for these situations? Martin -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sleibrand at internap.com Thu Mar 6 16:09:28 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 13:09:28 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> Tom Vest wrote: > If the largest ISPs rush out and buy up as much IPv4 as they can > today, in anticipation of "need" they know they'll have in the future > -- but also thereby get out ahead other operators that also have > "need" today -- isn't that a kind of hoarding? When any buying today > exceeds "need" today, it has a distorting -- inflationary and > anticompetitive -- effect regardless of whether that was the primary > goal or just a convenient side-effect. > > Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets > absolutely inevitable, should also assume that hoarding for > profiteering or simply to keep down the competition will be the norm. > Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets > absolutely inevitable, should also assume that any countervailing > rules that can be easily bypassed without consequence (i.e., > "ineffective" rules) will be ignored. This is definitely one of the problems we're trying to avoid with the conditions in the transfer policy proposal. It's clear to me that ARIN's current need-based policies are doing a good job of preventing ISPs from rushing out and getting (for free) a lot more IPv4 addresses than they need, so I believe that requiring similar justification to get IPv4 addresses via transfer will also work well. Do you see any of transfer conditions in the proposal as "countervailing rules that can be easily bypassed without consequence (i.e., "ineffective" rules)"? If so, why do you think they'd be ineffective? Thanks, Scott From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 6 16:26:56 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 08:26:56 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> Tony Li wrote: > > |It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN case) > |we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free > |pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some > |debate. > | > |For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is > |that hoarding? > > > Of course not. But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every prefix, > drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that would > distort the market. And drive the industry to IPv6 deployment. Geoff From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 6 16:43:33 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 08:43:33 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D06585.2020402@apnic.net> Tom Vest wrote: > > Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets > absolutely inevitable, should also assume that hoarding for > profiteering or simply to keep down the competition will be the norm. > Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes markets > absolutely inevitable, should also assume that any countervailing > rules that can be easily bypassed without consequence (i.e., > "ineffective" rules) will be ignored. But whats the goal here Tom? We all share a common view that post unallocated pool exhaustion there will be aa period where demand outstrips supply and in a market situation the price of IPv4 escalates, while the price of IPv6 remains relative constant and relatively insignificant. Ultimately consumers are exposed to the price differential as is conventional when prices of supply shift, and it is reasonable to anticipate that most consumders would express a preference for a lower priced service. Perhaps the objective here is NOT "to try and construct a perfect Ipv4 market". Perhaps it is more along the lines of "to try and expose some basic economic signals about the relative scarcity of Ipv4 and Ipv6 addresses to provide more direct and focussed impetus for industry-wide IPv6 adoption" Geoff From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 16:55:21 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 16:55:21 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> Message-ID: On Mar 6, 2008, at 4:26 PM, Geoff Huston wrote: > Tony Li wrote: >> >> |It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN >> case) >> |we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free >> |pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some >> |debate. >> | >> |For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is >> |that hoarding? >> >> >> Of course not. But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every >> prefix, >> drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that >> would >> distort the market. > > And drive the industry to IPv6 deployment. > > Geoff I think we all wish this is how things will go. But it could just as easily go the other way, and either vector could easily be pre-empted by major unwelcome surprises. Randy's very educational demonstrations have revealed that there's a long way to go before anything is 100% certain. In the mean time, new entrants are not going to be the ones to pioneer this effort, because they'd still have to wait for the big guys to get their act together in order to be able to benefit much from entering the business. So if anyone is to lead, it will be the big guys. Do we believe that they're holding out until they know they can monetize their future IPv4 surplus assets? Do we believe that they're simply unable to afford the transition unless they can extract large sums from the IPv4 trade? Who is going to provide those sums, if not other big operators? Or do we think that adding a seven digit number to the cost of starting up will fill the gap without sparking internal rebellions and external interventions? One could also say that OPEC and increasing "real" oil scarcity is leading to the adoption of hydrogen fuel cell technology. In fact one could have said that back in the early 1970s too; we could still be saying in 20-30 years from now. Burning bridges behind you when the future is still uncertain just doesn't seem like prudent planning to me... TV From Ed.Lewis at neustar.biz Thu Mar 6 16:01:07 2008 From: Ed.Lewis at neustar.biz (Edward Lewis) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 16:01:07 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Lame Delegations In-Reply-To: <47CFFF43.5080608@arin.net> References: <47CFFF43.5080608@arin.net> Message-ID: To Mark, If you need a hand, let me know...even if it isn't code I had a hand in. If anyone knows "lame" - it's me. Ed At 9:27 -0500 3/6/08, Member Services wrote: >ARIN has elected to remove the Lame Delegation identification and >notification software from production. Following several months of >periodic issues, ARIN determined it is best to take the software >offline, review, and retest several components. One recent problem >resulted in blank e-mail messages being sent to approximately one >hundred organizations. We apologize for this inconvenience. > >The software is expected to be back online in early April 2008. If >you have any further questions or comments, please contact info at arin.net. > >Regards, > >Mark Kosters >Chief Technology Officer > > >_______________________________________________ >PPML >You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >ARIN Public Policy >Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net >if you experience any issues. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Edward Lewis +1-571-434-5468 NeuStar Mail archives, backups. Sometimes I think the true beneficiaries of standards work are the suppliers of disk drives. From gih at apnic.net Thu Mar 6 18:23:04 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 10:23:04 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> Message-ID: <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> Tom Vest wrote: >> >> And drive the industry to IPv6 deployment. >> >> Geoff > > I think we all wish this is how things will go. > But it could just as easily go the other way, and either vector could > easily be pre-empted by major unwelcome surprises. > Randy's very educational demonstrations have revealed that there's a > long way to go before anything is 100% certain. > > In the mean time, new entrants are not going to be the ones to pioneer > this effort, because they'd still have to wait for the big guys to get > their act together in order to be able to benefit much from entering the > business. So if anyone is to lead, it will be the big guys. Do we > believe that they're holding out until they know they can monetize their > future IPv4 surplus assets? Do we believe that they're simply unable to > afford the transition unless they can extract large sums from the IPv4 > trade? Who is going to provide those sums, if not other big operators? > Or do we think that adding a seven digit number to the cost of starting > up will fill the gap without sparking internal rebellions and external > interventions? > > One could also say that OPEC and increasing "real" oil scarcity is > leading to the adoption of hydrogen fuel cell technology. In fact one > could have said that back in the early 1970s too; we could still be > saying in 20-30 years from now. Burning bridges behind you when the > future is still uncertain just doesn't seem like prudent planning to me... About the only time we had a choice in this particular saga was around 4 - 5 years back when the post-bust economic recovery lifted the Ipv4 address consumption rate from around 4 /8's per year to around 10 /8's per year. At that time there was still sufficient space in the unallocated address pool to support a dual stack transition without undue escalation of the pain barrier. But there were no economic signals whereby this could be expressed. The cost of IPv4 deployments continued to fall in unit cost terms so its little wonder than there was no serious deployment of IPv6 - the underlying differential pricing signals were simply not present and IPv6 was additional cost without any incremental revenue opportunities. But, like it or not Tom, the bridge behind us is already in cinders (I suppose I should be thankful that the analogy has moved on from sinking ships, stampedes, and train crashes to burning bridges ! :-) ). However, I find it hard to sift through your words here to extract what you are simply stating as a preferred outcome, so instead let me restate my perspective here. Scarcity in IPv4 addresses will be reflected in price in any market scenario. When demand outstrips supply this is an entirely conventional outcome. The market also has characteristics that lead to expectations of high volatility. Again, this is not uncommon and frankly really cannot be avoided. However, there is a form of substitution that in and of itself is not without cost, but when the price of IPv4 in such a market exceeds the substitution cost of deployment of IPv6 then the market signal regarding IPv6 deployment would be clear to all. So one can either say "the future is this big scary unknown place that we shouldn't tamper with", or you can do what you can to mitigate some of the more destructive potential outcomes and attempt to encourage some of the more beneficial ones. Now if your aim is to make IPv4 last forever then obviously we disagree about what is a net beneficial outcome for this Internet. Geoff From alh-ietf at tndh.net Thu Mar 6 20:13:43 2008 From: alh-ietf at tndh.net (Tony Hain) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 17:13:43 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> Message-ID: <12c201c87ff0$7fc27c70$7f477550$@net> Geoff Huston wrote: > ... > So one can either say "the future is this big scary unknown place that > we shouldn't tamper with", or you can do what you can to mitigate some > of the more destructive potential outcomes and attempt to encourage > some > of the more beneficial ones. Now if your aim is to make IPv4 last > forever then obviously we disagree about what is a net beneficial > outcome for this Internet. "this big scary unknown place" is one of the economic factors that has lead us past the point where we could avoid the looming pain. There is a cost to learning something new, and those that have not learned it will not be able to justify their high salaries in the new world order. This makes it very self-serving to seek out any excuse to maintain the status quo. The warped part of most of these discussions is that they are only concerned with the address-assignment/routing part of the system, and they completely ignore the costs associated with deploying and managing the end-system/application environment. The perception that the edge network can live with only one version is propagated by those in the core that have no concept of what it costs at the edge. There will be an extended period of overlap, despite exhaustion of the free pool. The space will fragment, with or without transfer policies, and the cost for operating the IPv4 network will rise. This will happen no matter what the price is for a block of space. While I agree there needs to be a mechanism to keep the records straight, it is not at all clear that there is any way to impose a historical perspective of 'need' onto a trading market. For starters, the measure of 'need' is not based on the amount of space, it is on the ability to get that routed. Just as now, a site may need a /30, but if routing says that the smallest thing that will pass a filter is a /24, then the site will not pass the test without inflating their claim to the smallest routable block. If you are really going to spend time on designing a market, design a market for routing slots, then the addressing market will take care of itself. Unfortunately, the RIRs are not in the business of routing, and the big ISPs are more interested in killing off the little guys than building a market that would sustain competition. BGP based TE is a prime example of artificially raising the barrier to entry, and complete fragmentation of the IPv4 pool only magnifies that effect. Before spending too much time on an optimal market design, look at the winners and losers in each scenario, then look at who has influence over which scenario gets picked. When you find the match between those with influence and the scenario where they win, you will know which path we are on... Tony From sleibrand at internap.com Thu Mar 6 20:27:30 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 17:27:30 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <12c201c87ff0$7fc27c70$7f477550$@net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> <12c201c87ff0$7fc27c70$7f477550$@net> Message-ID: <47D09A02.6090707@internap.com> Tony Hain wrote: > While I agree there needs to be a mechanism to keep the records straight, it > is not at all clear that there is any way to impose a historical perspective > of 'need' onto a trading market. For starters, the measure of 'need' is not > based on the amount of space, it is on the ability to get that routed. Not exclusively. At the low end, what you say (and the example you give) is correct. But most IPs are not used by organizations getting a /24 to multihome. They are being used by actual devices (computers, home NAT boxes, whatever) with a single public IP per device. > Just as now, a site may need a /30, but if routing says that the smallest thing > that will pass a filter is a /24, then the site will not pass the test > without inflating their claim to the smallest routable block. If you are > really going to spend time on designing a market, design a market for > routing slots, then the addressing market will take care of itself. > > Unfortunately, the RIRs are not in the business of routing Exactly. I have designed a routing slot market, and I'm sure you've designed several (and spent more time on it than I). That isn't sufficient, though, since you and I have no leverage to actually implement such a market. So, given that we can create an IPv4 transfer market, and we can't create a routing slot market, I think it behooves us to do the former in such a way as to permit the latter to be done later, if and when it's needed. But I think we need to design our IPv4 transfer market in such a way as to manage externalities through policy until such a time as they can be managed directly through other mechanisms. > Before spending too much time on an optimal market design, look at the > winners and losers in each scenario, then look at who has influence over > which scenario gets picked. When you find the match between those with > influence and the scenario where they win, you will know which path we are > on... That sounds rather fatalistic, but another reading is that all of us have a great deal of influence over which scenario gets picked (through the public policy process), so we should do our best to pick the best one (i.e. the one with the most winners and fewest losers). -Scott From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 22:19:30 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 22:19:30 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> Message-ID: <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> On Mar 6, 2008, at 4:09 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > Tom Vest wrote: >> If the largest ISPs rush out and buy up as much IPv4 as they can >> today, in anticipation of "need" they know they'll have in the >> future -- but also thereby get out ahead other operators that >> also have "need" today -- isn't that a kind of hoarding? When any >> buying today exceeds "need" today, it has a distorting -- >> inflationary and anticompetitive -- effect regardless of whether >> that was the primary goal or just a convenient side-effect. >> Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that makes >> markets absolutely inevitable, should also assume that hoarding >> for profiteering or simply to keep down the competition will be >> the norm. Anyone who assumes the kind of operator behavior that >> makes markets absolutely inevitable, should also assume that any >> countervailing rules that can be easily bypassed without >> consequence (i.e., "ineffective" rules) will be ignored. > > This is definitely one of the problems we're trying to avoid with > the conditions in the transfer policy proposal. It's clear to me > that ARIN's current need-based policies are doing a good job of > preventing ISPs from rushing out and getting (for free) a lot more > IPv4 addresses than they need, so I believe that requiring similar > justification to get IPv4 addresses via transfer will also work well. > > Do you see any of transfer conditions in the proposal as > "countervailing rules that can be easily bypassed without > consequence (i.e., "ineffective" rules)"? If so, why do you think > they'd be ineffective. An excellent question. First the deductive answer. Every claim that I've ever heard that a decentralized, every-operator-for-itself resource transfer policy is inevitable starts with the assertion that any rule (and any rulemaker) that gets in the way of maximum self-help will be irrelevant in the post-free pool world. Perhaps some people quietly believe that address resources should always have been available only to the highest bidder, but I've never heard anyone admit to that belief, now or in the past. In any case, on this view any of the proposed transfer rules that actually did anything, i.e., that stood to actually impede any operator from obtaining any address resource that they could pay for at any time, would be ignored regardless of the consequences. Now the "real world" answer. If RIR-rooted sidr is universally adopted and continues to be used by all RIR members, then for as long as that remains true it's possible to imagine that non-compliant transactions between two RSA signatories might have "consequences." It's much harder to imagine what consequence noncompliance could possibly have in any other context (e.g., legacy -> RSA, RSA -> legacy, legacy -> legacy). Do you think that legacy and non-RSA signatories will forebear from advertising or selling address space to "unqualified" RIR members for a little extra? What would prevent them from doing so? How credible is even that one (RSA->RSA transactions) kind of assurance? If everyone that advocated markets also publicly embraced sidr, and was keen to implement sidr as a prerequisite to engaging the market, then I would find it easier to believe that enthusiasm for markets and willingness to abide by market-limiting rules are correlated attitudes. In practice, enthusiasm for one often seems to be associated with deep antipathy for the other. Why won't voluntary compliance "just work" as it largely has under the old RIR system? I think that operators and the RIRs have been most effective at sustaining "voluntary compliance" or ("voluntary coordination" if you prefer) in cases where compliance has been easy/ reflexive/automatic, and/or not entirely voluntary. I think that much has depended on the long-term relationship/membership model, which in turn has been predicated on the incremental, needs-based delegation of number resources over time. PDP input and feedback, maintenance of whois, the preservation of at least some common interests among large operators, small operators, new entrants, and entrants-to-be through the "needs-based" allocation rules, and the notion of "membership" itself, along with the ability to collect fees to maintain services (and reaffirm contact info) -- most or all of these one might think are "naturally" aligned with individual operator self-interest -- but most didn't work at all until CIDR + RIRs provided the glue to hold it all together. I think whois provides a good benchmark. Most people seem to think that the quality of whois is fairly low. Most would say that data quality (completeness + accuracy) is substantially higher among current RSA signatories, but low among legacy resource holders (with a few giant/obvious exceptions). Setting aside for a moment the "actual facts", why do people believe this? Assuming that the facts largely bear this out, I would reckon that the gap between actual and "perfect" data quality, and the delta between RSA signatories and legacies provides some indication of the *max upper threshold* of compliance that one might realistically expect. After all, when the cost of compliance is so very low, but many people still decline to go along, then how much lower is it going to be when the stakes are very very high? I'll wrap by simply stating that even if all of the above proves to be wrong or fixable, and the market works "perfectly" but effectively prices aspiring new entrants out of the industry, then I believe that would be grounds enough to reject it. An RIR may avoid antitrust scrutiny by divesting all interest and involvement in delegation transactions, but that antitrust scrutiny will only be diverted to the industry as a whole. We already know that a single disaffected community member can exact a heavy toll on the entire system, and that external allies are standing by to assist when it serves their own interests. We'd better get ready for lots of them... TV From tvest at pch.net Thu Mar 6 22:55:01 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 22:55:01 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> Message-ID: On Mar 6, 2008, at 6:23 PM, Geoff Huston wrote: > Tom Vest wrote: > >>> >>> And drive the industry to IPv6 deployment. >>> >>> Geoff >> I think we all wish this is how things will go. >> But it could just as easily go the other way, and either vector >> could easily be pre-empted by major unwelcome surprises. >> Randy's very educational demonstrations have revealed that there's >> a long way to go before anything is 100% certain. >> In the mean time, new entrants are not going to be the ones to >> pioneer this effort, because they'd still have to wait for the big >> guys to get their act together in order to be able to benefit much >> from entering the business. So if anyone is to lead, it will be >> the big guys. Do we believe that they're holding out until they >> know they can monetize their future IPv4 surplus assets? Do we >> believe that they're simply unable to afford the transition unless >> they can extract large sums from the IPv4 trade? Who is going to >> provide those sums, if not other big operators? Or do we think >> that adding a seven digit number to the cost of starting up will >> fill the gap without sparking internal rebellions and external >> interventions? >> One could also say that OPEC and increasing "real" oil scarcity is >> leading to the adoption of hydrogen fuel cell technology. In fact >> one could have said that back in the early 1970s too; we could >> still be saying in 20-30 years from now. Burning bridges behind >> you when the future is still uncertain just doesn't seem like >> prudent planning to me... > > About the only time we had a choice in this particular saga was > around 4 - 5 years back when the post-bust economic recovery lifted > the Ipv4 address consumption rate from around 4 /8's per year to > around 10 /8's per year. At that time there was still sufficient > space in the unallocated address pool to support a dual stack > transition without undue escalation of the pain barrier. But there > were no economic signals whereby this could be expressed. The cost > of IPv4 deployments continued to fall in unit cost terms so its > little wonder than there was no serious deployment of IPv6 - the > underlying differential pricing signals were simply not present and > IPv6 was additional cost without any incremental revenue > opportunities. > > But, like it or not Tom, the bridge behind us is already in cinders > (I suppose I should be thankful that the analogy has moved on from > sinking ships, stampedes, and train crashes to burning > bridges ! :-) ). However, I find it hard to sift through your words > here to extract what you are simply stating as a preferred outcome, > so instead let me restate my perspective here. I believe that there are still credible alternatives to a decentralized market that could do better on all of the important short-term fronts: sustain some level of IPv4 liquidity (mostly for new entrants, 6/4 gateways, xTRs, etc.), keep the industry open to new entrants, preserve needs-based allocation principles, preserve the central registry function, resist internal manipulation and external intervention, etc. -- to basically do all of the things necessary to sustain an orderly, incremental, self-governed (i.e., "successful") transition. For me that is the only goal that matters. > Scarcity in IPv4 addresses will be reflected in price in any market > scenario. Yes. But your statement is a restricted form of the incontrovertible general fact: scarcity will affect availability in any/every kind of system for allocating values, including "markets". > When demand outstrips supply this is an entirely conventional outcome. Markets are not inevitable. Demand for IPv4 outstripped "sustainable supply" at almost every moment since it was invented. Why weren't markets for Class B space inevitable back the last time we visited this territory? > The market also has characteristics that lead to expectations of > high volatility. Again, this is not uncommon and frankly really > cannot be avoided. If markets lead to high volatility, but other allocation systems may not, then does it make sense to just accept volatility as inevitable? Who benefits from volatility? If markets also lead to expectations of loss of other important collateral values (e.g., openness, industry solidarity/competence, independence, etc.), who benefits from that? > However, there is a form of substitution that in and of itself is > not without cost, but when the price of IPv4 in such a market > exceeds the substitution cost of deployment of IPv6 then the market > signal regarding IPv6 deployment would be clear to all. My concern is that there is a very high probability that the "critical infrastructure self-governance failure" signal will be much clearer to a much broader audience long before the other kind of signal percolates up and down far enough. > So one can either say "the future is this big scary unknown place > that we shouldn't tamper with", or you can do what you can to > mitigate some of the more destructive potential outcomes and > attempt to encourage some of the more beneficial ones. Oh I agree 100%, and am acting on that belief, just as I believe you are. We just seem to be scared and reassured by different things. > Now if your aim is to make IPv4 last forever then obviously we > disagree about what is a net beneficial outcome for this Internet. Come on Geoff ;-) I am not going to tax the patience/credulity of the audience by insinuating that you have some silly or sinister ulterior motive. But I will look forward to continuing the discussion, and hopefully contribute to some set of policies that we can have (some)(more) confidence in. TV From sleibrand at internap.com Thu Mar 6 23:03:05 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 20:03:05 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <47D061A0.4040104@apnic.net> <47D07CD8.6070402@apnic.net> Message-ID: <47D0BE79.9090508@internap.com> Tom Vest wrote: > I believe that there are still credible alternatives to a > decentralized market that could do better on all of the important > short-term fronts: sustain some level of IPv4 liquidity (mostly for > new entrants, 6/4 gateways, xTRs, etc.), keep the industry open to > new entrants, preserve needs-based allocation principles, preserve > the central registry function, resist internal manipulation and > external intervention, etc. -- to basically do all of the things > necessary to sustain an orderly, incremental, self-governed (i.e., > "successful") transition. For me that is the only goal that matters. I think we agree on the goal, but I'm not aware of the credible alternatives of which you speak. Could you enumerate some of them so we can discuss whether there are truly viable alternatives to a market? A lot of us are advocating a market approach because we don't see any better alternatives. Thanks, Scott From McNuttJ at missouri.edu Thu Mar 6 23:07:34 2008 From: McNuttJ at missouri.edu (McNutt, Justin M.) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 22:07:34 -0600 Subject: [ppml] Lame Delegations In-Reply-To: References: <47CFFF43.5080608@arin.net> Message-ID: Interesting. I wasn't aware that anyone other than me had attempted to address this issue. Even if we just consider the reverse name space, the number of lame - and RFC1918 - delegations in existence is pretty sad. Couple that with a lack of any kind of automated way to detect the proper contact for an address space (via SOA record or WHOIS data) and you get a nearly intractable problem. Though the general public (me) likely shouldn't have direct programmatic access to WHOIS information (for obvious anti-spam reasons), I should think that ARIN would be in a unique position to have access to this data and be able to respond effectively to both incorrect/unusable contact information as well as lame reverse delegations. As such, I for one would like to see such a project continue. If manpower is the issue, I submit myself as a resource. Put generally, I see a widespread lack of knowledge of how DNS works, to the point that I am honestly amazed that it works at all. Any project that serves to make the overall system better AND educate DNS admins is worth my personal time and effort. We will soon be hiring another tech capable of light programming duties, and I'd be willing to donate some of *his* time as well. Let us know if we can help. Thx! --J > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Edward Lewis > Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2008 3:01 PM > To: Member Services > Cc: ppml at arin.net > Subject: Re: [ppml] Lame Delegations > > To Mark, > > If you need a hand, let me know...even if it isn't code I had > a hand in. > > If anyone knows "lame" - it's me. > > Ed > > At 9:27 -0500 3/6/08, Member Services wrote: > >ARIN has elected to remove the Lame Delegation identification and > >notification software from production. Following several months of > >periodic issues, ARIN determined it is best to take the software > >offline, review, and retest several components. One recent problem > >resulted in blank e-mail messages being sent to approximately one > >hundred organizations. We apologize for this inconvenience. > > > >The software is expected to be back online in early April 2008. If > >you have any further questions or comments, please contact > info at arin.net. > > > >Regards, > > > >Mark Kosters > >Chief Technology Officer > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > >PPML > >You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > >ARIN Public Policy > >Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > >Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > >http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > >Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net > >if you experience any issues. > > -- > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > -=-=-=-=-=-=- > Edward Lewis > +1-571-434-5468 > NeuStar > > Mail archives, backups. Sometimes I think the true beneficiaries of > standards work are the suppliers of disk drives. > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From sleibrand at internap.com Thu Mar 6 23:29:25 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 20:29:25 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> Tom Vest wrote: > Now the "real world" answer. If RIR-rooted sidr is universally adopted > and continues to be used by all RIR members, then for as long as that > remains true it's possible to imagine that non-compliant transactions > between two RSA signatories might have "consequences." It's much harder > to imagine what consequence noncompliance could possibly have in any > other context (e.g., legacy -> RSA, RSA -> legacy, legacy -> legacy). Do > you think that legacy and non-RSA signatories will forebear from > advertising or selling address space to "unqualified" RIR members for a > little extra? What would prevent them from doing so? I think the main reason legitimate transfers (ones recognized by the recognized authority on who holds a resource, the RIR) will be favored by most potential participants due to the reduced risk of using such a system. For example, if I need IPv4 space after exhaustion, I could either go to ARIN, demonstrate to them that I need the space, and have access to a centralized listing service of transferors, all of whom ARIN has vouched for as being the legitimate holders of the addresses they're transferring. Or, I could go to some other black market, where I have no assurance that the organization I'm "buying" the addresses from is the legitimate holder of those addresses, and that they haven't or won't "sell" the same addresses to someone else in addition to me. I also have no way to update the authoritative registry if I "buy" the addresses on the black market, and therefore I have a harder time demonstrating (to my ISP or more importantly my customers) that I have any legitimate claim to the space. > I think whois provides a good benchmark. Most people seem to think that > the quality of whois is fairly low. Most would say that data quality > (completeness + accuracy) is substantially higher among current RSA > signatories, but low among legacy resource holders (with a few > giant/obvious exceptions). Setting aside for a moment the "actual > facts", why do people believe this? Assuming that the facts largely bear > this out, I would reckon that the gap between actual and "perfect" data > quality, and the delta between RSA signatories and legacies provides > some indication of the *max upper threshold* of compliance that one > might realistically expect. After all, when the cost of compliance is so > very low, but many people still decline to go along, then how much lower > is it going to be when the stakes are very very high? I think that a legitimate transfer market will actually result in a large improvement in the quality of records reflected in whois. In order for an address holder to transfer addresses, they'll first need to demonstrate to ARIN that they are the legitimate holder of those addresses (through documentation of their relationship to the original recipient listed in whois), and then sign an RSA or legacy RSA. I anticipate that this will prompt a large number of resource holders to update out-of-date contact information, and will prompt a number of legacy holders to sign legacy RSAs. > I'll wrap by simply stating that even if all of the above proves to be > wrong or fixable, and the market works "perfectly" but effectively > prices aspiring new entrants out of the industry, then I believe that > would be grounds enough to reject it. I don't anticipate that a market will price out new entrants. In fact, I favor the transfer policy proposal precisely because it provides an avenue for new and growing networks who need IPv4 space to get it after free pool exhaustion. In my opinion, the supply curve for IPv4 addresses will be somewhat elastic, meaning that as the price goes up many IPv4 address holders will begin to free up IPv4 addresses and make them available. Demand will be elastic as well (quantity demanded will go down as the price increases), but I think supply will be more elastic than demand simply because there are so many netblocks out there already, so address conservation efforts will have more effect on freeing up supply to be transferred than on reducing the demands for new space. -Scott From mksmith at adhost.com Fri Mar 7 00:09:18 2008 From: mksmith at adhost.com (Michael Smith) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 21:09:18 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> Message-ID: <1A97CDA0-3ABC-4567-A7F7-C07B3BEE94E8@adhost.com> Hello Scott: On Mar 6, 2008, at 8:29 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > >> I think whois provides a good benchmark. Most people seem to think >> that >> the quality of whois is fairly low. Most would say that data quality >> (completeness + accuracy) is substantially higher among current RSA >> signatories, but low among legacy resource holders (with a few >> giant/obvious exceptions). Setting aside for a moment the "actual >> facts", why do people believe this? Assuming that the facts largely >> bear >> this out, I would reckon that the gap between actual and "perfect" >> data >> quality, and the delta between RSA signatories and legacies provides >> some indication of the *max upper threshold* of compliance that one >> might realistically expect. After all, when the cost of compliance >> is so >> very low, but many people still decline to go along, then how much >> lower >> is it going to be when the stakes are very very high? > > I think that a legitimate transfer market will actually result in a > large improvement in the quality of records reflected in whois. In > order for an address holder to transfer addresses, they'll first > need to > demonstrate to ARIN that they are the legitimate holder of those > addresses (through documentation of their relationship to the original > recipient listed in whois), and then sign an RSA or legacy RSA. I > anticipate that this will prompt a large number of resource holders to > update out-of-date contact information, and will prompt a number of > legacy holders to sign legacy RSAs. > I think that the legacy holders with a sense of the Internet "community' have already returned, or are in the process of actively returning their unused space. I don't think we should even worry about the rest of those folks because I can't think of a single reason it is in their best interests to return their space, given the present state of ARIN policy. >> I'll wrap by simply stating that even if all of the above proves to >> be >> wrong or fixable, and the market works "perfectly" but effectively >> prices aspiring new entrants out of the industry, then I believe that >> would be grounds enough to reject it. > > I don't anticipate that a market will price out new entrants. In > fact, > I favor the transfer policy proposal precisely because it provides an > avenue for new and growing networks who need IPv4 space to get it > after > free pool exhaustion. > > In my opinion, the supply curve for IPv4 addresses will be somewhat > elastic, meaning that as the price goes up many IPv4 address holders > will begin to free up IPv4 addresses and make them available. Demand > will be elastic as well (quantity demanded will go down as the price > increases), but I think supply will be more elastic than demand simply > because there are so many netblocks out there already, so address > conservation efforts will have more effect on freeing up supply to be > transferred than on reducing the demands for new space. If a consortium is formed of the holder of legacy space, in particular, then supply will be regulated by the consortium, not by market forces. Then, if they're smart, they will regulate prices to the highest level the market will bear and sell them off a bit at a time. Think OPEC. The only way to make any of this a moot point is to make IPv4 irrelevant because IPv6 is fully embraced by the community. One way or the other, ARIN will lose control of the IPv4 space, whether by natural deprecation in favor of IPv6 or by continuous end-runs around ARIN policy through legal and illegal means. Unless ARIN wants to spend a large portion of its budget in legal battles my guess is there is not very much we can do. I know that ARIN says that they/we don't support one protocol over another, but it seems to me that we spend an inordinate amount of time working on policies that continue to buttress IPv4 with no comparative policies in "support of" IPv6. If ARIN doesn't support IPv6 then who will? If we don't make the ARIN community believe IPv6 is coming and that ARIN is more concerned with promoting IPv6 than trying to breath a little extra life into IPv4 then who will? It seems to me that the policy direction seems to be overly concerned with the latter. Regards, Mike From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 00:12:41 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 21:12:41 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> Message-ID: <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> Geoff, On Mar 5, 2008, at 10:43 PM, Geoff Huston wrote: > Some folk may be of the view that IPv4 + NATs is a long term viable > proposition, and may believe that in such a long term scenario the > value of IPv4 addresses may rise steadily over time. ... > Others may be of the view that one of the major elements in an IPv6 > transition is the incentive to stop deploying IPv4 and that may well > be based in an escalating value of IPv4 addresses, which would > increasingly provide economic incentives for entities to deploy IPv6 > as their mainstream technology base with minimal IPv4 translation > services. ... > Personally, I would tend to the first view - that escalating price > in an Ipv4 address market would rapidly drive the industry into IPv6. I think you meant that you tend to the second view. :-) I would agree this scenario is far preferable to the first. What actually comes about is, of course, hard to determine at this point in time. I personally believe that policies should be explicitly oriented towards promotion of the second view as one outcome of transfers could be a market encouraging increased address space utilization efficiency via NATs, which could reduce the pressure for IPv6 deployment. > I'd hardly characterize the APNIC policy proposal in such dramatic > terms. I thought the motto of RIR policy discussions was characterized by the following quote: "A little rudeness and disrespect can elevate a meaningless interaction to a battle of wills and add drama to an otherwise dull day." -- Calvin & Hobbes :-) > The APNIC model as it stands leaves the operation of any associated > market to the industry players themselves. I understand and in general agree with this approach. However, the implication of minimal constraint/regulation is that it gives actors free reign to pursue what they believe to be their best interests without regard to the more global implications of their actions. For example, as I understand it (correct me if I'm wrong), nothing in APNIC policy proposal deters (say) NIRs from efforts to corner the market for their members nor would it appear to discourage a raiding party from Sweden in Viking Long Boats to become an APNIC member and start acquiring address space for use elsewhere. To be clear, I am not necessarily saying this will happen, rather I was describing what I saw as extremes in the spectrum of the current proposals. Regards, -drc From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 00:31:02 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 21:31:02 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <1A97CDA0-3ABC-4567-A7F7-C07B3BEE94E8@adhost.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> <1A97CDA0-3ABC-4567-A7F7-C07B3BEE94E8@adhost.com> Message-ID: <47D0D316.5090006@internap.com> Michael Smith wrote: > Hello Scott: > > On Mar 6, 2008, at 8:29 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > >> I think that a legitimate transfer market will actually result in a >> large improvement in the quality of records reflected in whois. In >> order for an address holder to transfer addresses, they'll first need to >> demonstrate to ARIN that they are the legitimate holder of those >> addresses (through documentation of their relationship to the original >> recipient listed in whois), and then sign an RSA or legacy RSA. I >> anticipate that this will prompt a large number of resource holders to >> update out-of-date contact information, and will prompt a number of >> legacy holders to sign legacy RSAs. >> > I think that the legacy holders with a sense of the Internet "community' > have already returned, or are in the process of actively returning their > unused space. I don't think we should even worry about the rest of > those folks because I can't think of a single reason it is in their best > interests to return their space, given the present state of ARIN policy. I didn't say anything about community-minded legacy holders returning space to ARIN. I was talking about profit-minded legacy holders contacting ARIN to update their records and sign legacy RSAs, so they could then turn around and transfer some of the IPv4 addresses they hold to parties needing (and willing to pay) for them. >> In my opinion, the supply curve for IPv4 addresses will be somewhat >> elastic, meaning that as the price goes up many IPv4 address holders >> will begin to free up IPv4 addresses and make them available. Demand >> will be elastic as well (quantity demanded will go down as the price >> increases), but I think supply will be more elastic than demand simply >> because there are so many netblocks out there already, so address >> conservation efforts will have more effect on freeing up supply to be >> transferred than on reducing the demands for new space. > > If a consortium is formed of the holder of legacy space, in particular, > then supply will be regulated by the consortium, not by market forces. > Then, if they're smart, they will regulate prices to the highest level > the market will bear and sell them off a bit at a time. Think OPEC. That's a mighty big *if*. Generally suppliers in markets compete rather than collude, particularly when the number of suppliers is large, and each supplier controls a small fraction of supply. Those conditions are both met in this case: no address holder controls more than 1% of the IPv4 addresses, and there are thousands of different holders who might participate in the market. > > The only way to make any of this a moot point is to make IPv4 irrelevant > because IPv6 is fully embraced by the community. One way or the other, > ARIN will lose control of the IPv4 space, whether by natural deprecation > in favor of IPv6 or by continuous end-runs around ARIN policy through > legal and illegal means. Unless ARIN wants to spend a large portion of > its budget in legal battles my guess is there is not very much we can do. I think everyone is fully in favor of making IPv4 irrelevant through widespread adoption of IPv6. It's just a question of how quickly that can happen, and how we can make the transition less painful and costly for everyone involved. I believe that a transfer policy is necessary to get us from here to there as smoothly as possible. > I know that ARIN says that they/we don't support one protocol over > another, but it seems to me that we spend an inordinate amount of time > working on policies that continue to buttress IPv4 with no comparative > policies in "support of" IPv6. If ARIN doesn't support IPv6 then who > will? If we don't make the ARIN community believe IPv6 is coming and > that ARIN is more concerned with promoting IPv6 than trying to breath a > little extra life into IPv4 then who will? It seems to me that the > policy direction seems to be overly concerned with the latter. > I think the reason you don't see much policy work on IPv6 is that there aren't a lot of problems with IPv6 policy. Since there's no shortage of IPv6 addresses, we have the liberty of a very liberal IPv6 policy, providing huge blocks of addresses to just about any applicant who asks. If you can identify any policy areas where ARIN could better support IPv6, please share them. I for one believe we've addressed all the issues identified to date. -Scott From gih at apnic.net Fri Mar 7 00:38:26 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 16:38:26 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> David Conrad wrote: > Geoff, > > On Mar 5, 2008, at 10:43 PM, Geoff Huston wrote: >> Some folk may be of the view that IPv4 + NATs is a long term viable >> proposition, and may believe that in such a long term scenario the >> value of IPv4 addresses may rise steadily over time. > > ... >> Others may be of the view that one of the major elements in an IPv6 >> transition is the incentive to stop deploying IPv4 and that may well >> be based in an escalating value of IPv4 addresses, which would >> increasingly provide economic incentives for entities to deploy IPv6 >> as their mainstream technology base with minimal IPv4 translation >> services. > ... >> Personally, I would tend to the first view - that escalating price in >> an Ipv4 address market would rapidly drive the industry into IPv6. > > I think you meant that you tend to the second view. :-) just as well I added the extra text then - yes I can see escalating IPv4 prices providing clear price signals to players about the relative costs of Ipv4 and Ipv6 deployments > > I would agree this scenario is far preferable to the first. What > actually comes about is, of course, hard to determine at this point in > time. obviously. I personally believe that policies should be explicitly oriented > towards promotion of the second view as one outcome of transfers could > be a market encouraging increased address space utilization efficiency > via NATs, which could reduce the pressure for IPv6 deployment. Yes, I think we are on much the same page here. I can't see much point in attempting to suppress or distort an otherwise clear signal of scarcity by creating artificial impediments. Not only does it call into question the legitimacy of the party attempting to impose such constraints, and raise the question of whether such impositions should be accepted by the actors, it seems to me that it leads to no particularly useful space. > >> I'd hardly characterize the APNIC policy proposal in such dramatic terms. > > I thought the motto of RIR policy discussions was characterized by the > following quote: > > "A little rudeness and disrespect can elevate a meaningless interaction > to a battle of wills and add drama to an otherwise dull day." > -- Calvin & Hobbes > > :-) Well, in that case I'm obviously indebted to your dramatic contribution :-) > >> The APNIC model as it stands leaves the operation of any associated >> market to the industry players themselves. > > I understand and in general agree with this approach. > > However, the implication of minimal constraint/regulation is that it > gives actors free reign to pursue what they believe to be their best > interests without regard to the more global implications of their > actions. You know, I have this suspicion thats what this industry does best, and has perfected this approach with more than a century of practice. Indeed thats what I thought was encompassed in a economic study of this situation where we have managed to get to where we are now by precisely this behaviour of each actor diligently pursuing their (of their shareholders') interests. For example, as I understand it (correct me if I'm wrong), > nothing in APNIC policy proposal deters (say) NIRs from efforts to > corner the market for their members nor would it appear to discourage a > raiding party from Sweden in Viking Long Boats to become an APNIC member > and start acquiring address space for use elsewhere. This is correct - The proposal states that as long as the parties are members of APNIC, and the resource is a current resource in the APNIC database then APNIC will recognise a transfer of resource holding between the two parties. Geoff From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 00:51:20 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 21:51:20 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> Message-ID: <5BC5F153-9C9B-45D9-9C13-CD62E828191E@virtualized.org> Scott, On Mar 5, 2008, at 3:29 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: >> What are 'negative impacts'? > > I think you outlined a few of them earlier today, but they would > include the results of a number of different types of speculation > (unnecessary volatile prices, scarcity, etc.), hoarding of addresses > for various reasons (speculation, attempts to starve out > competitors, etc.), and unnecessary deaggregation. With the exception of the last, all of these consequences are part and parcel of the fact that the IPv4 free pool is exhausted. Put enough constraints on transfers and people won't bother. End result: hoarding (for some value of that variable), speculation via a black market, etc. The only thing the policy will have done is decrease ARIN's relevance in the post IPv4 free pool exhaustion world since the registration database will become less and less useful over time. As far as I can tell, the whole point of allowing transfers is to get allocated-but-unused address space back into play. If people hoard or buy it all up as a speculative effort, we're no worse off than we are when the IPv4 free pool is emptied, right? As for unnecessary deaggregation, what is or is not necessary is likely a matter of opinion. I firmly believe ISPs will look after themselves as they have done in the past and are doing so today by applying filters if they feel their infrastructure is at risk. In this particular respect, we've been here before and some folks still have the T-shirts (hopefully they've been washed). I'd be curious to understand why past solutions would not apply. >> I have a couple more fundamental questions: >> a) What is the overarching goal the transfer policy is trying to >> achieve? > > If there were just one goal, this would be easy. We're trying to > ensure the continued availability of IP resources after IPv4 free > pool exhaustion, minimizing disruption, minimizing unnecessary > deaggregation, preserving some level of fairness, etc... By this description, it would seem the policy is attempting to put ARIN in the position of being an arbiter of quite a few thing things it hasn't taken on before, e.g., "fairness" (fair to whom?), "availability" (for whom?), "unnecessary deaggregation" (from whose perspective), etc. I might suggest there are many, many mines in that particular field and that ARIN is not necessarily in the best position to blaze a path there. >> b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable >> time/resources) to enforce that policy? > > The main tool is that, as the recognized authority in registration > of IPv4 addresses in North America, recognition as valid of any > transfers by ARIN has considerable value to both transferors and > transferees. So it would seem a core criteria in any policy would be to minimize effects that would force folks to go elsewhere to have their transfers recognized, no? >> - the 6 month restriction could force folks to go outside the >> policy in desperation (e.g., the amount of address space available >> via transfers is likely to be hard to predict. You could be in a >> situation where at one point in time, the only option is a small >> block even though you know it won't last 6 months. What option do >> you have?) > > You could get PA space from your ISP or another LIR. I am assuming the folks most interested in getting address space will be ISPs so they can continue adding customers. Is the assumption of this policy that the consumers of address space are end users? > The intent of a the transfer policy is that it would ensure the > availability of blocks of all sizes legitimately demanded by > transferees. Therefore, if we do it right, there should always be > an appropriately sized block available at some price. ... > Rather, we hope to prevent the transfer of large numbers of small > blocks when a larger one would do, as we don't want networks to be > cobbling together their IP space from multiple sources and then > being forced to announce extra routes for all the different blocks. I fear the restrictions you are imposing will make it essentially impossible to "do it right" and will result in folks with address space finding other outlets in which to meet the needs of those who need address space. However, perhaps I misjudge the situation. Regards, -drc From tvest at pch.net Fri Mar 7 01:12:21 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 01:12:21 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> Message-ID: <266485D2-F010-49BB-B576-AFBFE5D329DC@pch.net> On Mar 6, 2008, at 11:29 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > Tom Vest wrote: > >> Now the "real world" answer. If RIR-rooted sidr is universally >> adopted and continues to be used by all RIR members, then for as >> long as that remains true it's possible to imagine that non- >> compliant transactions between two RSA signatories might have >> "consequences." It's much harder to imagine what consequence >> noncompliance could possibly have in any other context (e.g., >> legacy -> RSA, RSA -> legacy, legacy -> legacy). Do you think that >> legacy and non-RSA signatories will forebear from advertising or >> selling address space to "unqualified" RIR members for a little >> extra? What would prevent them from doing so? > > I think the main reason legitimate transfers (ones recognized by > the recognized authority on who holds a resource, the RIR) will be > favored by most potential participants due to the reduced risk of > using such a system. For example, if I need IPv4 space after > exhaustion, I could either go to ARIN, demonstrate to them that I > need the space, and have access to a centralized listing service of > transferors, all of whom ARIN has vouched for as being the > legitimate holders of the addresses they're transferring. Okay, all of this holds, but only for (RSA->RSA) transactions, which seem to me to be fairly low probability events until some/many large members are well into IPv6 migration. Of course I could turn out to be wrong, esp. is sidr is very widely adopted by current RSA non- signatories (thereby presumably becoming ARIN members)... > Or, I could go to some other black market, where I have no > assurance that the organization I'm "buying" the addresses from is > the legitimate holder of those addresses, and that they haven't or > won't "sell" the same addresses to someone else in addition to me. > I also have no way to update the authoritative registry if I "buy" > the addresses on the black market, and therefore I have a harder > time demonstrating (to my ISP or more importantly my customers) > that I have any legitimate claim to the space. If it's currently in production, I doubt that there will be many takers. If it's not, then I would reckon that some kind of incremental payment plan (i.e., like the kind the black hats always use in the movies) would solve most of these problems. >> I think whois provides a good benchmark. Most people seem to think >> that the quality of whois is fairly low. Most would say that data >> quality (completeness + accuracy) is substantially higher among >> current RSA signatories, but low among legacy resource holders >> (with a few giant/obvious exceptions). Setting aside for a moment >> the "actual facts", why do people believe this? Assuming that the >> facts largely bear this out, I would reckon that the gap between >> actual and "perfect" data quality, and the delta between RSA >> signatories and legacies provides some indication of the *max >> upper threshold* of compliance that one might realistically >> expect. After all, when the cost of compliance is so very low, but >> many people still decline to go along, then how much lower is it >> going to be when the stakes are very very high? > > I think that a legitimate transfer market will actually result in a > large improvement in the quality of records reflected in whois. In > order for an address holder to transfer addresses, they'll first > need to demonstrate to ARIN that they are the legitimate holder of > those addresses (through documentation of their relationship to the > original recipient listed in whois), and then sign an RSA or legacy > RSA. I think what you mean is, "in order for an address holder to transfer addresses by means of the approved transfer mechanism" ... > I anticipate that this will prompt a large number of resource > holders to update out-of-date contact information, and will prompt > a number of legacy holders to sign legacy RSAs. Although there are probably a few real Rip Van Winkles out there, I think it is more reasonable to assume that most remaining legacy non- signatories are motivated by something other than ignorance of the opportunity to follow the rules. Perhaps the proposed transfer process will achieve such prominence and critical mass that legacy resource holders will waive their self-declared right to do whatever they want with their resources. Perhaps none of them will find it more convenient/profitable to sell around the official mechanism and its rules. I wonder how high "white market" prices will have to go for all of these assumptions to hold true (note: foreshadowing for the new entrants point below)... Perhaps no RSA signatory will be tempted to jump the queue and trawl the gray market. Perhaps all are willing to continue abiding by needs- based allocation rules, even if that means that the wait for address space could be very long. But if that's so, there are probably better mechanisms to leverage this will to coordination that are less risky and volatile and unpredictable... >> I'll wrap by simply stating that even if all of the above proves >> to be wrong or fixable, and the market works "perfectly" but >> effectively prices aspiring new entrants out of the industry, then >> I believe that would be grounds enough to reject it. > > I don't anticipate that a market will price out new entrants. In > fact, I favor the transfer policy proposal precisely because it > provides an avenue for new and growing networks who need IPv4 space > to get it after free pool exhaustion. I concede that Richard Branson will always be able to start a new ISP if he wants to, so in principle the industry will always remain "open" in some trivial sense. The kind of "open" I was referring to was the more functional/pragmatic kind -- i.e., the kind that mollifies internal critics and makes them more likely to identify their interests with community and its institutions rather than an aspiring competitor, the kind that persuades anti-trust authorities to move on, because there's nothing to see here... > In my opinion, the supply curve for IPv4 addresses will be somewhat > elastic, meaning that as the price goes up many IPv4 address > holders will begin to free up IPv4 addresses and make them available. I agree, but I believe that there are better, less volatile, more sustainable methods to leverage that elasticity, so that the needs- based allocation regime and all of the collateral values that have gotten a (largely unnoticed) free ride on it over the last decade can be preserved. > Demand will be elastic as well (quantity demanded will go down as > the price increases), I agree here too, but I believe that there are better, less volatile, more sustainable methods to manage that elasticity so that it is spread across all resource users rather than killing the newest/ smallest first. > but I think supply will be more elastic than demand simply because > there are so many netblocks out there already, (in the gray) > so address conservation efforts will have more effect on freeing up > supply to be transferred than on reducing the demands for new space. We are in 100% agreement here again. The trick is to marshall price signals to induce this kind of behavior sooner rather than later, and to keep the resulting address recirculation process more effectively tied to needs-based delegation principles. So long as the price/heat continues to go up evenly across all resource users, the effects on migration out of v4 should be the same. Given that, all that's really necessary is to keep everyone approximately equally happy/unhappy but *together* through the full (long) transition -- e.g., from gated v4/v6 coexistence to LISP or some other, similarly durable/scalable future arrangement. TV From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 01:14:05 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 22:14:05 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> Message-ID: <881EF36A-A09A-4606-A52B-71E46DE2120E@virtualized.org> Tony, On Mar 6, 2008, at 10:31 AM, Tony Li wrote: > |It is probably worthwhile remembering that (at least in the ARIN > case) > |we're talking about life after the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free > |pool. The definition of "hoarding" will likely be subject to some > |debate. > | > |For example, there is a well known university sitting on a /8. Is > |that hoarding? > > Of course not. It would seem others disagree. > But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every prefix, > drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that would > distort the market. Very true. I believe one theory is that such a course of action would _strongly_ encourage IPv6 deployment and hence, would not necessarily be a bad thing. The implication being that if you believe IPv6 is the right way to go, minimal restrictions would have the most positive long term effect, albeit it may result in a bit of initial "discomfort"... Regards, -drc From tvest at pch.net Fri Mar 7 01:25:46 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 01:25:46 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> Message-ID: <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> On Mar 7, 2008, at 12:38 AM, Geoff Huston wrote: > You know, I have this suspicion thats what this industry does best, > and > has perfected this approach with more than a century of practice. > Indeed > thats what I thought was encompassed in a economic study of this > situation where we have managed to get to where we are now by > precisely > this behaviour of each actor diligently pursuing their (of their > shareholders') interests. Sometimes that best practice leads to global or near-global collapse. It has happened twice in our industries/careers already, with costs that I believe you both know well. Sometimes what follows the collapse is better, sometimes it's not that obvious. Regardless, many people and companies suffer badly, for a long time if not permanently. If you wish to claim that this transition poses no such risks, then I will try very hard to just move on to other points. If you acknowledge that risk, however, I think it's worth considering less risky/volatile options. TV From gih at apnic.net Fri Mar 7 01:39:10 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 17:39:10 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> Tom Vest wrote: > > On Mar 7, 2008, at 12:38 AM, Geoff Huston wrote: > >> You know, I have this suspicion thats what this industry does best, and >> has perfected this approach with more than a century of practice. Indeed >> thats what I thought was encompassed in a economic study of this >> situation where we have managed to get to where we are now by precisely >> this behaviour of each actor diligently pursuing their (of their >> shareholders') interests. > > Sometimes that best practice leads to global or near-global collapse. > It has happened twice in our industries/careers already, with costs that > I believe you both know well. > > Sometimes what follows the collapse is better, sometimes it's not that > obvious. > Regardless, many people and companies suffer badly, for a long time if > not permanently. > > If you wish to claim that this transition poses no such risks, then I > will try very hard to just move on to other points. > > If you acknowledge that risk, however, I think it's worth considering > less risky/volatile options. Tom, as Scott has already requested from you, we haven't seen any other options from you yet! Once the unallocated space is exhausted then if you still want IPv4 addresses you are going to have get addresses from someone who already has them. Now I must admit that the escalation of events from airplane crashes, to ships sinking, to bridges burning to now global collapse is all riveting reading, but lets put this into some realistic proportion. Yes, the situation the this industry has driven itself into is messy, but I'm pretty sure that global collapse is not exactly on the agenda. In such situations you hare going to have a number of responses -some will wait for as long as possible and try to take a lead from others who they think have steered an appropriate course through this. Others will adopt a position of early adoption in the hope that it will lead to an advantaged position as the progress. And others will fall somewhere in between the two. Some of these choices that actors make will play out to the benefit of the actors, other will not. Some vendors will produce product ahead of market demand, most will not. Thats not new news now or in the past. Thats just the way we operate as an industry. What I would claim is that this transition is just another risk factor in an industry that has its fair share already and doubtless will continue to have its fair share in the future. Geoff From jcurran at istaff.org Fri Mar 7 02:59:53 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 02:59:53 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> Message-ID: At 5:39 PM +1100 3/7/08, Geoff Huston wrote: >Yes, the situation the this industry has driven itself into is messy, but >I'm pretty sure that global collapse is not exactly on the agenda. >... >What I would claim is that this transition is just another risk factor >in an industry that has its fair share already and doubtless will >continue to have its fair share in the future. I'd agree with you if there were anything resembling a useful feedback mechanism on the global routing table. As it is, the only knob available is route filtering, and while that works fine as a tool against needless deaggregation, it really doesn't work well filtering lots of new unique routes from your peers all of which are necessary to cover their new customers... The costs of injecting new routes are borne by third parties (i.e. all other DFZ participants). Without direct predictable routing costs, there is no counter-pressure to fragmentation in the presence of a high demand marketplace. If ISP's continue to attempt to globally connect new customers via IPv4 after depletion, one had best hope they do it by finding and obtaining very large underutilized blocks; the usage model would closely resemble today's RIR-provided blocks, and the resulting routing demand when announced would at least be comparable to today's (manageable) situation. If ISP's can't obtain large blocks post depletion and we instead see customers having to BYOB ("Bring Your Own Block") to get IPv4 connectivity, then new routes will be introduced at a much greater rate, and with very real uncertainty regarding whether these routes will be filtered outside of their originating ISP. Despite such filtering, ISP's are motivated to keep connecting customers and refer connectivity issues to the filtering peer, since such filtering is "voluntarily". Some organizations would consider connections to the majority of the DFZ ISP backbones so that their public servers can have at least one address on the same "Carrier Internet" backbone as any new customer site. That end state isn't global collapse, but it also isn't global connectivity. /John Disclaimer: my opinions only; discard or forward as desired. From gih at apnic.net Fri Mar 7 03:17:53 2008 From: gih at apnic.net (Geoff Huston) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 19:17:53 +1100 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> Message-ID: <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> John Curran wrote: > At 5:39 PM +1100 3/7/08, Geoff Huston wrote: >> Yes, the situation the this industry has driven itself into is messy, but >> I'm pretty sure that global collapse is not exactly on the agenda. >> ... >> What I would claim is that this transition is just another risk factor >> in an industry that has its fair share already and doubtless will >> continue to have its fair share in the future. > > I'd agree with you if there were anything resembling a useful > feedback mechanism on the global routing table. The sad fact is that the global routing table has been under concentrated assault by the legions of /24s for many years now. Since 2001 50% of the routing table is more specifics - and now there are 135,208 of them. My supposition is that TE is the major factor - when you look at highly deaggregated prefixes you tend to see a collection of upstreams and load spreading across the upstreams. So in many ways the routing system is already under this "fragmentation" pressure and will remain so whether its IPv4 or IPv6 (and I suspect at a more meta level, efforts to reintroduce aggregation into the routing system, if adopted would not have much impact in changing the current numbers by very much simply because of these TE pressures). What we route across is the cross product of the number of distinct entites, the level of interconnection between entities and the desired/imposed level of diversity of path. And as the network expands the value of this cross product will rise, transfers, minimum size limits, or any other factor nowithstanding, and the routing table will continue to inflate at a rate that is higher than the number of distinct routing entities. So what I'm saying is that the routing system is an expression of a more basic metric of the network's interconnection, and that this value will be expressed in the routing system irregardless of the particular routing technology and irrespective of the varioous address policies that we may state. As I understand your argument here John its that fragmented address supply won't make it any better, but it could make it worse, and that could trigger responses such as selective filtering, threatening global connectivity. Yes, thats a valid concern. Without much data to quantify the risk its hard to assess how critical this factor will be. Geoff From michael.dillon at bt.com Fri Mar 7 06:06:41 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 11:06:41 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org><47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net><054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org><47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net><95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> Message-ID: > Tom, as Scott has already requested from you, we haven't seen > any other options from you yet! Once the unallocated space is > exhausted then if you still want IPv4 addresses you are going > to have get addresses from someone who already has them. Not so. You can also NOT GET ANY new IP addresses, and suffer the consequences. That could mean bankruptcy or it could mean increased costs to transfer to IPv6 in a hurry. The increased costs would mainly be lost opportunities while you fix the problem, and increased churn rates as some customers treat your company like a leper. The fact is that nobody needs to be dependent on new IPv4 addresses after the runout date. There is plenty of time for companies to make their businesses work with a mix of IPv6 and IPv4. There have been some very public demonstrations of this mixture at the last ARIN and NANOG meetings. There will be another demo at the upcoming IETF meeting. So far, if you examine the results of these demonstrations, there are no serious problems that could not be fixed within a two year timeframe. And we do have two years, probably more, to fix these issues. Once it is demonstrably possible to run a fully mixed IPv4 and IPv6 network, the need for transfers disappears. Note that I am not referring here to dual-stack networks. When I say MIXED I mean that you have some endpoints that are IPv4 and some endpoints that are IPV6 and that they can both communicate with each other over infrastructure that has at least one pure IPv6 section in it. > Yes, the situation the this industry > has driven itself into is messy, but I'm pretty sure that > global collapse is not exactly on the agenda. Indeed. The situation is more like the telecom collapse era when companies that were not sufficiently robust went out of business or were bought out or shrunk. This is a good thing for the economy since it is part of the process of natural selection of business models. > What I would claim is that this transition is just another > risk factor in an industry that has its fair share already > and doubtless will continue to have its fair share in the future. Exactly. There is no need for RIRs to take any special actions to prepare for IPv4 runout. No transfer policy is needed. Just keep running the RIR as normal and keep reporting status so that we can see how much time is left. --Michael Dillon Don't forget that ARIN has a wiki with info (and pointers to resources) for network providers who want to add IPv6 to their networks. http://www.getipv6.info From leo.vegoda at icann.org Fri Mar 7 06:26:05 2008 From: leo.vegoda at icann.org (Leo Vegoda) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 03:26:05 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: Message-ID: On 07/03/2008 12:06, "michael.dillon at bt.com" wrote: [...] > Exactly. There is no need for RIRs to take any special actions > to prepare for IPv4 runout. No transfer policy is needed. Just > keep running the RIR as normal and keep reporting status so that > we can see how much time is left. Plan A. Because there is no Plan B. I'm sure it will be exciting. Leo From randy at psg.com Fri Mar 7 07:19:59 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 04:19:59 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Tom Vest wrote: > Every claim that I've ever heard that a decentralized, > every-operator-for-itself resource transfer policy is inevitable > starts with the assertion that any rule (and any rulemaker) that gets > in the way of maximum self-help will be irrelevant in the post-free > pool world. see a doctor about your ears > Markets are not inevitable. a market already exists, so the inevitability is irrelevant Scott Leibrand wrote: > I think everyone is fully in favor of making IPv4 irrelevant through > widespread adoption of IPv6. there are at least three other camps, lisp, nat-for-all, and rabid-anything-but-ipv6. and they are not insignificant. this discussion makes their points well. Michael Smith wrote: > If a consortium is formed of the holder of legacy space, in > particular, then supply will be regulated by the consortium, not by > market forces. Then, if they're smart, they will regulate prices to > the highest level the market will bear and sell them off a bit at a > time. Think OPEC. they would have to. black helicopters are extremely expensive, especially the invisible ones. the bogeyperson play, whether the bogeyperson is the igf, the itu, the evil legacy holders, or whatever is getting pretty childish and boring, and i now severely discount anyone who tries to play it as a threat. i suspect i will like the bogeypeople about as well as the folk here. there are good apples in every barrel. and if they think a bit differently, then it will be an opportunity for me to learn a different view of the world, always a good thing. Geoff Huston wrote: > an april day fools effort (rejected by the RFC Editor, by the way) > that rewrote the Kyoto Protocol to talk about BGP Update credits > (http://www.potaroo.net/drafts/draft-bert-kyoto-protocol-00.html). > The really scary bit is that it has been the closest I've ever seen > to the imposition of economic controls on the routing system that > could possibly fly. i take it seriously lucy makes a strong case that carbon like pool markets best model what we have here. > I can't see much point in attempting to suppress or distort an > otherwise clear signal of scarcity by creating artificial > impediments. Not only does it call into question the legitimacy of > the party attempting to impose such constraints, and raise the > question of whether such impositions should be accepted by the > actors, it seems to me that it leads to no particularly useful space. at layer 11, i am hearing a lot of noise on the line of "registries desperately trying to assure a continuing income stream," and "amateur over- regulators are worse than most markets." i do not think either is completely true. but discussions such as on this list are being read by folk who wear different and expensive clothes and they are not impressed. heck, i am not impressed. "guns in the hands of children." and guns on which more and more of our economies and societies are increasingly dependent. Scott Leibrand wrote: > But most IPs are not used by organizations getting a /24 to > multihome. They are being used by actual devices (computers, home > NAT boxes, whatever) with a single public IP per device. if true, and i have not seen actual measurement, then this is productive use of a scarce resource. cool. how can we increase it? hint: the grown-up economists i heard earlier this week said a benefit of a market is that it finds "best use" for the goods (not magically, of course). but most routing table slots are being used by TE and asocial pollution of the commons. this behavior is non-productive. i want to stomp it. John Curran wrote: > I'd agree with you if there were anything resembling a useful > feedback mechanism on the global routing table. As it is, the only > knob available is route filtering, and while that works fine as a > tool against needless deaggregation, it really doesn't work well > filtering lots of new unique routes from your peers all of which are > necessary to cover their new customers... the latter represents real business and folk with real packets. the TE and intentional fragging represents non-product and is worth stomping. drc wrote: > Put enough constraints on transfers and people won't bother. End > result: hoarding (for some value of that variable), speculation via a > black market, etc. The only thing the policy will have done is > decrease ARIN's relevance in the post IPv4 free pool exhaustion world > since the registration database will become less and less useful > over time. bingo! much of this discussion is about how best to shoot ourselves, as an organization and an industry, in the foot. i suspect we will succeed in killing ourselves as amateur over-regulators, but the guns will be removed from our hands before we do serious damage to the industry. > it would seem the policy is attempting to put ARIN in the position of > being an arbiter of quite a few thing things it hasn't taken on > before, e.g., "fairness" (fair to whom?), "availability" (for whom?), > "unnecessary deaggregation" (from whose perspective), etc. I might > suggest there are many, many mines in that particular field and that > ARIN is not necessarily in the best position to blaze a path there. from listening to some economic grown-ups early this week, one of the take-aways was that these are not simple issues and even the language we seem to be using is a far from productive. we amateur regulators are in way way over our heads, and thrashing is not gonna make us float any better. what it will likely do is bring in the professionals, and i am starting to look forward to that as preferable to all this. randy From woody at pch.net Fri Mar 7 07:32:01 2008 From: woody at pch.net (Bill Woodcock) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 04:32:01 -0800 (PST) Subject: [ppml] Abuse address In-Reply-To: <004301c87fc8$edad6650$5b01a8c0@mvs1domain.mvssol.com> References: <004301c87fc8$edad6650$5b01a8c0@mvs1domain.mvssol.com> Message-ID: On Thu, 6 Mar 2008, Martin Wills wrote: > Why does Arin not insist on some abuse address showing up in Whois? You are ARIN. If you want the ARIN staff to revise the templates to make an abuse address mandatory, please follow the policy proposal process to suggest that, and see if the other members agree with you. http://www.arin.net/policy/irpep_template.html -Bill From tvest at pch.net Fri Mar 7 07:35:18 2008 From: tvest at pch.net (Tom Vest) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 07:35:18 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Message-ID: <2E24AD52-C9C3-4BE6-ADCC-33F242251362@pch.net> On Mar 7, 2008, at 7:19 AM, Randy Bush wrote: > Tom Vest wrote: >> Every claim that I've ever heard that a decentralized, >> every-operator-for-itself resource transfer policy is inevitable >> starts with the assertion that any rule (and any rulemaker) that gets >> in the way of maximum self-help will be irrelevant in the post-free >> pool world. > > see a doctor about your ears > >> Markets are not inevitable. > > a market already exists, so the inevitability is irrelevant > > Scott Leibrand wrote: >> I think everyone is fully in favor of making IPv4 irrelevant through >> widespread adoption of IPv6. > > there are at least three other camps, lisp, nat-for-all, and > rabid-anything-but-ipv6. and they are not insignificant. this > discussion makes their points well. > > Michael Smith wrote: >> If a consortium is formed of the holder of legacy space, in >> particular, then supply will be regulated by the consortium, not by >> market forces. Then, if they're smart, they will regulate prices to >> the highest level the market will bear and sell them off a bit at a >> time. Think OPEC. > > they would have to. black helicopters are extremely expensive, > especially the invisible ones. > > the bogeyperson play, whether the bogeyperson is the igf, the itu, the > evil legacy holders, or whatever is getting pretty childish and > boring, > and i now severely discount anyone who tries to play it as a > threat. i > suspect i will like the bogeypeople about as well as the folk here. > there are good apples in every barrel. and if they think a bit > differently, then it will be an opportunity for me to learn a > different > view of the world, always a good thing. > > Geoff Huston wrote: >> an april day fools effort (rejected by the RFC Editor, by the way) >> that rewrote the Kyoto Protocol to talk about BGP Update credits >> (http://www.potaroo.net/drafts/draft-bert-kyoto-protocol-00.html). >> The really scary bit is that it has been the closest I've ever seen >> to the imposition of economic controls on the routing system that >> could possibly fly. > > i take it seriously lucy makes a strong case that carbon like pool > markets best model what we have here. > >> I can't see much point in attempting to suppress or distort an >> otherwise clear signal of scarcity by creating artificial >> impediments. Not only does it call into question the legitimacy of >> the party attempting to impose such constraints, and raise the >> question of whether such impositions should be accepted by the >> actors, it seems to me that it leads to no particularly useful space. > > at layer 11, i am hearing a lot of noise on the line of "registries > desperately trying to assure a continuing income stream," and "amateur > over- regulators are worse than most markets." i do not think > either is > completely true. but discussions such as on this list are being > read by > folk who wear different and expensive clothes and they are not > impressed. heck, i am not impressed. "guns in the hands of > children." > and guns on which more and more of our economies and societies are > increasingly dependent. > > Scott Leibrand wrote: >> But most IPs are not used by organizations getting a /24 to >> multihome. They are being used by actual devices (computers, home >> NAT boxes, whatever) with a single public IP per device. > > if true, and i have not seen actual measurement, then this is > productive > use of a scarce resource. cool. how can we increase it? hint: the > grown-up economists i heard earlier this week said a benefit of a > market > is that it finds "best use" for the goods (not magically, of course). Maybe we can get a volume discount on hearing intervention then... clearly I am not the only potential customer. None of the "grown-ups" you heard earlier this week actually said *one word* about how to establish a viable market. Lots of talk about how nice a viable market might be, and some about how one could be cleanly administered after it had been established, assuming all of the conveniently skirted bootstrap problems are solved and has already agreed about what values should be maximized. I thought we had all agreed that whitewashing/marketing-speak wasn't all that constructive for promoting constructive adaptation? You certainly seem to have embraced that philosophy for IPv6, and I think we're all better off for it. Why the complete about-face here? TV > but most routing table slots are being used by TE and asocial > pollution > of the commons. this behavior is non-productive. i want to stomp it. > > John Curran wrote: >> I'd agree with you if there were anything resembling a useful >> feedback mechanism on the global routing table. As it is, the only >> knob available is route filtering, and while that works fine as a >> tool against needless deaggregation, it really doesn't work well >> filtering lots of new unique routes from your peers all of which are >> necessary to cover their new customers... > > the latter represents real business and folk with real packets. > the TE > and intentional fragging represents non-product and is worth stomping. > > drc wrote: >> Put enough constraints on transfers and people won't bother. End >> result: hoarding (for some value of that variable), speculation via a >> black market, etc. The only thing the policy will have done is >> decrease ARIN's relevance in the post IPv4 free pool exhaustion world >> since the registration database will become less and less useful >> over time. > > bingo! much of this discussion is about how best to shoot > ourselves, as > an organization and an industry, in the foot. i suspect we will > succeed > in killing ourselves as amateur over-regulators, but the guns will be > removed from our hands before we do serious damage to the industry. > >> it would seem the policy is attempting to put ARIN in the position of >> being an arbiter of quite a few thing things it hasn't taken on >> before, e.g., "fairness" (fair to whom?), "availability" (for whom?), >> "unnecessary deaggregation" (from whose perspective), etc. I might >> suggest there are many, many mines in that particular field and that >> ARIN is not necessarily in the best position to blaze a path there. > > from listening to some economic grown-ups early this week, one of the > take-aways was that these are not simple issues and even the > language we > seem to be using is a far from productive. we amateur regulators > are in > way way over our heads, and thrashing is not gonna make us float any > better. what it will likely do is bring in the professionals, and > i am > starting to look forward to that as preferable to all this. > > randy > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net > if you experience any issues. From randy at psg.com Fri Mar 7 08:00:18 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 05:00:18 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <2E24AD52-C9C3-4BE6-ADCC-33F242251362@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <2E24AD52-C9C3-4BE6-ADCC-33F242251362@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D13C62.3050504@psg.com> > None of the "grown-ups" you heard earlier this week actually said *one > word* about how to establish a viable market. considering you seem to have problems with your ears, perhaps you might not tell me what mine heard. > Lots of talk about how nice a viable market might be, and some about how > one could be cleanly administered after it had been established, > assuming all of the conveniently skirted bootstrap problems are solved > and has already agreed about what values should be maximized. heard that stuff too. > I thought we had all agreed that whitewashing/marketing-speak wasn't all > that constructive for promoting constructive adaptation? > You certainly seem to have embraced that philosophy for IPv6, and I > think we're all better off for it. > Why the complete about-face here? i suggest you show the whitewash about face before slinging mud in a knee-jerk reaction. nowhere in my message did i say that there was a magic solution, markets were perfect, ... if things were simple, we would not be having discussions in this and other fora. but knee-jerk fanboy reactions make cause much of this forum to be increasingly discounted. randy From jcurran at istaff.org Fri Mar 7 08:00:17 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 08:00:17 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Message-ID: At 4:19 AM -0800 3/7/08, Randy Bush wrote: >at layer 11, i am hearing a lot of noise on the line of "registries >desperately trying to assure a continuing income stream," Registries have a function to perform (technical administration of numbering resources) which right now doesn't appear to be readily automatable. This is mostly because the semantics on the resources include both uniqueness and hierarchy/topology, with the result being historically lots of wrangling over allocation policy and routing implications. As IPv4 availability decreases, the expectation appears to be even more policy work to 'best' administration the remaining free pool. If the semantics were changed to be only uniqueness (such as you might have in the IPv6 domain after any successful endpoint/location split, or IPv4 post-depletion if it's felt that the routing implications of IPv4 xfers are simply beyond RIR scope), this core function of the RIR becomes much simpler and one can imagine a greatly reduced need for policy administration and a high degree of automation on the resource administration side. When considering implications of a potential 'market', one of the points raised by the ARIN AC to the ARIN Board was best summed up as follows: * Preserving ARIN's reason to exist, should not enter the calculus of this decision. If the path to a better Internet involves the dissolution of ARIN, then so be it. I don't know about the thoughts of other RIR's on this topic (and the ARIN Board hasn't expressed a formal position) but personally I feel that the RIR's exist to serve the need of technical administration of the resources, and most definitely not the other way around. /John From jcurran at istaff.org Fri Mar 7 08:44:26 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 08:44:26 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: At 7:17 PM +1100 3/7/08, Geoff Huston wrote: > >The sad fact is that the global routing table has been under concentrated assault by the legions of /24s for many years now. > >Since 2001 50% of the routing table is more specifics - and now there are 135,208 of them. My supposition is that TE is the major factor - when you look at highly deaggregated prefixes you tend to see a collection of upstreams and load spreading across the upstreams. > >So in many ways the routing system is already under this "fragmentation" pressure and will remain so whether its IPv4 or IPv6 Agreed, but I'll note that every day hundreds of new entities connect up to the Internet via PA space with no fragmentation as a result. Further, ISP's can make conscience decisions to inject routes for TE and to filter others TE more specifics. In a post-depletion scenario where customers want IPv4 connectivity and bring their own blocks, ISPs have little choice but to accept the customers (and inject the route) rather than sending them to a competitor. This includes customers showing up with just a /30 and NAT CPE... There's no reason to think that the number of new sites per unit time is declining, so it's really a question of the number of new routes to cover the same growth rate. >As I understand your argument here John its that fragmented address supply won't make it any better, but it could make it worse, and that could trigger responses such as selective filtering, threatening global connectivity. Yes, thats a valid concern. Without much data to quantify the risk its hard to assess how critical this factor will be. To rephrase slightly: a fragmented IPv4 address supply, made available to individual end sites via transfer policy, *will* make it much, much worse, and inevitably require a high degree of selective filtering. It still remains to be seen whether any RIR adopts a transfer policy which creates such an address supply. /John From jmaimon at chl.com Fri Mar 7 09:16:31 2008 From: jmaimon at chl.com (Joe Maimon) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 09:16:31 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <47D14E3F.1090301@chl.com> David Conrad wrote: > I would agree this scenario is far preferable to the first. What > actually comes about is, of course, hard to determine at this point in > time. I personally believe that policies should be explicitly > oriented towards promotion of the second view as one outcome of > transfers could be a market encouraging increased address space > utilization efficiency via NATs, which could reduce the pressure for > IPv6 deployment. This would actually be a best case scenario, where access to ipv4 internet is through ipv4 nat, but ipv6 is end-to-end. Thus ipv6 service (which is plentiful and cheap) now has a clear advantage to it, one that will only grow as the rfc1918-ing of "consumer" customers picks up speed, and dual stack can actually work as a practical migration strategy. This is actually the path of least resistance for ISP's wishing to migrate their customer base to ipv6 in the face of ipv4 shortage, whether or not ipv4 is available for whatever price. Switch your users to pop boundaried rfc1918 natted to give "normal" access to ipv4 net, offer them all ipv6, offer the holdouts and content/service providers inbound ipv4 either sold by the port or by the address for a premium. Market pressures and network effect should take care of the rest. Without this approach, the pressure becomes all about enabling access to ipv4 from ipv6 (and ipv4 to ipv6), because otherwise ipv6 is useless. So which is the better technology and outcome, dual stack of nat ipv4 and end to end ipv6 or single stack ipv6 with {proxy | nat | undefined} solutions for ipv4 interop? The situation for content providers is likely a bit more problematic than for ISP's. From bicknell at ufp.org Fri Mar 7 09:57:41 2008 From: bicknell at ufp.org (Leo Bicknell) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 09:57:41 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Message-ID: <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> In a message written on Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 04:19:59AM -0800, Randy Bush wrote: > > Markets are not inevitable. > > a market already exists, so the inevitability is irrelevant I keep seeing a bunch of engineers argue these two points using rather fine points of the English language, and all sides are avoiding the real issue. A black market exists for /everything/. From IP's to toilet paper there are people selling it "outside the system". Thus Randy's quote of "a market already exists" is technically true. But, most black markets are /insignificant/. It doesn't matter if you measure by number of transactions, or dollar value, or any other measure in most cases the black market doesn't even come close to a rounding error. For most goods (e.g. toilet paper) people selling on the black market are doing so either to support illegal activity (e.g. TP'ing someone's house with "untraceable" paper) or because they have some problem with the system (e.g. don't want to pay sales tax on their TP). I would argue at this stage the black market in Internet Resources is insignificant in that it is both small in number of transactions and small in dollar value. I would also argue most of the transactions are supporting illegal activity (spam, malware, etc). What's really interesting is if the black market turns into something where a significant percentage of law abiding citizens turn to the black market. For one of the largest black markets ever think prohibition; many ordinary citizens who would otherwise obey the law turned to "illegal" producers. In this respect Randy totally misses the boat with "inevitability is irrelevant" because he ignored the the original poster intent, which was something more like this: Black markets that gain wide acceptance between otherwise rule following participants are not inevitable. Is such a market inevitable? I don't think so. Today we have a system where most major ISP's want to see documentation you can use the IP space you want to route. Whois, LOA from the holder, we've all seen the various checks. Yes, I realize not 100% of the networks check, but enough do that it is common. We all see technical value in these checks. Those who fail to hold their customers to the checks generally get the wrath of the community (witness the Youtube event, for the most recent case) because we know this is a sort of mutually assured destruction. While we would all like to be able to announce any prefix we want if we all did that and trounced over each others customers the Internet would quite literally fall apart. In short, it's my belief that even if there was no way to transfer resources the black market would never rise above a rounding error (although it may get somewhat larger than it is today); and is thus not an issue. However, if we're going to have a real discussion this issue people need to grow up. The fact that 10 people bought and sold hijacked netblocks last year is a complete non sequitur to the discussion at hand. The interesting discussion is if there will be a market where AT&T, VerizonBusiness, Qwest, Level 3, Cox, Comcast, Cablevision, and other large companies will purchase IP resources. Would the situation get so bad that these large corporations would risk punishment by the law, regulators, and their peers for turning to a black market. I think not. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: not available URL: From bicknell at ufp.org Fri Mar 7 10:10:06 2008 From: bicknell at ufp.org (Leo Bicknell) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 10:10:06 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <881EF36A-A09A-4606-A52B-71E46DE2120E@virtualized.org> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <881EF36A-A09A-4606-A52B-71E46DE2120E@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <20080307151006.GB43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> In a message written on Thu, Mar 06, 2008 at 10:14:05PM -0800, David Conrad wrote: > > But say if Warren Buffet decided to buy up every prefix, > > drive up prices and then dole them out with an eye dropper, that would > > distort the market. > > Very true. I believe one theory is that such a course of action would > _strongly_ encourage IPv6 deployment and hence, would not necessarily > be a bad thing. The implication being that if you believe IPv6 is the > right way to go, minimal restrictions would have the most positive > long term effect, albeit it may result in a bit of initial > "discomfort"... This statement is true, but potentially misleading. There are a number of scenarios under which the price for resources in a market would skyrocket. I think there is wide agreement that if the price is high enough it is less pain to move to IPv6. The issue for many though is how we "hit the wall". One of the major arguments for a transfer policy is that having a "hard stop" date is painful to the industry. We can't just run out of IPv4 and switch to IPv6. However, if speculators were to enter the market, that's exactly what could happen. Over the course of a very short period of time (perhaps a month, maybe less) speculators could drive the price to a point where no ISP can afford it, and there is a rapid migration to IPv6. Thus if your motivation is that hitting the wall is bad, then the speculator's driving up prices and causing a switch is likely to seem in the same league, if not worse as people may have been lulled into a false sense of security by the existence of a white market. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: not available URL: From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 10:56:30 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 07:56:30 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: Leo, On Mar 7, 2008, at 6:57 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote: > What's really interesting is if the black market turns into something > where a significant percentage of law abiding citizens turn to the > black market. Very true. And the reason folks turn to a black market is generally because the white market is unable to meet their requirements. The reason this would be the case is typically because restrictions/ constraints/regulations make it too hard/expensive to obtain what you need from the white market. > In short, it's my belief that even if there was no way to transfer > resources the black market would never rise above a rounding error > (although it may get somewhat larger than it is today); and is thus > not an issue. A lot depends on the continued demand for IPv4 post free pool exhaustion and the level of restriction that is applied in efforts to increase utilization efficiency. If IPv4 post free pool exhaustion demand is a reasonable percentage of current demand and there is no way for that demand to be met through transfers, do you still posit a black market would be insignificant? > Would the > situation get so bad that these large corporations would risk > punishment by the law, regulators, and their peers for turning to > a black market. Last I checked, ARIN did not have force of law or regulation and had little control over what peers do amongst themselves. Perhaps more interestingly, it may be useful to remember that ARIN is not a monopoly in IPv4 address registration services. There are already two other potential venues for transfer registration services (with proposed transfer policies that are significantly less onerous) and those venues are already viewed as legitimate by large corporations (I imagine the ones you speak of are already members). Regards, -drc From mksmith at adhost.com Fri Mar 7 10:58:01 2008 From: mksmith at adhost.com (Michael Smith) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 07:58:01 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Message-ID: <26BF00DA-8F11-4073-B446-B66DC843226E@adhost.com> > Michael Smith wrote: >> If a consortium is formed of the holder of legacy space, in >> particular, then supply will be regulated by the consortium, not by >> market forces. Then, if they're smart, they will regulate prices to >> the highest level the market will bear and sell them off a bit at a >> time. Think OPEC. > > they would have to. black helicopters are extremely expensive, > especially the invisible ones. > > the bogeyperson play, whether the bogeyperson is the igf, the itu, the > evil legacy holders, or whatever is getting pretty childish and > boring, > and i now severely discount anyone who tries to play it as a > threat. i > suspect i will like the bogeypeople about as well as the folk here. > there are good apples in every barrel. and if they think a bit > differently, then it will be an opportunity for me to learn a > different > view of the world, always a good thing. No tin foil hats here. I am not an economist and I'm not a lawyer and it seems a lot of these discussions should include a lot more of both. There will probably be a lot of different markets and models and competing theories as to what type of resource IPv4 is and, thus, what model it's scarcity will follow. >> it would seem the policy is attempting to put ARIN in the position of >> being an arbiter of quite a few thing things it hasn't taken on >> before, e.g., "fairness" (fair to whom?), "availability" (for whom?), >> "unnecessary deaggregation" (from whose perspective), etc. I might >> suggest there are many, many mines in that particular field and that >> ARIN is not necessarily in the best position to blaze a path there. > > from listening to some economic grown-ups early this week, one of the > take-aways was that these are not simple issues and even the > language we > seem to be using is a far from productive. we amateur regulators > are in > way way over our heads, and thrashing is not gonna make us float any > better. what it will likely do is bring in the professionals, and i > am > starting to look forward to that as preferable to all this. Is the recommendation then to; 1) hold fast with our existing policies, 2) pare down what we have, or 3) who cares because, as you say, it's just a matter of time before the professionals get involved? Serious question. I tend to opt for number 2, although the safe bet might be "do nothing" because we're having limited success "doing something." Regards, Mike From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 11:11:48 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 08:11:48 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D14E3F.1090301@chl.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D14E3F.1090301@chl.com> Message-ID: <37E2478E-15C7-4ED0-83D5-66ED74A98179@virtualized.org> Joe, On Mar 7, 2008, at 6:16 AM, Joe Maimon wrote: > This would actually be a best case scenario, where access to ipv4 > internet is through ipv4 nat, but ipv6 is end-to-end. While I might agree, the tricky bit is having IPv6 end-to-end. This is obviously neither plentiful nor cheap at this point in time and if ISPs aren't paying attention to longer term realities of IPv4 exhaustion, this won't change. > The situation for content providers is likely a bit more problematic > than for ISP's. Yep. I imagine it is hard for content providers to make the business case to even look at IPv6 right now. And if content isn't available over IPv6, few ISP customers will ask for it, making it hard for ISPs to make their business case. And around we go. Regards, -drc From randy at psg.com Fri Mar 7 11:14:30 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 08:14:30 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <26BF00DA-8F11-4073-B446-B66DC843226E@adhost.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <26BF00DA-8F11-4073-B446-B66DC843226E@adhost.com> Message-ID: <47D169E6.6090804@psg.com> > Is the recommendation then to; 1) hold fast with our existing policies, > 2) pare down what we have, or 3) who cares because, as you say, it's > just a matter of time before the professionals get involved? i think the current proposals in apnic and arin are fair starting points, and are honest attempts to move forward. i suspect both are too restrictive for my taste, e.g. apnic's nir shield. but geoff's change (at the meeting) to allow inter-region trading was a step forward. and i know nirs are weird and twisty passages. and i have asked scott re the issues that give me pause with his. but they're probably a good start, and could be the basis of gaining experience for a year or two. randy From michael.dillon at bt.com Fri Mar 7 11:27:19 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 16:27:19 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com><507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net><47D05D88.4050400@internap.com><23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> Message-ID: > at layer 11, i am hearing a lot of noise on the line of > "registries desperately trying to assure a continuing income > stream," and "amateur > over- regulators are worse than most markets." i do not > think either is completely true. but discussions such as on > this list are being read by folk who wear different and > expensive clothes and they are not impressed. heck, i am not > impressed. "guns in the hands of children." > and guns on which more and more of our economies and > societies are increasingly dependent. Then these layer 11 people should ensure that their legal and regulatory people get involved in their ARIN relationship instead of leaving it entirely to the technologists or clerical administrators who often fill the role today. Not that they should replace these people, but I get the sense that not many ARIN representatives have a full dialog within their companies. > hint: the grown-up economists i heard earlier > this week said a benefit of a market is that it finds "best > use" for the goods (not magically, of course). IP addresses are not goods. It costs money to posess goods because they consumer space which must be paid for. There is also a risk involved in possessing goods because they could be stolen by thieves or destroyed by floods which would cause you to lose your investment. IP addresses cost nothing to hold onto, and there is no real risk of damage or loss of your investment, which is probably less than $1000 even if you count up all the manpower costs involved in getting the addresses in the first place. > bingo! much of this discussion is about how best to shoot > ourselves, as an organization and an industry, in the foot. > i suspect we will succeed in killing ourselves as amateur > over-regulators, but the guns will be removed from our hands > before we do serious damage to the industry. I agree with the first, disagree with the second. Yes, just about all the discussion of introducing soft-landing or transfer policies is an amateur attempt at creating a regulatory regime. But, no I don't think we will succeed at killing ourselves because I believe that most of these initiatives will ultimately be rejected. Or perhaps watered down so that they fail upon implementation. > from listening to some economic grown-ups early this week, > one of the take-aways was that these are not simple issues > and even the language we seem to be using is a far from > productive. It's not just the language, it is the perspective from which these proposals come. It smacks of people playing one of those civilization building games on a computer where the player has the powers of God. In the real world, nobody has that kind of power, and you cannot attain significant change in a short period of time. > what it will likely do is bring in the professionals, and i > am starting to look forward to that as preferable to all this. I think that we should take more initiative to invite the professionals in so that they can educate us. Over time, ARIN has added regular presentations by legal counsel, and recently an economist. Perhaps we could also find an expert on the SEC and market regulation, as well as somebody who could speak about the FCC regulatory regime. And it wouldn't hurt to look for a university which could do some cooperative research between their high-speed network research people and their economics department, to get a sense of the real costs of stretching the lifetime of IPv4 and deploying IPv6 services. --Michael Dillon From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 11:37:48 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 08:37:48 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: John, On Mar 7, 2008, at 5:44 AM, John Curran wrote: > In a post-depletion scenario where customers want IPv4 > connectivity and bring their own blocks, ISPs have little > choice but to accept the customers (and inject the route) > rather than sending them to a competitor. This includes > customers showing up with just a /30 and NAT CPE... Obviously, the fact that you announce a route does not imply your peers or their peers will accept that route. Ignoring the fact that the vast majority of customers will not be bringing their own blocks (they will instead be connecting via a (perhaps multi-layered) NAT and thus not contribute to the routing load), there will be back pressure on "transfers" of such long prefixes simply because they won't get you where you need to go. For your nightmare scenario to be made reality the following would need to occur: 1) origin ISP accepts long prefix 2) origin ISP announces long prefix to direct peers 3) direct peers ISPs accept long prefix 4) direct peers ISPs announce long prefix to their peers 5) Peers of peers accept long prefix 6) Peers of peers announce long prefix n) etc. At any point, if one of these does not hold true, you get some unreachability, leaving the customer (or perhaps the origin ISP if the customer is paying enough) to go try to negotiate (pay for) acceptance of the long prefix by the ISPs that are refusing it. All for the privilege of having only a single layer of NAT? Riiiight. Regards, -drc From jcurran at istaff.org Fri Mar 7 11:47:47 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 11:47:47 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: At 8:37 AM -0800 3/7/08, David Conrad wrote: >Ignoring the fact that the vast majority of customers will not be bringing their own blocks (they will instead be connecting via a (perhaps multi-layered) NAT and thus not contribute to the routing load), there will be back pressure on "transfers" of such long prefixes simply because they won't get you where you need to go. If the customers servers requiring unique addresses are covered by some PA assigned space, that's true. When ISP's can't find more address space to use for this purpose, then you'll see customer-provided blocks being routed instead or customers being turned down for IPv4 services, which will lead them to an ISP which will accept & try to route them... The ISP's who try not to pollute end up having to reject the new customer, and then again not accept their route when another ISP takes up the same customer. The ISP who takes the customer and tries to route them to the peers gets the revenue and simply redirects any connectivity blame to the well-behaved ISP for 'needlessly' filtering. (This, btw, is mirrors the dialog that went down during some of the earlier peering/filtering ISP wars...) /John From michael.dillon at bt.com Fri Mar 7 11:57:51 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 16:57:51 -0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com><435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org><47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com><000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com><00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com><507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net><47D05D88.4050400@internap.com><23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net><47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: > Would the situation get so bad > that these large corporations would risk punishment by the > law, regulators, and their peers for turning to a black market. I'm not aware of any laws against buying IP addresses on the "black" market, or any regulators who would take an interest in such activity. Also, since it is relatively easy for large corporations to hide this in a web of subsidiary corporations and holding companies, who would ever find out what they did? A few years ago, when the Enron affair was in the news, I had an interesting conversation with someone who was an insider in the large corporate finance area. He explained how Enron was merely the tip of the iceberg and how there were actually quite a lot more companies doing the same kind of debt-hiding. He claimed that a major driver behind many corporate acquisitions and bankruptcies was to hide what had been done and protect people from the same kind of fate as the Enron executives. The scale of this was huge with banks and bondholders involved as well, loaning money to clean companies to buy dirty ones, and forcing the dirty ones to sell or fail. It is still regular corporate finance practice to maintain a webwork of interlocking corporations in order to optimize their finances. Employees work for one company, all sales go to another one, a 3rd owns the network assets, a 4th one operates the network and so on. And that's just in one country. Add countries and it gets even more interesting. When JBC Ventures PLC buys an address block and books it as an expense, then nobody is breaking the law because IP addresses are not an asset and have no value. How are you going to find who ultimately controls JBC Ventures AO? Big ISP will claim that they are a customer in Lower Slobovia with a paid peering contract. If ARIN is not a lawmaker and has no regulatory powers under the law, then ARIN has no ability to "police" the organizations who hold allocations from ARIN ranges. Rather than pretend that ARIN does have such powers, we should accept the situation as it is, and focus on other activities in its charter. 1. to increase and diffuse knowledge to the general public about the Internet in its broadest sense; 2. to educate industry and the Internet community in order to further their technical understanding of the Internet; 3. to secure united action and to represent the Internet community nationally and internationally; 4. to manage and help conserve scarce Internet protocol resources, and to educate Internet protocol users on how to efficiently utilize these scarce resources as a service to the entire Internet community; 5. to do all and everything necessary to enhance the growth of the Internet and the prospects for competition among Internet Service Providers by encouraging the exploration and implementation of solutions to Internet Protocol number scarcity issues; 6. to encourage the exploration of new addressing and routing technologies that reduce or eliminate the costs or in some cases the need for renumbering when an Internet Service Provider or end user changes to a new Internet Service Provider; and, when such alternatives are developed, to work with its members to facilitate the assignment of portable addresses and/or the elimination of the cost of Internet Protocol renumbering; 7. to encourage allocation policy changes for Internet Service Providers in order to enhance competition by providing mobility of Internet Service Providers among upstream Internet Service Providers when it is generally agreed that the technology is available for portable addressing; 8. to manage the allocation and registration of Internet resources; 9. to promote and facilitate the expansion, development, and growth of the infrastructure of the Internet for the general public and members by any means consistent with the public interest through other activities, including, but not limited to, publications, meetings, conferences, training, educational seminars, and the issuance of grants and other financial support to educational institutions, foundations and other organizations exclusively for educational, charitable, and scientific purposes. --Michael Dillon From bicknell at ufp.org Fri Mar 7 12:15:19 2008 From: bicknell at ufp.org (Leo Bicknell) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 12:15:19 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> In a message written on Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 07:56:30AM -0800, David Conrad wrote: > If IPv4 post free pool exhaustion demand is a reasonable percentage of > current demand and there is no way for that demand to be met through > transfers, do you still posit a black market would be insignificant? Yes. How does an ISP tell the difference between a hijacked route (even accidently, think YouTube recently) and a route for a resource sold by YouTube on the black market? The answer is, they don't. ISP's today check whois and ask for LOA's to route space because they know without doing it hijacking may be more widespread and affect their customers. In the black market case this problem actually gets worse. Don't like ProvderX? Find all their customers, chop up the space, sell it on the black market. Wait for chaos. People sell ocean front property in Arizona, bridges in new york, people will sell things they do not have any relationship with at all, and someone will buy it. For ISP's to open this up is mutually assured destruction. If I accept a route that takes your customer offline, you'll do the same to me. A few months later and none of our customers will want anything to do with us, or the IPv4 internet. No, the only path forward for large, legitimate ISP's is to continue to treat the black market space as they do today, poisoned and unroutable. Remember too, successful black markets (illegal drugs, moonshine, even fake CD's and DVD's) generally have strong branding. The guy buying from a street corner has even more reason to suspect he's going to get ripped off and is more cautious than a standard consumer. Large black markets brand their products, monkeys on the E tablets, moonshine with elaborate labels, CD's and DVD's with intros stating "warezed by cOoLd00d23" to build consumer confidence. I'm not seeing how a black market IP dealer could develop brand loyalty in this way. > Last I checked, ARIN did not have force of law or regulation and had > little control over what peers do amongst themselves. Perhaps more > interestingly, it may be useful to remember that ARIN is not a > monopoly in IPv4 address registration services. There are already two > other potential venues for transfer registration services (with > proposed transfer policies that are significantly less onerous) and > those venues are already viewed as legitimate by large corporations (I > imagine the ones you speak of are already members). I never said ARIN would enforce law or regulation. I suspect if I offered DoD address space for sale on eBay someone would pay me a visit right quick. I bet I'd be charged with a crime too, or at least sent to Guantanamo. If the number of hijackings increase the government will step in and arrest people for fraud, "hacking", tax evasion, or the litany of other things they use to control crime. Deals will go bad and people will sue each other over them; or in another form of regulation send Bruno over with a baseball bat. As for other RIR's, if ARIN has no transfer policy and APNIC does, more power to companies who can go off and participate in APNIC's system. I do not see the existence, or lack of a transfer policy in APNIC making any significant difference in the black market in the ARIN region either way. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: not available URL: From jmaimon at chl.com Fri Mar 7 12:42:23 2008 From: jmaimon at chl.com (Joe Maimon) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 12:42:23 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> References: <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: <47D17E7F.4050101@chl.com> Leo Bicknell wrote: > In a message written on Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 07:56:30AM -0800, David Conrad wrote: > >>If IPv4 post free pool exhaustion demand is a reasonable percentage of >>current demand and there is no way for that demand to be met through >>transfers, do you still posit a black market would be insignificant? > > > Yes. > > How does an ISP tell the difference between a hijacked route (even > accidently, think YouTube recently) and a route for a resource sold by > YouTube on the black market? > > The answer is, they don't. ISP's today check whois and ask for > LOA's to route space because they know without doing it hijacking > may be more widespread and affect their customers. Why wouldnt you receive a LOA as part of your black market transaction? From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 12:59:12 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 09:59:12 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> References: <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> Message-ID: <4FCC1821-FFF5-4553-8F24-CB3489AA8AE4@virtualized.org> Leo, On Mar 7, 2008, at 9:15 AM, Leo Bicknell wrote: > In a message written on Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 07:56:30AM -0800, David > Conrad wrote: >> If IPv4 post free pool exhaustion demand is a reasonable percentage >> of >> current demand and there is no way for that demand to be met through >> transfers, do you still posit a black market would be insignificant? > > Yes. Hmm. Well, OK. A bit hard to argue with this position. Regards, -drc From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 13:23:11 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 10:23:11 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: John, On Mar 7, 2008, at 8:47 AM, John Curran wrote: > The ISP's who try not to pollute end up having to reject the > new customer, and then again not accept their route when > another ISP takes up the same customer. The ISP who > takes the customer and tries to route them to the peers > gets the revenue and simply redirects any connectivity > blame to the well-behaved ISP for 'needlessly' filtering. Yeah, and? The "well-behaved" ISP is receiving no revenue from the customer that went to the "badly-behaved" ISP so redirected blame will fall on deaf ears. The Internet gripe ratio goes up. Not a big deal as far as I can tell. > (This, btw, is mirrors the dialog that went down during > some of the earlier peering/filtering ISP wars...) And if I remember correctly, the fact that a few ISPs actually implemented filters were sufficient to help drive the solution that kept everybody's routers from falling over. I'm not sure I understand why you think this won't happen again. ISPs already filter. ISPs that continue to use old hardware that maxes out around 240K routes are reportedly filtering somewhat aggressively. ISPs I've spoken with have said they'll do what they need to when they need to if their routers are about to fall over. I guess I'm just not smart enough to see why ISPs would threaten their own infrastructures just so somebody else's customers can gain connectivity. Regards, -drc From jcurran at istaff.org Fri Mar 7 13:34:18 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 13:34:18 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: At 10:23 AM -0800 3/7/08, David Conrad wrote: >And if I remember correctly, the fact that a few ISPs actually implemented filters were sufficient to help drive the solution that kept everybody's routers from falling over. I'm not sure I understand why you think this won't happen again. Ah, I wasn't clear... I believe it will happen again. Unfortunately, it won't be TE more-specifics being filtered this time, it will be routes covering unique end-site locations. >ISPs already filter. ISPs that continue to use old hardware that maxes out around 240K routes are reportedly filtering somewhat aggressively. ISPs I've spoken with have said they'll do what they need to when they need to if their routers are about to fall over. I guess I'm just not smart enough to see why ISPs would threaten their own infrastructures just so somebody else's customers can gain connectivity. They won't... hence my statement that the end state isn't global collapse, but it also isn't global connectivity. /John From bicknell at ufp.org Fri Mar 7 13:34:56 2008 From: bicknell at ufp.org (Leo Bicknell) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 13:34:56 -0500 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoFRe: NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D17E7F.4050101@chl.com> References: <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D132EF.7080604@psg.com> <20080307145741.GA43339@ussenterprise.ufp.org> <20080307171519.GA55931@ussenterprise.ufp.org> <47D17E7F.4050101@chl.com> Message-ID: <20080307183456.GA63445@ussenterprise.ufp.org> In a message written on Fri, Mar 07, 2008 at 12:42:23PM -0500, Joe Maimon wrote: > Why wouldnt you receive a LOA as part of your black market transaction? You may, but that system rapidly breaks down. I think if you ask the people where the rubber meets the road today's system is cumbersome at best. And it's a system based around a series of assumptions: 1) The supernet is held by the granting entity for the duration of the subnet's existance. That is, I can look up the parent, call them, and verify the LOA is good. 2) The granting entity is willing to verify the LOA. People do call and check them. People who get a "UUNet" LOA call "VerzionBusiness" and ask if it's still valid. Someone has to make, and take the calls. The first criteria is easily violated when an entire block is transferred. Now it's just a block with the wrong name on it. Transfer it twice and the entity on the record can't verify the transaction history at all, someone would have to walk through it step by step. The second criteria is easily violated by multiple transfers. Party A transferrs a /16 to Party B, Party B then turns it into /24's to Parties C-M. Party F shows up at an ISP who looks in whois and calls party A. They can't verify, and probably do not want to handle the call volume for C-M. They may refuse to answer as a result. There's some hope certificates could make this all easier. On the one hand I think they could; all of the cases I've described could be easily captured in certificates. However, when it goes wrong, it really goes wrong. Consider when Provider A goes chaper 11, and is bought by Provider B. What are the chances party B gets the key, and the secret phrase to unlock it? What are the chances they have enough history to sign things with the new Provider A key? Who's going to take the time to do all that work? In a really bad scenario you have an entire subtree of the space that is certified, certified wrong. Could these problems be solved? I think so. There are ways to mitigate all of these concerns. Can they be solved in time to save IPv4? I don't think so. Time to look towards IPv6. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: not available URL: From randy at psg.com Fri Mar 7 16:16:50 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:16:50 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> Message-ID: <47D1B0C2.3010103@psg.com> > Unfortunately, it won't be TE more-specifics being > filtered this time, it will be routes covering unique > end-site locations. why do you think that? seems to me that TE and other defragging is non-product, and end sites are product. as the former are a very large portion of the table, it would seem more productive to stomp them. randy From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 16:25:57 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:25:57 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D1B0C2.3010103@psg.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> <47D1B0C2.3010103@psg.com> Message-ID: <47D1B2E5.1040707@internap.com> Randy Bush wrote: >> Unfortunately, it won't be TE more-specifics being >> filtered this time, it will be routes covering unique >> end-site locations. > > why do you think that? seems to me that TE and other defragging is > non-product, and end sites are product. as the former are a very large > portion of the table, it would seem more productive to stomp them. I agree that TE deaggregates will be first to be filtered, but I think it's important that any policy we put in place doesn't create a whole bunch more small unique routes covering end-sites. That will both reduce the need for filtering, and make sure that there can actually be covering aggregates that can make it safe to filter distant deaggregates. -Scott From jhframe at dcn.org Fri Mar 7 16:46:22 2008 From: jhframe at dcn.org (Jim Frame) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:46:22 -0800 Subject: [ppml] Legacy RSAs signed In-Reply-To: <47BE755E.3010305@dcn.org> References: <200802212301.m1LN1C6q012697@cjbsys.bdb.com> <47BE755E.3010305@dcn.org> Message-ID: <47D1B7AE.4030302@dcn.org> Jim Frame wrote: > Davis Community Network has signed, though not without reservations. In light of some of the responses to my 02/21 post, DCN has reconsidered the matter and has reviewed the terms of the RSA. Although I wish we had a more perfect understanding of the manner in which IP address space will be treated in a legal sense, I'm comfortable that our decision to sign the RSA was the right one. I'm encouraged by the proposals for transfer policies that I've seen, and am hopeful that in the end the RSA will provide us with a good framework in which to manage a resource that we -- a very small 501(c)(3) -- like to regard as ours. Thanks to all who took the time to contact me offline and offer their insights. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- Jim Frame jhframe at dcn.org (530) 756-8584 756-8201 (FAX) Frame Surveying & Mapping 609 A Street Davis, CA 95616 -----------------------< Davis Community Network >------------------- From randy at psg.com Fri Mar 7 16:52:31 2008 From: randy at psg.com (Randy Bush) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:52:31 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D1B2E5.1040707@internap.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> <47D1B0C2.3010103@psg.com> <47D1B2E5.1040707@internap.com> Message-ID: <47D1B91F.3030403@psg.com> > I agree that TE deaggregates will be first to be filtered and intentional de-aggs that are not even TE > but I think it's important that any policy we put in place doesn't > create a whole bunch more small unique routes covering end-sites. oh? what if those are legitimate users and new entrants who need unique routing because they are multi-homed or whatever? somehow i do not think that intentionally preventing them by policy is going to stand up for very long. ipv6 and nat-pt (or whatever the tvtf calls it to save face) or massive ipv4/ipv4 nat, whichever way it goes (or it goes both ways!) is gonna cause many *legitimate* small prefixes to be injected in slowly increasing numbers. get over it. this is simply what happens when ostriches pretend there is no need for architectural change in routing given a world where the scale is ever-increasing. the result is you need to handle more routes. this is far from new. welcome to the new line card every year club. what is needed is not policy preventing entrants into the market, but rather router vendors to supply routers that can carry the load. and you can push it out a few years by beating on the vendors to give us knobs to stomp non-product deagg. i have cases filed with j & c for years, and a mailbox of excuses to match. or you can go down the path of lisp. watch out, on the third step there is a sign "magic will happen here". but at least dino is working on the problem a opposed to blowing glossy paper at us. or you can go down the path of multi-natting from PA space with a policy of giving all the PI space to the largest providers. and if you think you can do the latter without having to explain it all to lawyers and politicians (which may not be a bad thing. it can't be all that much harder than explaining it to amateur policy-making friends, and it sure will be more effective), please share what you are smoking. randy From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 16:56:50 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 13:56:50 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D1B91F.3030403@psg.com> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913- 998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org> <47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net> <054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org> <47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net> <95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> <47D0FA31.8050105@apnic.net> <47D1B0C2.3010103@psg.com> <47D1B2E5.1040707@internap.com> <47D1B91F.3030403@psg.com> Message-ID: <47D1BA22.4010805@internap.com> My own proposal is not to slow down the rate of new entrants who need routing slots to multihome. The number of those is growing, but IMO is still manageable. Rather, I want to help prevent the unnecessary addition of multiple non-aggregatable routes per ASN, i.e. by requiring that transferees get 6-12+ months worth of IP space at a time, rather than allowing them to pick up multiple smaller blocks one by one. -Scott Randy Bush wrote: >> I agree that TE deaggregates will be first to be filtered > > and intentional de-aggs that are not even TE > >> but I think it's important that any policy we put in place doesn't >> create a whole bunch more small unique routes covering end-sites. > > oh? what if those are legitimate users and new entrants who need unique > routing because they are multi-homed or whatever? somehow i do not > think that intentionally preventing them by policy is going to stand up > for very long. > > ipv6 and nat-pt (or whatever the tvtf calls it to save face) or massive > ipv4/ipv4 nat, whichever way it goes (or it goes both ways!) is gonna > cause many *legitimate* small prefixes to be injected in slowly > increasing numbers. get over it. > > this is simply what happens when ostriches pretend there is no need for > architectural change in routing given a world where the scale is > ever-increasing. the result is you need to handle more routes. > > this is far from new. welcome to the new line card every year club. > what is needed is not policy preventing entrants into the market, but > rather router vendors to supply routers that can carry the load. > > and you can push it out a few years by beating on the vendors to give us > knobs to stomp non-product deagg. i have cases filed with j & c for > years, and a mailbox of excuses to match. > > or you can go down the path of lisp. watch out, on the third step there > is a sign "magic will happen here". but at least dino is working on the > problem a opposed to blowing glossy paper at us. > > or you can go down the path of multi-natting from PA space with a policy > of giving all the PI space to the largest providers. and if you think > you can do the latter without having to explain it all to lawyers and > politicians (which may not be a bad thing. it can't be all that much > harder than explaining it to amateur policy-making friends, and it sure > will be more effective), please share what you are smoking. > > randy From info at arin.net Fri Mar 7 17:19:07 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 17:19:07 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal - Revised Text Message-ID: <47D1BF5B.9030707@arin.net> Policy Proposal 2008-2, IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal, has been revised. This proposal is open for discussion on this mailing list and will be on the agenda at the upcoming ARIN Public Policy Meeting in Denver. The current policy proposal text is provided below and is also available at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/2008_2.html Regards, Member Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) ### * ### Policy Proposal 2008-2 IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal Author: ARIN Advisory Council Proposal Version: 1.1 Date: 7 March 2008 Proposal type: modify Policy term: permanent Policy statement: Replace the current NRPM section 8 with the following -- 8. Transfers [8.1. Transfers ? retain as is: Number resources are non-transferable and are not assignable to any other organization unless ARIN has expressly and in writing approved a request for transfer. ARIN is tasked with making prudent decisions on whether to approve the transfer of number resources. It should be understood that number resources are not "sold" under ARIN administration. Rather, number resources are assigned to an organization for its exclusive use for the purpose stated in the request, provided the terms of the Registration Services Agreement continue to be met and the stated purpose for the number resources remains the same. Number resources are administered and assigned according to ARIN's published policies. Number resources are issued, based on justified need, to organizations, not to individuals representing those organizations. Thus, if a company goes out of business, regardless of the reason, the point of contact (POC) listed for the number resource does not have the authority to sell, transfer, assign, or give the number resource to any other person or organization. The POC must notify ARIN if a business fails so the assigned number resources can be returned to the available pool of number resources if a transfer is not requested and justified.] [8.2 ? remove the word ?only?, and retitle to ?Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership?: 8.2. Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership ARIN will consider requests for the transfer of number resources upon receipt of evidence that the new entity has acquired the assets which had, as of the date of the acquisition or proposed reorganization, justified the current entity's use of the number resource. Examples of assets that justify use of the number resource include, but are not limited to: ? Existing customer base ? Qualified hardware inventory ? Specific software requirements.] [Renumber existing 8.3 to 8.2.1 and retitle to ?Documentation Requirements for Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership?: 8.2.1. Documentation Requirements for Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership In evaluating a request for transfer, ARIN may require the requesting organization to provide any of the following documents, as applicable, plus any other documents deemed appropriate: ? An authenticated copy of the instrument(s) effecting the transfer of assets, e.g., bill of sale, certificate of merger, contract, deed, or court decree ? A detailed inventory of all assets utilized by the requesting party in maintaining and using the number resource ? A list of the requesting party's customers using the number resource. If further justification is required, the requesting party may be asked to provide any of the following, or other supporting documentation, as applicable: ? A general listing of the assets or components acquired ? A specific description of acquisitions, including: o Type and quantity of equipment o Customer base ? A description of how number resources are being utilized ? Network engineering plans, including: o Host counts o Subnet masking o Network diagrams o Reassignments to customers] 8.3. Simple Transfer of IPv4 Addresses After the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free pool (when IANA allocates its last unallocated unicast IPv4 address block), ARIN will also process IPv4 address transfer requests subject to the following conditions. These conditions apply only to Simple IPv4 transfers, not to transfers performed according to section 8.2. 8.3.1 Conditions on the transferor (the organization providing addresses for transfer): ? The transferor resides in the ARIN service area. ? The transferor has signed an RSA and/or a legacy RSA covering the IPv4 addresses transferred. ? The transferor has no outstanding balances with ARIN. ? The transferor has not received any IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN (through ordinary allocations or assignments, or through this Simple Transfer policy) within the preceding 24 months. ? The transferor may not request any IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN (through ordinary allocations or assignments, or through this Simple Transfer policy) within the subsequent 24 months. 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee (the organization receiving the transferred addresses): ? The transferee resides in the ARIN service area and intends to use the transferred IPv4 addresses within the ARIN service area. ? The transferee has no outstanding balances with ARIN. ? The transferee?s need is confirmed by ARIN, according to current ARIN policies, including but not limited to confirmation of utilization rate of any prior IPv4 allocations, assignments, or previously transferred IPv4 addresses held by the transferee. ? The transferee signs (or has previously signed) an RSA covering the IPv4 addresses transferred. ? The transferee has not provided any IPv4 addresses for transfer through this Simple Transfer process within the preceding 24 months. ? The transferee may not provide any IPv4 addresses for transfer through this Simple Transfer process within the subsequent 24 months, except in the case of business failure. ? The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block large enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. ? The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer through this Simple Transfer process every 6 months. 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be transferred: ? The IPv4 block must comply with applicable ARIN requirements, including minimum allocation size (i.e. NRPM 4.2.2., 4.2.4., 4.3.2., 4.3.6.). However, an IPv4 allocation or assignment of /24 or larger, but smaller than the current minimum allocation size, may be transferred as a whole resource, but may not be subdivided. ? The IPv4 block must currently be registered for use within the ARIN service area, either as part of an address block assigned by IANA to ARIN, or as part of a legacy address block allocated within the ARIN service area. ? There must exist no dispute as to the status of the IPv4 block or regarding the allocation or assignment of such block to the transferor. ? The transferor may retain one contiguous address range out of their original allocation or assignment for their own use, and transfer the other contiguous address range. If the address range to be transferred consists of multiple non-aggregatable CIDR blocks, each may be transferred to a different transferee. The retained address range may not be further subdivided or transferred for a period of 12 months. Notwithstanding the preceding, the block may be subdivided as provided in section 8.3.6. 8.3.4 Fees ? Completion of a transfer requires payment of a transfer fee according to ARIN?s schedule of fees. ? The transferee will be subject to all future ARIN membership and service fees according to the transferee?s total address holdings. 8.3.5 Pre-qualification ? An interested transferee must seek pre-qualification from ARIN to confirm its eligibility to receive a transfer (including satisfaction of need according to current ARIN policies) before making any solicitation for transfer. Upon pre-qualification, ARIN will provide the transferee with documentation of the pre-qualification, including the size (CIDR prefix length) of the largest IPv4 address block the transferee is eligible to receive, and the expiration date of the pre-qualification. ? An interested transferor must seek pre-qualification from ARIN to confirm its eligibility to offer a transfer (including lack of outstanding balances and having signed an RSA) before offering IPv4 address resources for transfer. Upon pre-qualification, ARIN will provide the transferor with documentation of the pre-qualification, including the network block and the expiration date of the pre-qualification. 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN If ARIN determines that there is an inadequate supply of small blocks, ARIN may allow transferors to subdivide network blocks beyond the limited subdivision permitted under 8.3.3. ARIN will attempt to ensure an adequate supply of small blocks while minimizing deaggregation. 8.3.7. Safe Harbor for IPv4 Transfers through this Simple Transfer Process When an IPv4 address resource is made available for transfer, it shall be deemed exempt from ARIN utilization audit until 90 days after its transfer pre-qualification or until the transfer is completed, whichever comes first. In the event that a transfer is not consummated within the prequalification time period, the block may be immediately re-prequalified for transfer. Notwithstanding the current offered state of the address resource, however, the audit exemption period shall expire untolled 90 days after the expiration of the first pre-qualification period. After the expiration of any utilization audit exemption period, ARIN shall have 90 days in which to initiate a utilization audit. In no event shall non-exempt time be construed to extend the end of the next exemption period. 8.3.8. Simple IPv4 Transfers to or from Organizations Under Common Ownership or Control If an IPv4 transferor or transferee is under common ownership or control with any other organization that holds one or more IPv4 blocks, the IPv4 transfer request must report all such organizations under common ownership or control. When evaluating compliance with IPv4 Simple Transfer conditions, ARIN may consider a transferor?s transfer request in light of requests from other organizations under common ownership or control with the transferor. Similarly, ARIN may consider a transferee?s request in light of requests from other organizations under common ownership or control with the transferee. In evaluating requests from other organizations under common ownership or control, ARIN staff will consider the relationship between the organizations, the degree of coordination between the organizations, and the bona fide use of the addresses at issue to determine whether all appropriate conditions are met. 8.3.9. Record-keeping and Publication of Simple Transfers of IPv4 Addresses ARIN will develop and operate a listing service to assist interested transferors and transferees by providing them a centralized location to post information about IPv4 blocks available from prequalified transferors and IPv4 blocks needed by prequalified transferees. Participation in the listing service is voluntary. After completion of the transfer, ARIN will update the registration records pertaining to the IPv4 block at issue. ARIN will adjust its records as to the holdings of the transferor and transferee. After the transfer, ARIN will publish WHOIS data that reflects the current allocation or assignment of the transferred block. ARIN will also make available information about any prior recipient(s) of such block. ARIN will also publish a log of all transfers, including block, transferor, transferee, and date. Rationale: The ARIN Board of Trustees asked the Advisory Council to consider a set of questions around the depletion of the free pool of IPv4 addresses, the transition to IPv6 for Internet address needs in the future, and ARIN's possible role in easing the transition. Over the past few years the AC has spent a great deal of time reflecting on these issues ? as a group, as individuals, and in consultation with the community. One outcome of this process is this policy proposal, which the AC is submitting for consideration at the next meeting. We are proposing some changes to existing ARIN policy regarding the transfer of IP address block registrations between subscribers, which will allow for the emergence of trade in IPv4 address space, with ARIN to provide a listing service for address blocks available for transfer under the liberalized policy. We are aware that this proposal, if adopted, will mark a major change in ARIN's role in the community and the Internet. This policy proposal would create a transfer mechanism for IPv4 number resources between those who have excess resources and those who have a need, thereby allowing ARIN to continue to serve its mission after IANA free pool exhaustion. This proposal would also set conditions on such transfers intended to preserve as much as possible the existing policy related to efficient, needs-based resource issuance, and would leverage ARIN's extensive control systems, audit trails, and recognized position as a trusted agent to avoid speculation and hoarding and diminish the likelihood and extent of an uncontrolled 'black market' where the risk and potential for fraud is immeasurably higher. Many of the transfer conditions are self-explanatory, but some worth highlighting are that: ? To discourage speculation, a waiting period (proposed at 24 months) is required before a transferee (or ordinary resource recipient) can become a transferor, or vice versa. ? Transferees must qualify for IPv4 space (just as they do today when getting it from ARIN) before they can receive address space by transfer, or solicit space on a listing service. ? To discourage unnecessarily rapid growth of routing tables, an allocation or assignment may not be arbitrarily deaggregated. To allow a transferor to downsize within their existing space, they may split off a contiguous address range, once every 12 months, and transfer the resulting netblock(s), which are subject to ARIN?s minimum allocation size, to one or more transferee(s). ? A transferee may receive one transfer every 6 months, so they?ll be incented to transfer a block appropriately sized for their needs, which will further discourage deaggregation and keep smaller blocks available for smaller organizations. The proposal would also have ARIN develop and operate a listing service to facilitate transfers and provide an authoritative central source of information on space available and requested for transfer. It would not prohibit private party transactions, but would require that potential transferors and transferees be pre-qualified first, so that neither party will encounter any unexpected surprises when they ask ARIN to process the transfer. Timetable for implementation: Immediately, with most aspects of policy taking effect upon IANA exhaustion, per the policy text. From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 17:19:28 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 14:19:28 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <5BC5F153-9C9B-45D9-9C13-CD62E828191E@virtualized.org> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> <5BC5F153-9C9B-45D9-9C13-CD62E828191E@virtualized.org> Message-ID: <47D1BF70.9080402@internap.com> David Conrad wrote: > As for unnecessary deaggregation, what is or is not necessary is likely > a matter of opinion. I firmly believe ISPs will look after themselves > as they have done in the past and are doing so today by applying filters > if they feel their infrastructure is at risk. In this particular > respect, we've been here before and some folks still have the T-shirts > (hopefully they've been washed). I'd be curious to understand why past > solutions would not apply. The type of unnecessary deaggregation I'm trying to avoid is this: Organization A's IPv4 needs are growing, but their budget is tight. In order to meet this quarter's needs, they transfer a block from org B. Next quarter, they again need new addresses, so they transfer another block from org C. Before the year is out, they have at least 3 extra routes in the routing table, which can't be aggregated, nor can they be filtered without breaking connectivity. Rather, I'd like to require A to get a large enough block up front to meet their needs for 6-12+ months, thereby reducing the amount of deaggregation and the externality effects on the rest of the Internet. (And if they really can't afford 6 months of space, they can always lease PA space from their ISP or another LIR.) >>> b) What tools exist (or can be expected to exist given reasonable >>> time/resources) to enforce that policy? >> >> The main tool is that, as the recognized authority in registration of >> IPv4 addresses in North America, recognition as valid of any transfers >> by ARIN has considerable value to both transferors and transferees. > > So it would seem a core criteria in any policy would be to minimize > effects that would force folks to go elsewhere to have their transfers > recognized, no? I don't think those effects have to be minimized, if the limitations help meet other goals. But we do need to make sure that the costs of those effects is less than the benefits of using the white market. >>> - the 6 month restriction could force folks to go outside the policy >>> in desperation (e.g., the amount of address space available via >>> transfers is likely to be hard to predict. You could be in a >>> situation where at one point in time, the only option is a small >>> block even though you know it won't last 6 months. What option do >>> you have?) >> >> You could get PA space from your ISP or another LIR. > > I am assuming the folks most interested in getting address space will be > ISPs so they can continue adding customers. Is the assumption of this > policy that the consumers of address space are end users? Agreed. Most end users will get their space from ISPs. Most ISPs would probably prefer to "own" their own IPv4 space, but in a pinch they could get addresses from an upstream or a non-connected LIR (say a /8 holder who'd rather lease out space than transfer it). > I fear the restrictions you are imposing will make it essentially > impossible to "do it right" and will result in folks with address space > finding other outlets in which to meet the needs of those who need > address space. However, perhaps I misjudge the situation. Can you identify which restrictions are onerous and would force people to go elsewhere? We just submitted version 1.1 (which should be posted to PPML today), which allows deaggregation of transfered blocks to the level required to ensure adequate supply at smaller block sizes. -Scott From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 17:38:36 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 14:38:36 -0800 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal - Revised Text In-Reply-To: <47D1BF5B.9030707@arin.net> References: <47D1BF5B.9030707@arin.net> Message-ID: <47D1C3EC.9070405@internap.com> Here's a list of changes we made between 1.0 and 1.1: - Removed undefined "M&A" from the new title of the existing policy, and retitled it "Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership" - Per staff suggestion, renumbered existing 8.3 to 8.2.1, to make it clear it goes with the other existing policy, and is separate from the new policy. - Per staff suggestion, renumbered all of the new policy text under a single policy section, 8.3. - At staff request, defined IANA exhaustion (when IANA allocates its last unallocated unicast IPv4 address block) in 8.3. - Per thread with Jason on PPML, added clarifying statement in 8.3 that "These conditions apply only to Simple IPv4 transfers, not to transfers performed according to section 8.2." - At staff request, defined transferor in 8.3.1 and transferee in 8.3.2. - Per PPML discussion, added "The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block large enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses." under 8.3.2. - In response to staff comment, added "through this Simple Transfer process" to clarify the 8.3.2 condition that "The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer through this Simple Transfer process every 6 months." - In order to avoid having an inadequate supply of smaller blocks, added section 8.3.6 to allow limited deaggregation of transfered blocks at ARIN discretion, to the level required to "ensure an adequate supply of small blocks while minimizing deaggregation." - Re-worded the 8.3.7 Safe Harbor statement for clarity. - In response to staff comment, added clarification to 8.3.8 that "Participation in the listing service is voluntary." -Scott Member Services wrote: > Policy Proposal 2008-2, IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal, has been revised. > This proposal is open for discussion on this mailing list and will be on > the agenda at the upcoming ARIN Public Policy Meeting in Denver. > > The current policy proposal text is provided below and is also available > at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/2008_2.html > > Regards, > > Member Services > American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) > > > ### * ### > > > Policy Proposal 2008-2 > IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal > > Author: ARIN Advisory Council > > Proposal Version: 1.1 > > Date: 7 March 2008 > > Proposal type: modify > > Policy term: permanent > > Policy statement: > > Replace the current NRPM section 8 with the following -- > > 8. Transfers > > [8.1. Transfers ? retain as is: > > Number resources are non-transferable and are not assignable to any > other organization unless ARIN has expressly and in writing approved a > request for transfer. ARIN is tasked with making prudent decisions on > whether to approve the transfer of number resources. > > It should be understood that number resources are not "sold" under ARIN > administration. Rather, number resources are assigned to an organization > for its exclusive use for the purpose stated in the request, provided > the terms of the Registration Services Agreement continue to be met and > the stated purpose for the number resources remains the same. Number > resources are administered and assigned according to ARIN's published > policies. > > Number resources are issued, based on justified need, to organizations, > not to individuals representing those organizations. Thus, if a company > goes out of business, regardless of the reason, the point of contact > (POC) listed for the number resource does not have the authority to > sell, transfer, assign, or give the number resource to any other person > or organization. The POC must notify ARIN if a business fails so the > assigned number resources can be returned to the available pool of > number resources if a transfer is not requested and justified.] > > [8.2 ? remove the word ?only?, and retitle to ?Transfers as an Artifact > of Change in Resource Holder Ownership?: > > 8.2. Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder Ownership > ARIN will consider requests for the transfer of number resources upon > receipt of evidence that the new entity has acquired the assets which > had, as of the date of the acquisition or proposed reorganization, > justified the current entity's use of the number resource. Examples of > assets that justify use of the number resource include, but are not > limited to: > ? Existing customer base > ? Qualified hardware inventory > ? Specific software requirements.] > [Renumber existing 8.3 to 8.2.1 and retitle to ?Documentation > Requirements for Transfers as an Artifact of Change in Resource Holder > Ownership?: > > 8.2.1. Documentation Requirements for Transfers as an Artifact of Change > in Resource Holder Ownership In evaluating a request for transfer, ARIN > may require the requesting organization to provide any of the following > documents, as applicable, plus any other documents deemed appropriate: > ? An authenticated copy of the instrument(s) effecting the transfer of > assets, e.g., bill of sale, certificate of merger, contract, deed, or > court decree > ? A detailed inventory of all assets utilized by the requesting party in > maintaining and using the number resource > ? A list of the requesting party's customers using the number resource. > If further justification is required, the requesting party may be asked > to provide any of the following, or other supporting documentation, as > applicable: > ? A general listing of the assets or components acquired > ? A specific description of acquisitions, including: > o Type and quantity of equipment > o Customer base > ? A description of how number resources are being utilized > ? Network engineering plans, including: > o Host counts > o Subnet masking > o Network diagrams > o Reassignments to customers] > > 8.3. Simple Transfer of IPv4 Addresses > > After the exhaustion of the IANA IPv4 free pool (when IANA allocates its > last unallocated unicast IPv4 address block), ARIN will also process > IPv4 address transfer requests subject to the following conditions. > These conditions apply only to Simple IPv4 transfers, not to transfers > performed according to section 8.2. > > 8.3.1 Conditions on the transferor (the organization providing addresses > for transfer): > ? The transferor resides in the ARIN service area. > ? The transferor has signed an RSA and/or a legacy RSA covering the IPv4 > addresses transferred. > ? The transferor has no outstanding balances with ARIN. > ? The transferor has not received any IPv4 allocations or assignments > from ARIN (through ordinary allocations or assignments, or through this > Simple Transfer policy) within the preceding 24 months. > ? The transferor may not request any IPv4 allocations or assignments > from ARIN (through ordinary allocations or assignments, or through this > Simple Transfer policy) within the subsequent 24 months. > > 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee (the organization receiving the > transferred addresses): > ? The transferee resides in the ARIN service area and intends to use the > transferred IPv4 addresses within the ARIN service area. > ? The transferee has no outstanding balances with ARIN. > ? The transferee?s need is confirmed by ARIN, according to current ARIN > policies, including but not limited to confirmation of utilization rate > of any prior IPv4 allocations, assignments, or previously transferred > IPv4 addresses held by the transferee. > ? The transferee signs (or has previously signed) an RSA covering the > IPv4 addresses transferred. > ? The transferee has not provided any IPv4 addresses for transfer > through this Simple Transfer process within the preceding 24 months. > ? The transferee may not provide any IPv4 addresses for transfer through > this Simple Transfer process within the subsequent 24 months, except in > the case of business failure. > ? The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block large > enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. > ? The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer through this > Simple Transfer process every 6 months. > > 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be transferred: > ? The IPv4 block must comply with applicable ARIN requirements, > including minimum allocation size (i.e. NRPM 4.2.2., 4.2.4., 4.3.2., > 4.3.6.). However, an IPv4 allocation or assignment of /24 or larger, but > smaller than the current minimum allocation size, may be transferred as > a whole resource, but may not be subdivided. > ? The IPv4 block must currently be registered for use within the ARIN > service area, either as part of an address block assigned by IANA to > ARIN, or as part of a legacy address block allocated within the ARIN > service area. > ? There must exist no dispute as to the status of the IPv4 block or > regarding the allocation or assignment of such block to the transferor. > ? The transferor may retain one contiguous address range out of their > original allocation or assignment for their own use, and transfer the > other contiguous address range. If the address range to be transferred > consists of multiple non-aggregatable CIDR blocks, each may be > transferred to a different transferee. The retained address range may > not be further subdivided or transferred for a period of 12 months. > Notwithstanding the preceding, the block may be subdivided as provided > in section 8.3.6. > > 8.3.4 Fees > ? Completion of a transfer requires payment of a transfer fee according > to ARIN?s schedule of fees. > ? The transferee will be subject to all future ARIN membership and > service fees according to the transferee?s total address holdings. > > 8.3.5 Pre-qualification > > ? An interested transferee must seek pre-qualification from ARIN to > confirm its eligibility to receive a transfer (including satisfaction of > need according to current ARIN policies) before making any solicitation > for transfer. Upon pre-qualification, ARIN will provide the transferee > with documentation of the pre-qualification, including the size (CIDR > prefix length) of the largest IPv4 address block the transferee is > eligible to receive, and the expiration date of the pre-qualification. > ? An interested transferor must seek pre-qualification from ARIN to > confirm its eligibility to offer a transfer (including lack of > outstanding balances and having signed an RSA) before offering IPv4 > address resources for transfer. Upon pre-qualification, ARIN will > provide the transferor with documentation of the pre-qualification, > including the network block and the expiration date of the > pre-qualification. > > 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN > > If ARIN determines that there is an inadequate supply of small blocks, > ARIN may allow transferors to subdivide network blocks beyond the > limited subdivision permitted under 8.3.3. ARIN will attempt to ensure > an adequate supply of small blocks while minimizing deaggregation. > > 8.3.7. Safe Harbor for IPv4 Transfers through this Simple Transfer Process > > When an IPv4 address resource is made available for transfer, it shall > be deemed exempt from ARIN utilization audit until 90 days after its > transfer pre-qualification or until the transfer is completed, whichever > comes first. > > In the event that a transfer is not consummated within the > prequalification time period, the block may be immediately > re-prequalified for transfer. Notwithstanding the current offered state > of the address resource, however, the audit exemption period shall > expire untolled 90 days after the expiration of the first > pre-qualification period. After the expiration of any utilization audit > exemption period, ARIN shall have 90 days in which to initiate a > utilization audit. In no event shall non-exempt time be construed to > extend the end of the next exemption period. > > 8.3.8. Simple IPv4 Transfers to or from Organizations Under Common > Ownership or Control > > If an IPv4 transferor or transferee is under common ownership or control > with any other organization that holds one or more IPv4 blocks, the IPv4 > transfer request must report all such organizations under common > ownership or control. > > When evaluating compliance with IPv4 Simple Transfer conditions, ARIN > may consider a transferor?s transfer request in light of requests from > other organizations under common ownership or control with the > transferor. Similarly, ARIN may consider a transferee?s request in light > of requests from other organizations under common ownership or control > with the transferee. In evaluating requests from other organizations > under common ownership or control, ARIN staff will consider the > relationship between the organizations, the degree of coordination > between the organizations, and the bona fide use of the addresses at > issue to determine whether all appropriate conditions are met. > > 8.3.9. Record-keeping and Publication of Simple Transfers of IPv4 Addresses > > ARIN will develop and operate a listing service to assist interested > transferors and transferees by providing them a centralized location to > post information about IPv4 blocks available from prequalified > transferors and IPv4 blocks needed by prequalified transferees. > Participation in the listing service is voluntary. > > After completion of the transfer, ARIN will update the registration > records pertaining to the IPv4 block at issue. ARIN will adjust its > records as to the holdings of the transferor and transferee. > > After the transfer, ARIN will publish WHOIS data that reflects the > current allocation or assignment of the transferred block. ARIN will > also make available information about any prior recipient(s) of such > block. ARIN will also publish a log of all transfers, including block, > transferor, transferee, and date. > > > > Rationale: > The ARIN Board of Trustees asked the Advisory Council to consider a set > of questions around the depletion of the free pool of IPv4 addresses, > the transition to IPv6 for Internet address needs in the future, and > ARIN's possible role in easing the transition. > > Over the past few years the AC has spent a great deal of time reflecting > on these issues ? as a group, as individuals, and in consultation with > the community. One outcome of this process is this policy proposal, > which the AC is submitting for consideration at the next meeting. We are > proposing some changes to existing ARIN policy regarding the transfer of > IP address block registrations between subscribers, which will allow for > the emergence of trade in IPv4 address space, with ARIN to provide a > listing service for address blocks available for transfer under the > liberalized policy. We are aware that this proposal, if adopted, will > mark a major change in ARIN's role in the community and the Internet. > > This policy proposal would create a transfer mechanism for IPv4 number > resources between those who have excess resources and those who have a > need, thereby allowing ARIN to continue to serve its mission after IANA > free pool exhaustion. This proposal would also set conditions on such > transfers intended to preserve as much as possible the existing policy > related to efficient, needs-based resource issuance, and would leverage > ARIN's extensive control systems, audit trails, and recognized position > as a trusted agent to avoid speculation and hoarding and diminish the > likelihood and extent of an uncontrolled 'black market' where the risk > and potential for fraud is immeasurably higher. > > Many of the transfer conditions are self-explanatory, but some worth > highlighting are that: > ? To discourage speculation, a waiting period (proposed at 24 months) is > required before a transferee (or ordinary resource recipient) can become > a transferor, or vice versa. > ? Transferees must qualify for IPv4 space (just as they do today when > getting it from ARIN) before they can receive address space by transfer, > or solicit space on a listing service. > ? To discourage unnecessarily rapid growth of routing tables, an > allocation or assignment may not be arbitrarily deaggregated. To allow a > transferor to downsize within their existing space, they may split off a > contiguous address range, once every 12 months, and transfer the > resulting netblock(s), which are subject to ARIN?s minimum allocation > size, to one or more transferee(s). > ? A transferee may receive one transfer every 6 months, so they?ll be > incented to transfer a block appropriately sized for their needs, which > will further discourage deaggregation and keep smaller blocks available > for smaller organizations. > The proposal would also have ARIN develop and operate a listing service > to facilitate transfers and provide an authoritative central source of > information on space available and requested for transfer. It would not > prohibit private party transactions, but would require that potential > transferors and transferees be pre-qualified first, so that neither > party will encounter any unexpected surprises when they ask ARIN to > process the transfer. > > Timetable for implementation: Immediately, with most aspects of policy > taking effect upon IANA exhaustion, per the policy text. > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From drc at virtualized.org Fri Mar 7 19:10:27 2008 From: drc at virtualized.org (David Conrad) Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 16:10:27 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D1BF70.9080402@internap.com> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> <5BC5F153-9C9B-45D9-9C13-CD62E828191E@virtualized.org> <47D1BF70.9080402@internap.com> Message-ID: Scott, On Mar 7, 2008, at 2:19 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > Organization A's IPv4 needs are growing, but their budget is tight. > In order to meet this quarter's needs, they transfer a block from > org B. Next quarter, they again need new addresses, so they transfer > another block from org C. Before the year is out, they have at > least 3 extra routes in the routing table, which can't be > aggregated, nor can they be filtered without breaking connectivity. Sounds plausible. > Rather, I'd like to require A to get a large enough block up front > to meet their needs for 6-12+ months, thereby reducing the amount of > deaggregation and the externality effects on the rest of the > Internet. (And if they really can't afford 6 months of space, they > can always lease PA space from their ISP or another LIR.) Assuming they can find it. You presume there are options available to organization A that I'm somewhat skeptical will actually exist. There will always be incentive to minimize the number of number of blocks being announced if you have to go out and find those blocks and then convince your ISP(s) to actually route them so if folk are having to go find address space, they're presumably doing it for a good reason. I suppose we'll see. > Can you identify which restrictions are onerous and would force > people to go elsewhere? We just submitted version 1.1 (which should > be posted to PPML today), which allows deaggregation of transfered > blocks to the level required to ensure adequate supply at smaller > block sizes. Will review and comment, hopefully by Monday, but I would point out that people go to the purely black market today so the restrictions folks face today would appear to be too onerous. Adding vast tracts of new regulation would seem likely to increase the number of folks forced into the black market. Regards, -drc From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 19:29:59 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 16:29:59 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF2CD3.6090706@internap.com> <5BC5F153-9C9B-45D9-9C13-CD62E828191E@virtualized.org> <47D1BF70.9080402@internap.com> Message-ID: <47D1DE07.7090002@internap.com> David Conrad wrote: > Scott, > > On Mar 7, 2008, at 2:19 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: >> Rather, I'd like to require A to get a large enough block up front to >> meet their needs for 6-12+ months, thereby reducing the amount of >> deaggregation and the externality effects on the rest of the >> Internet. (And if they really can't afford 6 months of space, they >> can always lease PA space from their ISP or another LIR.) > > Assuming they can find it. You presume there are options available to > organization A that I'm somewhat skeptical will actually exist. There > will always be incentive to minimize the number of number of blocks > being announced if you have to go out and find those blocks and then > convince your ISP(s) to actually route them so if folk are having to go > find address space, they're presumably doing it for a good reason. Yes, I do think that once the market gets started (shortly after IANA exhaustion), transferors will begin offering blocks of every size. If/when those blocks get transferred, additional blocks will be offered. I don't foresee supply drying up: there should always be blocks available at a price that's not too different (on a per-IP basis) between different block sizes. In order to make sure this happens, we do need to allow some level of deaggregation of offered netblocks down to the size level demanded by new entrants. I think we could simply allow deaggregation by transferors, and keep the 6-month-supply restriction on transferees. Others feel that this would result in excessive deaggregation at the beginning, and would leave too few larger blocks later on. As a compromise, the 1.1 draft gives ARIN discretion to gradually adjust the level of deaggregation permitted, to ensure that blocks of all sizes are always available at comparable prices. > I suppose we'll see. Yes, we definitely will, and can adjust policy later as needed, but hopefully we can also foresee enough to put decent policy in place before free pool exhaustion. >> Can you identify which restrictions are onerous and would force people >> to go elsewhere? We just submitted version 1.1 (which should be >> posted to PPML today), which allows deaggregation of transfered blocks >> to the level required to ensure adequate supply at smaller block sizes. > > Will review and comment, hopefully by Monday, Thanks. > but I would point out that > people go to the purely black market today so the restrictions folks > face today would appear to be too onerous. Adding vast tracts of new > regulation would seem likely to increase the number of folks forced into > the black market. We seem to be operating off different assumptions here. As far as I can tell the level of black market transfers today is very small in comparison to the white market (addresses acquired from ARIN). I also don't see the transfer policy as "adding vast tracts of new regulation": most of the restrictions in the transfer policy mirror restrictions in existing ARIN policy for space acquired out of the free pool. There are a few new restrictions, but generally they take the place of other (more complex) restrictions in existing free-pool-allocation policy. -Scott From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 19:40:25 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 16:40:25 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> <20080305171211.GI12712@shell01.cell.sv2.tellme.com> <447C2865-04A1-4680-BEE1-3974ADE3ADD3@virtualized.org><47CF92AE.7070806@apnic.net><054258CF-4B5D-4A1B-98BA-35E26EC386C9@virtualized.org><47D0D4D2.4030909@apnic.net><95F06EFB-BAA6-449F-B020-3E61372A0DBE@pch.net> <47D0E30E.2050508@apnic.net> Message-ID: <47D1E079.6000203@internap.com> michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: > The fact is that nobody needs to be dependent on new IPv4 > addresses after the runout date. There is plenty of time for > companies to make their businesses work with a mix of IPv6 and > IPv4. There have been some very public demonstrations of this > mixture at the last ARIN and NANOG meetings. There will be > another demo at the upcoming IETF meeting. So far, if you > examine the results of these demonstrations, there are no > serious problems that could not be fixed within a two year > timeframe. And we do have two years, probably more, to fix > these issues. I hope you're right, but I'm not willing to bet the industry on it. I for one haven't even seen *plans* for supporting line-rate translation at the scale required (10Gbps+). > Once it is demonstrably possible to run a fully mixed IPv4 > and IPv6 network, the need for transfers disappears. Note > that I am not referring here to dual-stack networks. When > I say MIXED I mean that you have some endpoints that are > IPv4 and some endpoints that are IPV6 and that they can > both communicate with each other over infrastructure that > has at least one pure IPv6 section in it. I agree with your conditional statement, but I don't believe that such mixed networking will be possible across-the-board before IPv4 free pool exhaustion. If I'm wrong, great: we've just wasted some time planning for a disaster that didn't occur. But if you're wrong, and we don't have a plan B, then we'll have a big problem on our hands. -Scott From paul at vix.com Fri Mar 7 20:42:33 2008 From: paul at vix.com (Paul Vixie) Date: Sat, 08 Mar 2008 01:42:33 +0000 Subject: [ppml] it's sort of pretty when you see it this way Message-ID: <45572.1204940553@sa.vix.com> it seems possible to me that a thread dominated by the usual suspects isn't getting any attention from anybody. the usual suspects are pounding the table from their usual position, and lurkers are using kill-by-thread to avoid hearing it all again. but, the way my reader chooses to render it is by indenting direct replies, which in this case ended up with a rather pretty pattern. before i killed-by- thread, that is. you guys need to stop worrying about getting the last word, or something. re: Geoff Huston ] Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF < 65: Tom Vest > [ 79: Geoff Huston ] [ 61: "Tony Hain" ] [ 52: Scott Leibrand ] [ 125: Tom Vest ] [ 28: Scott Leibrand ] < 117: Tom Vest > [ 80: Scott Leibrand ] [ 100: Michael Smith ] [ 90: Scott Leibrand ] [ 161: Tom Vest ] [ 126: Randy Bush ] Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF [ 172: Tom Vest ] [ 35: Randy Bush ] [ 45: John Curran ] [ 116: Leo Bicknell ] [ 51: David Conrad ] [ 113: Leo Bicknell ] [ 30: Joe Maimon ] [ 97: Leo Bicknell ] [ 25: David Conrad ] [ 84: michael.dillon at bt.co] [ 62: Michael Smith ] [ 25: Randy Bush ] [ 83: michael.dillon at bt.co] < 70: David Conrad > Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF [ 104: Geoff Huston ] [ 37: Tom Vest ] [ 65: Geoff Huston ] [ 56: John Curran ] [ 55: Geoff Huston ] [ 39: John Curran ] [ 49: David Conrad ] [ 28: John Curran ] [ 43: David Conrad ] [ 23: John Curran ] [ 17: Randy Bush [ 24: Scott Leibrand [ 49: Randy Bush [ 59: Scott [ 65: michael.dillon at bt.co] [ 23: Leo Vegoda ] [ 42: Scott Leibrand ] [ 53: Joe Maimon ] [ 30: David Conrad ] < 102: David Conrad > [ 76: Scott Leibrand ] [ 50: David Conrad ] [ 73: Scott Leibrand ] < 38: David Conrad > [ 81: Leo Bicknell ] From sleibrand at internap.com Fri Mar 7 20:52:42 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2008 17:52:42 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <266485D2-F010-49BB-B576-AFBFE5D329DC@pch.net> References: <47CDA182.80502@internap.com> <435DE256-44B8-48FC-9F4B-AC3BC8D70D65@virtualized.org> <47CF088B.5060809@internap.com> <47CF4F8F.2030504@psg.com> <000301c87f66$c7a4fed0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <00b801c87fb8$4ddf77e0$6e00a8c0@ad.redback.com> <507B4D6C-D2BC-44BF-843E-CDCDF1708BED@pch.net> <47D05D88.4050400@internap.com> <23785B40-BAA3-4A06-9DB9-EB82FA0F0885@pch.net> <47D0C4A5.3000402@internap.com> <266485D2-F010-49BB-B576-AFBFE5D329DC@pch.net> Message-ID: <47D1F16A.1050107@internap.com> Tom Vest wrote: > > On Mar 6, 2008, at 11:29 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > >> I think the main reason legitimate transfers (ones recognized by the >> recognized authority on who holds a resource, the RIR) will be favored >> by most potential participants due to the reduced risk of using such a >> system. For example, if I need IPv4 space after exhaustion, I could >> either go to ARIN, demonstrate to them that I need the space, and have >> access to a centralized listing service of transferors, all of whom >> ARIN has vouched for as being the legitimate holders of the addresses >> they're transferring. > > Okay, all of this holds, but only for (RSA->RSA) transactions, which > seem to me to be fairly low probability events until some/many large > members are well into IPv6 migration. Of course I could turn out to be > wrong, esp. is sidr is very widely adopted by current RSA > non-signatories (thereby presumably becoming ARIN members)... Are you familiar with the legacy RSA? It's a new version of the RSA specifically designed to recognize and preserve most of the rights of legacy holders. I believe that the opportunity to transfer addresses will be a strong incentive for many legacy holders (like Jim Frame) to sign the legacy RSA. >> I anticipate that this will prompt a large number of resource holders >> to update out-of-date contact information, and will prompt a number of >> legacy holders to sign legacy RSAs. > > Although there are probably a few real Rip Van Winkles out there, I > think it is more reasonable to assume that most remaining legacy > non-signatories are motivated by something other than ignorance of the > opportunity to follow the rules. Perhaps the proposed transfer process > will achieve such prominence and critical mass that legacy resource > holders will waive their self-declared right to do whatever they want > with their resources. Perhaps none of them will find it more > convenient/profitable to sell around the official mechanism and its > rules. I wonder how high "white market" prices will have to go for all > of these assumptions to hold true (note: foreshadowing for the new > entrants point below)... > > Perhaps no RSA signatory will be tempted to jump the queue and trawl the > gray market. I think the incentive for legacy holders to use the white market will be, quite simply, that prices are higher and there are more buyers there. The reason for this will be because potential transferees have a strong incentive to ensure that they are recognized as the proper holder of the addresses they've paid for. The black market won't be able to provide that, so prices will be lower there, and the only addresses supplied at lower prices on the black market will be from address holders who can't prove to ARIN that they're the legitimate holder of the addresses. > Perhaps all are willing to continue abiding by needs-based > allocation rules, even if that means that the wait for address space > could be very long. Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. > But if that's so, there are probably better > mechanisms to leverage this will to coordination that are less risky and > volatile and unpredictable... There definitely will be some volatility to a market solution, but I think it actually manages risk and predictability pretty well. There certainly are a lot of economists and financial folks who've developed all the tools we could possibly need to understand the market and predict what it's likely to do, especially as things actually start to play out. >> I don't anticipate that a market will price out new entrants. In >> fact, I favor the transfer policy proposal precisely because it >> provides an avenue for new and growing networks who need IPv4 space to >> get it after free pool exhaustion. > > > I concede that Richard Branson will always be able to start a new ISP if > he wants to, so in principle the industry will always remain "open" in > some trivial sense. The kind of "open" I was referring to was the more > functional/pragmatic kind -- i.e., the kind that mollifies internal > critics and makes them more likely to identify their interests with > community and its institutions rather than an aspiring competitor, the > kind that persuades anti-trust authorities to move on, because there's > nothing to see here... I think you're making an unsubstantiated assumption that prices in a transfer market will get extremely high. But as long as decent substitutes (IPv6, NAT, etc.) exist for some fraction of the IPv4 address holders, the price will never get higher than the marginal cost of freeing up IPv4 addresses. >> In my opinion, the supply curve for IPv4 addresses will be somewhat >> elastic, meaning that as the price goes up many IPv4 address holders >> will begin to free up IPv4 addresses and make them available. > > I agree, but I believe that there are better, less volatile, more > sustainable methods to leverage that elasticity, so that the needs-based > allocation regime and all of the collateral values that have gotten a > (largely unnoticed) free ride on it over the last decade can be preserved. > >> Demand will be elastic as well (quantity demanded will go down as the >> price increases), > > I agree here too, but I believe that there are better, less volatile, > more sustainable methods to manage that elasticity so that it is spread > across all resource users rather than killing the newest/smallest first. As per above, I don't think a transfer market will price out ("kill") new/small entrants. Rather, their cost of acquiring new IPv4 addresses should be about what it costs the next legacy holder or IPv6-adopting ISP to free up addresses. I'm still not convinced that there exists a better way to make additional supply of IPv4 addresses available. >> but I think supply will be more elastic than demand simply because >> there are so many netblocks out there already, > > (in the gray) Many of which are held by legacy holders, yes, but as I argue above, a transfer policy will give them a strong incentive to sign a legacy RSA so they can transfer the space without having to fake a corporate acquisition. >> so address conservation efforts will have more effect on freeing up >> supply to be transferred than on reducing the demands for new space. > > We are in 100% agreement here again. > The trick is to marshall price signals to induce this kind of behavior > sooner rather than later, and to keep the resulting address > recirculation process more effectively tied to needs-based delegation > principles. So long as the price/heat continues to go up evenly across > all resource users, the effects on migration out of v4 should be the > same. Given that, all that's really necessary is to keep everyone > approximately equally happy/unhappy but *together* through the full > (long) transition -- e.g., from gated v4/v6 coexistence to LISP or some > other, similarly durable/scalable future arrangement. Unfortunately, I think we have too many disparate types of IPv4 address holders (particularly legacy and non-legacy) to put everyone back in the same boat. Therefore, we're stuck with the next best thing, which is providing everyone the same incentive to free up addresses. -Scott From leo.vegoda at icann.org Sun Mar 9 04:21:21 2008 From: leo.vegoda at icann.org (Leo Vegoda) Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2008 00:21:21 -0800 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D1F16A.1050107@internap.com> Message-ID: On 08/03/2008 02:52, "Scott Leibrand" wrote: [...] > Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to > pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? Leo From owen at delong.com Mon Mar 10 01:37:03 2008 From: owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong) Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2008 22:37:03 -0700 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> References: <292DCB81-EAD1-4774-8913-998B3F2E39E7@virtualized.org> Message-ID: On Mar 4, 2008, at 1:01 PM, David Conrad wrote: > Hi, > > On Mar 4, 2008, at 9:27 AM, Owen DeLong wrote: >> Leo Bicknell made the point that without this policy or something > >> like it, the world becomes set in stone after IPv4 runout. Haves >> have and have nots have not and there's no way for that to change. > > > To be blunt, this strikes me as astoundingly hallucinatory. > > Without some form of transfer policy, ARIN simply becomes irrelevant > as address consumers go to the "black" market in order to meet their > requirements. > > With a transfer policy, ARIN _may_ retain some relevance as a source > of "title" information, but a lot depends on the restrictions ARIN > attempts to impose. Make the policy too restrictive, and people > will go elsewhere. > > In the end, with or without a transfer policy, you're still out of > "free" IPv4 addresses and businesses will do what they feel is > necessary to get around unenforceable bureaucratic rules. > > Regards, > -drc I am not as convinced as you are that routing of black-market IP will be so readily available from service providers. Owen From leo.vegoda at icann.org Mon Mar 10 05:17:25 2008 From: leo.vegoda at icann.org (Leo Vegoda) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 02:17:25 -0700 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: <47D3FCF3.6040600@opus1.com> Message-ID: On 09/03/2008 16:06, "Joel Snyder" wrote: [...] >>> Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to >>> pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. >> >> That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? > > Yeah, about 200 years of economics research. It turns out to be true > for anything, ranging from "true love" to "oil" to "IP addresses." Are you suggesting that there will be a steady flow of prefixes of all sizes or making a comment on economic theory? Leo From bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com Mon Mar 10 05:34:18 2008 From: bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com (bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 09:34:18 +0000 Subject: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF In-Reply-To: References: <47D3FCF3.6040600@opus1.com> Message-ID: <20080310093418.GA25932@vacation.karoshi.com.> On Mon, Mar 10, 2008 at 02:17:25AM -0700, Leo Vegoda wrote: > On 09/03/2008 16:06, "Joel Snyder" wrote: > > [...] > > >>> Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to > >>> pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. > >> > >> That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? > > > > Yeah, about 200 years of economics research. It turns out to be true > > for anything, ranging from "true love" to "oil" to "IP addresses." > > Are you suggesting that there will be a steady flow of prefixes of all sizes > or making a comment on economic theory? it could be, leo, that for the right price, there might be a "steady flow" of prefixes. at least this is what i think Geoff and David have argued. --bill From sleibrand at internap.com Mon Mar 10 13:05:52 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 10:05:52 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Prefix availability under 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <47D56A70.7040903@internap.com> Leo Vegoda wrote: > On 09/03/2008 16:06, "Joel Snyder" wrote: > > [...] > >>>> Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to >>>> pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. >>> That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? >> Yeah, about 200 years of economics research. It turns out to be true >> for anything, ranging from "true love" to "oil" to "IP addresses." > > Are you suggesting that there will be a steady flow of prefixes of all sizes > or making a comment on economic theory? I took his comment as a general comment on economic theory. With regards to availability of different prefix sizes, that is definitely a concern, and was the reason for the addition of the section "8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN" to version 1.1 of 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal. Under that proposal, ARIN would allow deaggregation of larger blocks as needed to meet demand for smaller blocks. This should ensure that, if an organization is willing to pay the market price for it, there should be prefixes available of every size up to /8. If you think there is a better way to solve the problem than the current 8.3.6 text, I'd love to hear it. That text was proposed as a compromise, so it'd be great to get more input to see whether the community feels it strikes the right balance. -Scott From leo.vegoda at icann.org Mon Mar 10 16:16:24 2008 From: leo.vegoda at icann.org (Leo Vegoda) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 13:16:24 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Prefix availability under 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D56A70.7040903@internap.com> Message-ID: On 10/03/2008 18:05, "Scott Leibrand" wrote: [...] >>>>> Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to >>>>> pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. >>>> That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? >>> Yeah, about 200 years of economics research. It turns out to be true >>> for anything, ranging from "true love" to "oil" to "IP addresses." >> >> Are you suggesting that there will be a steady flow of prefixes of all sizes >> or making a comment on economic theory? > > I took his comment as a general comment on economic theory. I suppose everyone can interpret the phrase "steady flow" differently. Maybe I should have been more precise. I am not aware of any published research on what the churn rate is likely to be and would be grateful for pointers. Thanks, Leo From sleibrand at internap.com Mon Mar 10 18:28:08 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2008 15:28:08 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Prefix availability under 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <47D5B5F8.90609@internap.com> Leo Vegoda wrote: > On 10/03/2008 18:05, "Scott Leibrand" wrote: > > [...] > >>>>>> Why would anyone have to wait for address space? If they're willing to >>>>>> pay the market price for it, there should always be space available. >>>>> That's a very bold statement. Is it based on research? >>>> Yeah, about 200 years of economics research. It turns out to be true >>>> for anything, ranging from "true love" to "oil" to "IP addresses." >>> Are you suggesting that there will be a steady flow of prefixes of all sizes >>> or making a comment on economic theory? >> I took his comment as a general comment on economic theory. > > I suppose everyone can interpret the phrase "steady flow" differently. Maybe > I should have been more precise. I am not aware of any published research on > what the churn rate is likely to be and would be grateful for pointers. I don't think anyone has published research on IPv4 transfer markets. Ben is ARIN's expert on the subject, perhaps he can comment. My own amateur-economist take on it is that, initially, supply (of currently unrouted space) will exceed demand, so price will stay low, and the quantity demanded (your "churn rate") will be only slightly lower than it is today (with price ~= 0). Price will then start to rise as the easy supply is put into production, bringing new, more expensive supply online, and reducing demand. -Scott From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 11:27:42 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 15:27:42 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) Message-ID: The Securities Act defines some terms in order to state what is and is not covered by the act. The definition of the term "security" is found in the section referred to in the subject. I used Cornell's online copy of the U.S. Code in order to read what I hope is the current definition. You can check that out here: or if you want to knock yourself out, you can find all of Title 15 here: It seems to me that the definition does not clearly exclude the trading of IP address contracts as some members of this list envision it. That means, that ARIN policy in this area could potentially create a new type of security or security derivative whose trading is regulated by the SEC. It would be interesting for ARIN to find a legal expert in the area of Title 15, particularly Chapter 2, who could explain what the definition means, and where there might be boundaries which ARIN policy must NOT cross if ARIN wishes to avoid regulatory scrutiny by the SEC. In addition, depending on how clear the case law is in this area, the legal expert could explain whether or not ARIN should ask the SEC for a ruling on the situation before proceeding with policies about IP address trading. The definition of "security" from Title 15 is as follows: (1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. --Michael Dillon P.S. In case you hadn't noticed, I am not a lawyer. From BillD at cait.wustl.edu Tue Mar 11 11:43:34 2008 From: BillD at cait.wustl.edu (Bill Darte) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:43:34 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > The Securities Act defines some terms in order to state what > is and is not covered by the act. The definition of the term > "security" is found in the section referred to in the > subject. I used Cornell's online copy of the U.S. Code in > order to read what I hope is the current definition. > You can check that out here: > > or if you want to knock yourself out, you can find all of > Title 15 here: > > > It seems to me that the definition does not clearly exclude > the trading of IP address contracts as some members of this > list envision it. That means, that ARIN policy in this area > could potentially create a new type of security or security > derivative whose trading is regulated by the SEC. > > It would be interesting for ARIN to find a legal expert in > the area of Title 15, particularly Chapter 2, who could > explain what the definition means, and where there might be > boundaries which ARIN policy must NOT cross if ARIN wishes to > avoid regulatory scrutiny by the SEC. In addition, depending > on how clear the case law is in this area, the legal expert > could explain whether or not ARIN should ask the SEC for a > ruling on the situation before proceeding with policies about > IP address trading. > > The definition of "security" from Title 15 is as follows: > > (1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury > stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of > indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any > profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, > preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable > share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, > certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided > interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, > straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate > of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any > interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, > call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a > national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, > or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as > a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation > in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, > guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or > purchase, any of the foregoing. > > --Michael Dillon > > P.S. In case you hadn't noticed, I am not a lawyer. Then why are you playing one on TV...I mean ppml.... I am also not a lawyer, but see nothing in the definition that comes close to what I see being proposed in the transfer policy update proposal. And, ARIN Counsel, who is a lawyer has already weighed in on this in an informal way suggesting a similar opinion that the SEC is unlikely to take interest. Bill Darte > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From info at arin.net Tue Mar 11 11:44:18 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:44:18 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Policy Proposal 2007-21: PIv6 for legacy holders with RSA and efficient use - Revised Text Message-ID: <47D6A8D2.50405@arin.net> Policy Proposal 2007-21, PIv6 for legacy holders with RSA and efficient use, has been revised. After ARIN XX this proposal was remanded to the ARIN Advisory Council by the ARIN Board of Trustees. The AC asked the author to revise the text and present the propsal again. The proposal is open for discussion on this mailing list and is on the agenda at the upcoming Public Policy Meeting in Denver. The current policy proposal text is provided below and is also available at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/2007_21.html Regards, Member Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) ### * ### Policy Proposal 2007-21 PIv6 for legacy holders with RSA and efficient use Author: Scott Leibrand Proposal Version: 2.0 Date: 11 March 2008 Proposal type: modify Policy term: permanent Policy statement: Modify NRPM section 6.5.8.1 (Direct assignments from ARIN to end-user organizations: Criteria), to read: To qualify for a direct assignment, an organization must: 1. not be an IPv6 LIR; and 2. qualify for an IPv4 assignment or allocation from ARIN under the IPv4 policy currently in effect, or demonstrate efficient utilization of all direct IPv4 assignments and allocations, each of which must be covered by a current ARIN RSA. Rationale: Current policy allows direct IPv6 allocations and assignments to nearly all organizations with IPv4 allocations or assignments from ARIN. As a result, such organizations can get IPv6 space just as easily as they can get IPv4 space, making it easy for them to transition to IPv6 as soon as they're ready to do so. However, there are some organizations who received IPv4 /23's and /24's prior to the formation of ARIN, and use that space in a multihomed, provider-independent fashion. Under current policy, such organizations cannot get IPv6 PI space without artificially inflating host counts, and are therefore discouraged from adopting IPv6. This policy proposal aims to remove this disincentive, and allow such organizations to easily adopt IPv6. In addition, pre-ARIN assignments were issued through an informal process, and many legacy resource holders have not yet entered into a formal agreement with ARIN, the manager of many such IP numbering resources. This policy proposal would require that such assignments be brought under a current ARIN Registration Services Agreement, thereby formalizing the relationship. Some pre-ARIN assignments may not be used efficiently. As unallocated IPv4 numbering resources are approaching exhaustion, it is important to ensure efficient utilization of IPv4 assignments, and to arrange for reclamation of unused space. Therefore, this policy would require that the organization wishing to receive IPv6 PI space demonstrate efficient utilization of their IPv4 assignment. (Efficient utilization is already defined elsewhere in policy, and the exact mechanism for achieving and determining efficient use is a matter of procedure, not of policy, so detailed procedures are not included in the policy statement above. The intent is that any organization with an assignment of /23 or larger which is less than 50% utilized would renumber and return whole unused CIDR blocks as necessary to bring the remaining CIDR block to 50% utilization or higher. A /24 should be considered efficiently utilized as long as it is in use for multihoming, as /25's and smaller are not routable for that purpose.) It has been suggested that this policy would be useful only until the growth of IPv6 exceeds the growth of IPv4. I would agree with this, and would further posit that the existing "qualify ... under the IPv4 policy currently in effect" language should also be modified at that time. I have therefore proposed this policy with a policy term of "permanent", with the expectation that this section of policy (6.5.8.1) will be rewritten at the appropriate time to entirely remove all IPv4 dependencies. Timetable for implementation: immediate From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 12:01:07 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 09:01:07 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a stretch of imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only network engineers are capable of that stretch. I forget the legal term offhand (and I'm not going to waste working day time looking it up) -- something like "intended use". It's a legal idea widely used by judges to toss out complaints/motions which basically says that the law must have been intended to cover the issue. That one cannot reread a law and try to make it cover something it clearly was never intended to cover. To say that IP addresses (location identifiers at best) are monetary securities is a stretch only a network engineer could imagine. michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: > The Securities Act defines some terms in order to state what is and is > not covered by the act. The definition of the term "security" is found > in the section referred to in the subject. I used Cornell's online copy > of the U.S. Code in order to read what I hope is the current definition. > You can check that out here: > > or if you want to knock yourself out, you can find all of Title 15 here: > > > It seems to me that the definition does not clearly exclude the trading > of IP address contracts as some members of this list envision it. That > means, that ARIN policy in this area could potentially create a new type > of security or security derivative whose trading is regulated by the > SEC. > > It would be interesting for ARIN to find a legal expert in the area of > Title 15, particularly Chapter 2, who could explain what the definition > means, and where there might be boundaries which ARIN policy must NOT > cross if ARIN wishes to avoid regulatory scrutiny by the SEC. In > addition, depending on how clear the case law is in this area, the legal > expert could explain whether or not ARIN should ask the SEC for a ruling > on the situation before proceeding with policies about IP address > trading. > > The definition of "security" from Title 15 is as follows: > > (1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security > future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of > interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, > collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or > subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust > certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided > interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, > option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group > or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the > value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered > into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, > in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", > or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim > certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to > subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. > > --Michael Dillon > > P.S. In case you hadn't noticed, I am not a lawyer. > > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From info at arin.net Tue Mar 11 12:31:01 2008 From: info at arin.net (Member Services) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 12:31:01 -0400 Subject: [ppml] ARIN XXI - Policy Proposals and Draft Agenda Message-ID: <47D6B3C5.7030601@arin.net> The following policy proposals have been under discussion on the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List and will be presented for consideration at the upcoming ARIN XXI Public Policy Meeting in Denver on 7-8 April 2008. 2008-3: Community Networks IPv6 Allocation 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal 2008-1: SWIP support for smaller than /29 assignments 2007-27: Cooperative distribution of the end of the IPv4 free pool 2007-23: End Policy for IANA IPv4 allocations to RIRs 2007-21: PIv6 for legacy holders with RSA and efficient use 2007-17: Legacy Outreach and Partial Reclamation 2007-14: Resource Review Process The full text for each proposal can be found at: http://www.arin.net/policy/proposal_archive.html Agenda information has been updated. Find the draft agenda as well as hotel information at: http://www.arin.net/ARIN-XXI/ ARIN XXI attendees are eligible for a special room rate of $189 (USD), based on availability, if reservations are made before THIS Friday, 14 March. So make your hotel reservation and register for the meeting today! Regards, Member Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 12:34:52 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 16:34:52 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: > To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a > stretch of imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only > network engineers are capable of that stretch. I didn't say that. We all know that IP addresses are not property and cannot be bought and sold. But now people are proposing that contracts, bearing the right to use certain IP addresses, can be bought and sold. That looks a lot like commodities contracts (which are promises of delivery) and some derivatives contracts and even things like re-insurance contracts. You and I are not experts in the law and really can't say one way or other, whether IP address contract trading would fall under the area regulated by the SEC. In fact, since the law in this area is quite complex, there probably are some situations that would clearly be covered, and some that would clearly not be covered. Before people write the policy that defines the situation, it would be nice to know what these boundaries are, before we cross them. And if the question is sufficiently fuzzy, then ARIN could ask the SEC for a ruling, before we take the action which has unintended consequences. Many of the people promoting IP address transfers have also spoken in favor of a scenario which sounds and awful lot like a securities exchange scenario. They hold this forth as a carrot to entice supporters. But can they actually deliver all the features of that carrot without attracting SEC regulatory oversight? I don't know and I don't think that anyone in ARIN, (BoT, staff, AC, members, hangers-on) really has the specialist knowledge to make that determination. --Michael Dillon From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 12:56:32 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 09:56:32 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <47D6B9C0.1050305@svcolo.com> michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: >> To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a >> stretch of imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only >> network engineers are capable of that stretch. > > I didn't say that. We all know that IP addresses are not property and > cannot be bought and sold. But now people are proposing that contracts, > bearing the right to use certain IP addresses, can be bought and sold. > That looks a lot like commodities contracts (which are promises of > delivery) and some derivatives contracts and even things like > re-insurance contracts. Question: does my rental property fall under SEC regulation? No. And I sell contracts to use that property. Go back to your act and read it again. It clearly says a lot of words, but the only direct nouns in play are clearly those representing interest in monetary items *or* mineral rights. Interest in commodities other than mineral rights are not included. And please stop playing lawyer. From jcurran at istaff.org Tue Mar 11 13:01:43 2008 From: jcurran at istaff.org (John Curran) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:01:43 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: At 4:34 PM +0000 3/11/08, wrote: >Many of the people promoting IP address transfers have also spoken in >favor of a scenario which sounds and awful lot like a securities >exchange scenario. They hold this forth as a carrot to entice >supporters. But can they actually deliver all the features of that >carrot without attracting SEC regulatory oversight? I don't know and I >don't think that anyone in ARIN, (BoT, staff, AC, members, hangers-on) >really has the specialist knowledge to make that determination. Michael - It's possible that you didn't see my response below: We have had ARIN Counsel look into this possibility per your request, and it does not appear to be an issue. If a specific policy proposal comes before the Board, we will seek an in-depth legal review at that time. /John Chair, ARIN Board of Trustees === >To: >From: John Curran >Subject: Re: [ppml] NANOG IPv4 Exhaustion BoF >Cc: >Bcc: >X-Attachments: > >At 8:46 PM +0000 3/4/08, wrote: >> >>So far, from the discussion that I have seen, it does not appear that >>anyone seriously considered the possibility that the IP address >>market proposals are getting rather close to the territory that the >>SEC regulates. That's why I'm raising the issue here, in hopes that >>some of the people on this list will discuss it with the BoT, >>and with some sort of legal advisor who has expertise in the right >>area of law. It could be the current counsel or some other lawyer. >>That is up to the BoT. > >It has been raised as an issue and discussed. At first review by our >counsel, there does not appear to be an issue here. > >The Board will ask for a more formal opinion of the legal ramifications >(as we always do) if/when a recommendation for new policy comes >before it. > >/John >Chair, ARIN Board of Trustees From arin-contact at dirtside.com Tue Mar 11 13:05:10 2008 From: arin-contact at dirtside.com (William Herrin) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:05:10 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:01 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: > To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a stretch of > imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only network engineers are > capable of that stretch. Jo, Meaning no disrespect, but if that were true we wouldn't need to remind folks at every turn that "IP addresses aren't property." The fact is, they look like property and they're used like property. You say that they're just "location identifiers" but what is a land deed if not a location identifier? So far the courts have sided with the position that IP address are not property but this position is based in no little part on the fact that that the policy structure makes it impossible to buy or sell IP addresses in any formal sense. It can't be property unless you can buy and sell it. Change the rules on sales and the precedent may not hold. > I forget the legal term offhand (and I'm not going to waste working day > time looking it up) -- something like "intended use". It's a legal idea > widely used by judges to toss out complaints/motions which basically > says that the law must have been intended to cover the issue. That's not quite the way it works in the US, though strict constructionists often argue that it should be. There's another interesting function of US common law whose legal term I don't recall, but it goes something like this: if it looks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, its a duck. I don't think address assignments in the proposed transfer policy look like securities, but they look close enough that Michael's concern is not unreasonable. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 From owen at delong.com Tue Mar 11 13:13:57 2008 From: owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:13:57 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6B9C0.1050305@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <47D6B9C0.1050305@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <07526C86-A620-4633-A0C6-77313EAD018A@delong.com> On Mar 11, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Jo Rhett wrote: > michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: >>> To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a >>> stretch of imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only >>> network engineers are capable of that stretch. >> >> I didn't say that. We all know that IP addresses are not property and >> cannot be bought and sold. But now people are proposing that >> contracts, >> bearing the right to use certain IP addresses, can be bought and >> sold. >> That looks a lot like commodities contracts (which are promises of >> delivery) and some derivatives contracts and even things like >> re-insurance contracts. > > Question: does my rental property fall under SEC regulation? No. > And > I sell contracts to use that property. > > Go back to your act and read it again. It clearly says a lot of > words, > but the only direct nouns in play are clearly those representing > interest in monetary items *or* mineral rights. Interest in > commodities > other than mineral rights are not included. > > And please stop playing lawyer. > Actually, I believe what is under discussion is not contracts conveying the right to use the addresses, but, rather contracts which convey the right to have your name attached to the recorded registration of those addresses in a particular registry. The fact that ISPs generally tend to respect that registry above others in that region and that said registry is part of a cooperative of 5 registries that have each agreed to operate in non-overlapping geographic regions is somewhat coincidental to the contracts being discussed. It is my opinion that the securities discussion is a rathole. We have already heard from at least one person much more qualified than anyone else participating in the discussion so far that it is unlikely the SEC would view this as a securities transaction. Owen From stephen at sprunk.org Tue Mar 11 13:06:37 2008 From: stephen at sprunk.org (Stephen Sprunk) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 12:06:37 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <013d01c8839b$b6846a80$5e3816ac@atlanta.polycom.com> Thus spake >> To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a >> stretch of imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only >> network engineers are capable of that stretch. > > I didn't say that. We all know that IP addresses are not property and > cannot be bought and sold. But now people are proposing that > contracts, bearing the right to use certain IP addresses, can be > bought and sold. Perhaps I missed a message, but I haven't seen that proposed. What I've seen proposed so far is that people would be able to qualify for addresses for their own use with ARIN and pay a third party to provide those addresses. That is _not_ trading contracts to use addresses, and it's not even remotely similar. > In fact, since the law in this area is quite complex, there probably > are some situations that would clearly be covered, and some that > would clearly not be covered. Before people write the policy that > defines the situation, it would be nice to know what these > boundaries are, before we cross them. And if the question is > sufficiently fuzzy, then ARIN could ask the SEC for a ruling, before > we take the action which has unintended consequences. That is not how we've been told the process works. We have been explicitly told to make proposals based on what we think is best for the community and, if there are legal ramifications, those will be presented to the BoT for their consideration before a proposal is adopted. I would fully expect that if counsel determined that a proposal (which had passed the consensus process) would incur SEC regulation, the BoT would remand it back to the community for modification or use the ACSP to determine if we really want to go down that path. We should not play armchair lawyer here. We have real lawyers that will look at the results of the process and let us know if there are problems or unintended consequences. In fact, comments by counsel are part of the "staff assessment" that comes out before the meeting, and we'll see what, if any, concerns are there at that time. > I don't know and I don't think that anyone in ARIN, (BoT, staff, AC, > members, hangers-on) really has the specialist knowledge to make > that determination. ARIN pays lawyers for that specialist knowledge. I'm confident that our general counsel is quite capable of bringing in whatever outside resources are needed to get definitive answers if he doesn't have them himself, and in fact is obligated to do so or be guilty of malpractice. Michael, you need to accept that you're not a lawyer and let the experts do their job. It's nice that you're concerned, but you've already been told repeatedly that counsel is already aware of your concern. Drop it until we're told there's an actual problem, so that we can get back to arguing about the actual goals of the proposal and whether we want a market in the first place. S Stephen Sprunk "God does not play dice." --Albert Einstein CCIE #3723 "God is an inveterate gambler, and He throws the K5SSS dice at every possible opportunity." --Stephen Hawking From owen at delong.com Tue Mar 11 13:21:21 2008 From: owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:21:21 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <66C3F902-CA33-48CE-9586-EA6DD7CD5370@delong.com> On Mar 11, 2008, at 10:05 AM, William Herrin wrote: > On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:01 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: >> To argue that an IP address meets that definition requires a >> stretch of >> imagination that even lawyers can't handle. Only network engineers >> are >> capable of that stretch. > > Jo, > > Meaning no disrespect, but if that were true we wouldn't need to > remind folks at every turn that "IP addresses aren't property." The > fact is, they look like property and they're used like property. You > say that they're just "location identifiers" but what is a land deed > if not a location identifier? > An address (for example, 2594 Rebecca Dr., El Sobrante, CA 94806) is a location identifier. A land deed is title in some piece of physical real estate. Addresses are a commonly used location identifier referenced in deeds, but, not all deeds use addresses. Indeed, some use very precise survey coordinates to describe the boundaries of the property rather than an address. IP addresses are like lattitude and longitude. Nobody owns any particular lattitude or longitude, but, no two objects of matter can occupy exactly the same lat/long/alt combination at the exact same time. > So far the courts have sided with the position that IP address are not > property but this position is based in no little part on the fact that > that the policy structure makes it impossible to buy or sell IP > addresses in any formal sense. It can't be property unless you can buy > and sell it. Change the rules on sales and the precedent may not hold. > That is an interesting question. However, our intent here is expressly not to permit the buying and selling of IP addresses, but, the trading in the registration of IP addresses. Definitely, this will be reviewed by counsel before being implemented as policy. I believe it has already been reviewed at least in part. > >> I forget the legal term offhand (and I'm not going to waste working >> day >> time looking it up) -- something like "intended use". It's a legal >> idea >> widely used by judges to toss out complaints/motions which basically >> says that the law must have been intended to cover the issue. > > That's not quite the way it works in the US, though strict > constructionists often argue that it should be. There's another > interesting function of US common law whose legal term I don't recall, > but it goes something like this: if it looks like a duck and it quacks > like a duck, its a duck. And therefore because it floats, it is made of wood and is, therefore, a witch. Burn her. Owen (With apologies to Python, M.) From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 13:24:02 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:24:02 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> William Herrin wrote: > Meaning no disrespect, but if that were true we wouldn't need to > remind folks at every turn that "IP addresses aren't property." The > fact is, they look like property and they're used like property. You > say that they're just "location identifiers" but what is a land deed > if not a location identifier? *sigh* Do you consider yourself a trained professional? That what you know took years of learning and experience? Then why insist that you can do a lawyer's job with no such experience? Go ask a lawyer what a deed is, and how a deed describes the property. Now try to describe an IP address in the same sense. (this answer was provided by a lawyer beside me, laughing) From arin-contact at dirtside.com Tue Mar 11 13:35:43 2008 From: arin-contact at dirtside.com (William Herrin) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:35:43 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 1:24 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: > *sigh* Do you consider yourself a trained professional? That what you > know took years of learning and experience? Then why insist that you can > do a lawyer's job with no such experience? Jo, Seems to me the only one insisting whether I can or can't do a lawyer's job is you. All I did was say I thought Michael's question was interesting and why I thought it was interesting. In your esteemed and educated view, is it permissible for a mere layman to inquire into the law? Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 From awahid at cwgo.com Tue Mar 11 13:39:21 2008 From: awahid at cwgo.com (Aamir Wahid) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:39:21 -0400 Subject: [ppml] PPML Digest, Vol 33, Issue 25 Message-ID: <946564330@mail.cwgo.com> From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 13:44:48 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:44:48 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> William Herrin wrote: > Seems to me the only one insisting whether I can or can't do a > lawyer's job is you. All I did was say I thought Michael's question > was interesting and why I thought it was interesting. In your esteemed > and educated view, is it permissible for a mere layman to inquire into > the law? It seems to me that the ARIN lists -- which I "should" read because they directly relate to my job, become unreadable/unusable if you actually work at said job, and that is entirely due to people making all sorts of unsubstantiated claims about things they know very little about. If people were to stop * making legal claims when they aren't lawyers * making claims about router/switch consumption when they work at an outfit too small (or too large) to know much about real life limitations of the big (or small) iron in question * making claims about burden to large/small entities when they work in the opposite (or neither) ...etc If we could all stick to discussing things we know something about, this list would be a lot more useful. (and 99% quieter) From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 11 13:53:48 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:53:48 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal Message-ID: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and discussion of the 2008-2 policy proposal. One item that I still think needs further discussion is the question of whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an IPv4 Transfer Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more limited set of restrictions be sufficient? Some background (or skip down to the bottom if you want): In 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee, there are two bullet points permitting and requiring transferees to get a larger block than they might otherwise, to help prevent deaggregation: ? The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block large enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. ? The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer through this Simple Transfer process every 6 months. In 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be transferred, a transferor is permitted to split their block into two pieces, keeping one and transferring the other. This could be an even split into two CIDR blocks, or at the other extreme it could mean splitting a /8, keeping a /22, and transferring the remaining /9, /10, /11, /12, /13, /14, /15, /16, /17, /18, /19, /21, and /22. However, it also means that a holder of a large IPv4 address block cannot simply transfer it off as 16,384 /22's. In 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN, further deaggregation beyond 8.3.3 is allowed, at ARIN's discretion, in order to deal with any shortage of smaller blocks resulting from the restrictions above. The conditions in 8.3.3 and 8.3.6 above represent a compromise between two views. On the one hand, there is the view that the transferee conditions in 8.3.2 are sufficient to recreate an environment very similar to the one we have today, in that recipients must justify their need for addresses, and then they receive a block large enough to meet their needs for a certain number of months. Today that block comes out of a /8 allocated from IANA to ARIN, so each such allocation generates at least one additional route in the routing table. There is little reason to believe that the number of prefixes demanded will change significantly, so there would be no incentive for transferors to deaggregate more than we do today, and therefore in this view the 8.3.2 conditions are adequate, and the last bullet of 8.3.3 and section 8.3.6 are unnecessary. The other view is that, without conditions restricting them from doing so, transferors of large netblocks will deaggregate their holdings to a large degree and transfer off the resulting pieces, resulting in a shortage of larger blocks. Under this view, the transfer policy should restrict the degree to which deaggregation is permitted, thereby encouraging transfer of larger blocks instead of smaller ones. In version 1.0 of the proposal, section 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN did not exist. Without it, a convincing argument was made that supply of small netblocks would be restricted, thereby driving up the price of small netblocks and driving down the price of large ones. To address this, we added section 8.3.6 in version 1.1. So, a few questions to discuss: Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict deaggregation of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? If so, what restrictions should be placed on deaggregation, and what types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide supply of smaller netblocks? Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into the policy, or should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust the restrictions as needed to best serve the interests of the community (section 8.3.6)? Thanks, Scott From BillD at cait.wustl.edu Tue Mar 11 14:05:15 2008 From: BillD at cait.wustl.edu (Bill Darte) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:05:15 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> References: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> Message-ID: And while you are answering these questions, or just browsing, please state plainly whether you are 'in favor' of this policy proposal, or 'opposed'. This will help the AC determine the extent to which consensus exists...and we thank you for that as well! Bill Darte > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Scott Leibrand > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 12:54 PM > To: arin ppml > Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in > 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal > > First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and > discussion of the 2008-2 policy proposal. > > One item that I still think needs further discussion is the > question of whether and how to restrict transferor > deaggregation in an IPv4 Transfer Policy. The question is, > should we place restrictions on both the transferee and > transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more limited > set of restrictions be sufficient? > > Some background (or skip down to the bottom if you want): > > In 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee, there are two bullet > points permitting and requiring transferees to get a larger > block than they might otherwise, to help prevent deaggregation: > * The transferee may request and receive a contiguous > CIDR block large > enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. > * The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address > transfer through this > Simple Transfer process every 6 months. > > In 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be > transferred, a transferor is permitted to split their block > into two pieces, keeping one and transferring the other. > This could be an even split into two CIDR blocks, or at the > other extreme it could mean splitting a /8, keeping a /22, > and transferring the remaining /9, /10, /11, /12, /13, /14, > /15, /16, /17, /18, /19, /21, and /22. However, it also > means that a holder of a large IPv4 address block cannot > simply transfer it off as > 16,384 /22's. > > In 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN, further > deaggregation beyond 8.3.3 is allowed, at ARIN's discretion, > in order to deal with any shortage of smaller blocks > resulting from the restrictions above. > > The conditions in 8.3.3 and 8.3.6 above represent a > compromise between two views. On the one hand, there is the > view that the transferee conditions in 8.3.2 are sufficient > to recreate an environment very similar to the one we have > today, in that recipients must justify their need for > addresses, and then they receive a block large enough to meet > their needs for a certain number of months. Today that block > comes out of a /8 allocated from IANA to ARIN, so each such > allocation generates at least one additional route in the > routing table. There is little reason to believe that the > number of prefixes demanded will change significantly, so > there would be no incentive for transferors to deaggregate > more than we do today, and therefore in this view the 8.3.2 > conditions are adequate, and the last bullet of 8.3.3 and > section 8.3.6 are unnecessary. > > The other view is that, without conditions restricting them > from doing so, transferors of large netblocks will > deaggregate their holdings to a large degree and transfer off > the resulting pieces, resulting in a shortage of larger > blocks. Under this view, the transfer policy should restrict > the degree to which deaggregation is permitted, thereby > encouraging transfer of larger blocks instead of smaller ones. > > In version 1.0 of the proposal, section 8.3.6 Deaggregation > when Permitted by ARIN did not exist. Without it, a > convincing argument was made that supply of small netblocks > would be restricted, thereby driving up the price of small > netblocks and driving down the price of large ones. To > address this, we added section 8.3.6 in version 1.1. > > > > So, a few questions to discuss: > > Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict > deaggregation of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? > > If so, what restrictions should be placed on deaggregation, > and what types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide > supply of smaller netblocks? > > Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into the > policy, or should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust > the restrictions as needed to best serve the interests of the > community (section 8.3.6)? > > Thanks, > Scott > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From owen at delong.com Tue Mar 11 14:14:30 2008 From: owen at delong.com (Owen DeLong) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:14:30 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> References: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> Message-ID: <1297F495-7F0E-49E3-9FFA-F9A3487C659C@delong.com> > So, a few questions to discuss: > > Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict > deaggregation > of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? > Yes. While in the longer term, loosening or removing such restrictions may prove to be a desirable thing to do, I believe we should see how things work with the restrictions initially and gain some experience with the policy before completely turning things loose. We can always deaggregate later, whereas re-aggregation is virtually impossible. > If so, what restrictions should be placed on deaggregation, and what > types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide supply of smaller > netblocks? > Personally, I think the original restrictions were a good starting point. I think that the compromise offered in the current 8.3.6 is an acceptable compromise, but, I do not feel we should go any further at this time. > Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into the policy, > or > should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust the restrictions as > needed to best serve the interests of the community (section 8.3.6)? > I prefer policy-based restrictions with the knowledge that policy can be adjusted later if necessary. However, I do think that the more dynamic ability of ARIN staff to respond to need and permit any needed deaggregation in the best interests of the community is a reasonable compromise which would pose acceptable risk. All of this is, of course, assuming that a transfer policy is a good idea at all. Frankly, the more we look at the various problems and attempts to tweak this policy to balance the various risks, the more convinced I become that it's just a bad idea and we should let IPv4 run its course and move on to IPv6 without creating policies to allow previously unanticipated address transfers. Indeed, people holding excess address space are always welcome to return said address space to ARIN under current policy, and, by many interpretations are actually required to do so. Owen From jweyand at computerdata.com Tue Mar 11 14:23:35 2008 From: jweyand at computerdata.com (Jim Weyand) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:23:35 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal Message-ID: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> Scott- Is there any quantitative data on the effect of deaggregation? The proposal relies on ARIN staff to make decisions regarding deaggregation. What skills and experience will be required of staff members to make reasonable decisions? -Jim Weyand > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf Of > Scott Leibrand > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 12:54 PM > To: arin ppml > Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 > Transfer Policy Proposal > > First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and discussion of > the 2008-2 policy proposal. > > One item that I still think needs further discussion is the question of > whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an IPv4 Transfer > Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the > transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more > limited set of restrictions be sufficient? > > Some background (or skip down to the bottom if you want): > > In 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee, there are two bullet points > permitting and requiring transferees to get a larger block than they > might otherwise, to help prevent deaggregation: > * The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block large > enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. > * The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer through > this > Simple Transfer process every 6 months. > > In 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be transferred, a > transferor is permitted to split their block into two pieces, keeping > one and transferring the other. This could be an even split into two > CIDR blocks, or at the other extreme it could mean splitting a /8, > keeping a /22, and transferring the remaining /9, /10, /11, /12, /13, > /14, /15, /16, /17, /18, /19, /21, and /22. However, it also means that > a holder of a large IPv4 address block cannot simply transfer it off as > 16,384 /22's. > > In 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN, further deaggregation > beyond 8.3.3 is allowed, at ARIN's discretion, in order to deal with any > shortage of smaller blocks resulting from the restrictions above. > > The conditions in 8.3.3 and 8.3.6 above represent a compromise between > two views. On the one hand, there is the view that the transferee > conditions in 8.3.2 are sufficient to recreate an environment very > similar to the one we have today, in that recipients must justify their > need for addresses, and then they receive a block large enough to meet > their needs for a certain number of months. Today that block comes out > of a /8 allocated from IANA to ARIN, so each such allocation generates > at least one additional route in the routing table. There is little > reason to believe that the number of prefixes demanded will change > significantly, so there would be no incentive for transferors to > deaggregate more than we do today, and therefore in this view the 8.3.2 > conditions are adequate, and the last bullet of 8.3.3 and section 8.3.6 > are unnecessary. > > The other view is that, without conditions restricting them from doing > so, transferors of large netblocks will deaggregate their holdings to a > large degree and transfer off the resulting pieces, resulting in a > shortage of larger blocks. Under this view, the transfer policy should > restrict the degree to which deaggregation is permitted, thereby > encouraging transfer of larger blocks instead of smaller ones. > > In version 1.0 of the proposal, section 8.3.6 Deaggregation when > Permitted by ARIN did not exist. Without it, a convincing argument was > made that supply of small netblocks would be restricted, thereby driving > up the price of small netblocks and driving down the price of large > ones. To address this, we added section 8.3.6 in version 1.1. > > > > So, a few questions to discuss: > > Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict deaggregation > of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? > > If so, what restrictions should be placed on deaggregation, and what > types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide supply of smaller > netblocks? > > Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into the policy, or > should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust the restrictions as > needed to best serve the interests of the community (section 8.3.6)? > > Thanks, > Scott > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN > Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you > experience any issues. From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 11 14:34:09 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:34:09 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> Message-ID: <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> Yes, there have been some numbers produced by ARIN staff (http://www.arin.net/statistics/index.html), which the AC has been using (along with some data from whois) to judge the likely demand and supply of larger and smaller blocks. In addition, I would anticipate that ARIN staff will also be able to use the prices on the listing service to decide whether/when to adjust deaggregation thresholds. If the per-IP price for smaller blocks gets to be higher than that for larger blocks, for example, that may mean that more deaggregation needs to be permitted. Fortunately, ARIN not only has a very smart staff, but also has the engaged the services of an economics expert with experience in a wide range of Internet issues (Ben), so I have confidence that they will be well prepared to make the decisions required to ensure smooth functioning of the market. -Scott Jim Weyand wrote: > Scott- > Is there any quantitative data on the effect of deaggregation? > > The proposal relies on ARIN staff to make decisions regarding > deaggregation. What skills and experience will be required of staff > members to make reasonable decisions? > > -Jim Weyand > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On Behalf > Of >> Scott Leibrand >> Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 12:54 PM >> To: arin ppml >> Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: > IPv4 >> Transfer Policy Proposal >> >> First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and discussion of >> the 2008-2 policy proposal. >> >> One item that I still think needs further discussion is the question > of >> whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an IPv4 > Transfer >> Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the >> transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more >> limited set of restrictions be sufficient? >> >> Some background (or skip down to the bottom if you want): >> >> In 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee, there are two bullet points >> permitting and requiring transferees to get a larger block than they >> might otherwise, to help prevent deaggregation: >> * The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block > large >> enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. >> * The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer > through >> this >> Simple Transfer process every 6 months. >> >> In 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be transferred, a >> transferor is permitted to split their block into two pieces, keeping >> one and transferring the other. This could be an even split into two >> CIDR blocks, or at the other extreme it could mean splitting a /8, >> keeping a /22, and transferring the remaining /9, /10, /11, /12, /13, >> /14, /15, /16, /17, /18, /19, /21, and /22. However, it also means > that >> a holder of a large IPv4 address block cannot simply transfer it off > as >> 16,384 /22's. >> >> In 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN, further deaggregation >> beyond 8.3.3 is allowed, at ARIN's discretion, in order to deal with > any >> shortage of smaller blocks resulting from the restrictions above. >> >> The conditions in 8.3.3 and 8.3.6 above represent a compromise between >> two views. On the one hand, there is the view that the transferee >> conditions in 8.3.2 are sufficient to recreate an environment very >> similar to the one we have today, in that recipients must justify > their >> need for addresses, and then they receive a block large enough to meet >> their needs for a certain number of months. Today that block comes > out >> of a /8 allocated from IANA to ARIN, so each such allocation generates >> at least one additional route in the routing table. There is little >> reason to believe that the number of prefixes demanded will change >> significantly, so there would be no incentive for transferors to >> deaggregate more than we do today, and therefore in this view the > 8.3.2 >> conditions are adequate, and the last bullet of 8.3.3 and section > 8.3.6 >> are unnecessary. >> >> The other view is that, without conditions restricting them from doing >> so, transferors of large netblocks will deaggregate their holdings to > a >> large degree and transfer off the resulting pieces, resulting in a >> shortage of larger blocks. Under this view, the transfer policy > should >> restrict the degree to which deaggregation is permitted, thereby >> encouraging transfer of larger blocks instead of smaller ones. >> >> In version 1.0 of the proposal, section 8.3.6 Deaggregation when >> Permitted by ARIN did not exist. Without it, a convincing argument > was >> made that supply of small netblocks would be restricted, thereby > driving >> up the price of small netblocks and driving down the price of large >> ones. To address this, we added section 8.3.6 in version 1.1. >> >> >> >> So, a few questions to discuss: >> >> Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict > deaggregation >> of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? >> >> If so, what restrictions should be placed on deaggregation, and what >> types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide supply of smaller >> netblocks? >> >> Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into the policy, > or >> should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust the restrictions as >> needed to best serve the interests of the community (section 8.3.6)? >> >> Thanks, >> Scott >> _______________________________________________ >> PPML >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN >> Public Policy >> Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if > you >> experience any issues. > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From tedm at ipinc.net Tue Mar 11 14:38:18 2008 From: tedm at ipinc.net (Ted Mittelstaedt) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:38:18 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> Message-ID: <000601c883a7$131305d0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Scott Leibrand > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 10:54 AM > To: arin ppml > Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in > 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal > > > First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and discussion of > the 2008-2 policy proposal. > > One item that I still think needs further discussion is the > question of > whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an > IPv4 Transfer > Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the > transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, No. However, the deaggregation should be performed by the "seller" not by the "buyer" It should also not be any longer than a /20 If a "transferor" AKA "seller" has a block longer than a /20 they should be prohibited from participating in this policy at all - they should return it to ARIN if they are going to give it up. If they have a /20 they should not be allowed to deaggregate it. If they have a /19 or shorter, they should complete the deaggregation PRIOR to transfer. You see, it may happen that a "transferor" may have a large block, like a /8 for example, that they have a "buyer" for only part of this - and their choice is either they deaggregate the large block and sell part of it now for cash now, or they hold off, expecting that later on someone who needs the complete undeaggregated block will come along and want to buy it. The liklihood is that over time the demand will be for smaller blocks. The reason being is that the cost of large blocks will be so high that the networks that can afford to buy them (and can provide justification for buying them) will find it cheaper to go to IPv6. It is the small fry that will be clinging to IPv4 the longest, and will be resisting the move to IPv6 for as long as possible - simply because putting in IPv6<->IPv4 gateways and other infrastructure to support old legacy IPv4 customers will be a much larger percentage of cost of their infrastructure. Of course, from a public good point of view, this is a bad thing because it essentially means that if a transfer policy goes into place that over time we will see more and more deaggregated IPv4 blocks as more and more of the large block holders abandon and split apart and sell off their large holdings. However, it really depends on what you want. If your goal is to prolong IPv4 lifespan, then your going to have to accept more and more deaggregation within the IPv4 routing table. If your goal is to reduce the global route table entry and your against more deaggregation, then to be consistent you should be completely against this transfer policy from the get-go. What you CANNOT have, is your cake and eat it to. You CANNOT have prolonged IPv4 lifespan without an increase in deaggregation. In any case, I am completely against this transfer policy proposal, and always have been. Ted From BillD at cait.wustl.edu Tue Mar 11 14:43:28 2008 From: BillD at cait.wustl.edu (Bill Darte) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 13:43:28 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> Message-ID: I will piggy back upon Scott's praise of the ARIN staff. I think it would be hard to find a more trustworthy, knowledgeable, competent and dedicated group than ARIN staff. Policy reliance upon them to 'do the right thing' is not an issue of whether they have the talent and ability to do it, but rather is it appropriate to express policy in that generalized way. The risk of being too expressive in giving guidance on how they may do these the task runs the risk of missing something necessary or bleeding over into operations...whereas being to general runs the risk of lack of transparency and perceived fairness. Bill Darte > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Scott Leibrand > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 1:34 PM > To: Jim Weyand > Cc: arin ppml > Subject: Re: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation > in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal > > Yes, there have been some numbers produced by ARIN staff > (http://www.arin.net/statistics/index.html), which the AC has > been using (along with some data from whois) to judge the > likely demand and supply of larger and smaller blocks. > > In addition, I would anticipate that ARIN staff will also be > able to use the prices on the listing service to decide > whether/when to adjust deaggregation thresholds. If the > per-IP price for smaller blocks gets to be higher than that > for larger blocks, for example, that may mean that more > deaggregation needs to be permitted. > > Fortunately, ARIN not only has a very smart staff, but also > has the engaged the services of an economics expert with > experience in a wide range of Internet issues (Ben), so I > have confidence that they will be well prepared to make the > decisions required to ensure smooth functioning of the market. > > -Scott > > Jim Weyand wrote: > > Scott- > > Is there any quantitative data on the effect of deaggregation? > > > > The proposal relies on ARIN staff to make decisions regarding > > deaggregation. What skills and experience will be required of staff > > members to make reasonable decisions? > > > > -Jim Weyand > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] > On Behalf > > Of > >> Scott Leibrand > >> Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 12:54 PM > >> To: arin ppml > >> Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: > > IPv4 > >> Transfer Policy Proposal > >> > >> First of all, thanks to everyone for their feedback and > discussion of > >> the 2008-2 policy proposal. > >> > >> One item that I still think needs further discussion is > the question > > of > >> whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an IPv4 > > Transfer > >> Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the > >> transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more > >> limited set of restrictions be sufficient? > >> > >> Some background (or skip down to the bottom if you want): > >> > >> In 8.3.2 Conditions on the transferee, there are two > bullet points > >> permitting and requiring transferees to get a larger block > than they > >> might otherwise, to help prevent deaggregation: > >> * The transferee may request and receive a contiguous CIDR block > > large > >> enough to provide a 12 month supply of IPv4 addresses. > >> * The transferee may only receive one IPv4 address transfer > > through > >> this > >> Simple Transfer process every 6 months. > >> > >> In 8.3.3 Conditions on the IPv4 address block to be > transferred, a > >> transferor is permitted to split their block into two > pieces, keeping > >> one and transferring the other. This could be an even > split into two > >> CIDR blocks, or at the other extreme it could mean splitting a /8, > >> keeping a /22, and transferring the remaining /9, /10, > /11, /12, /13, > >> /14, /15, /16, /17, /18, /19, /21, and /22. However, it also means > > that > >> a holder of a large IPv4 address block cannot simply > transfer it off > > as > >> 16,384 /22's. > >> > >> In 8.3.6 Deaggregation when Permitted by ARIN, further > deaggregation > >> beyond 8.3.3 is allowed, at ARIN's discretion, in order to > deal with > > any > >> shortage of smaller blocks resulting from the restrictions above. > >> > >> The conditions in 8.3.3 and 8.3.6 above represent a compromise > >> between two views. On the one hand, there is the view that the > >> transferee conditions in 8.3.2 are sufficient to recreate an > >> environment very similar to the one we have today, in that > recipients > >> must justify > > their > >> need for addresses, and then they receive a block large enough to > >> meet their needs for a certain number of months. Today that block > >> comes > > out > >> of a /8 allocated from IANA to ARIN, so each such allocation > >> generates at least one additional route in the routing > table. There > >> is little reason to believe that the number of prefixes > demanded will > >> change significantly, so there would be no incentive for > transferors > >> to deaggregate more than we do today, and therefore in > this view the > > 8.3.2 > >> conditions are adequate, and the last bullet of 8.3.3 and section > > 8.3.6 > >> are unnecessary. > >> > >> The other view is that, without conditions restricting them from > >> doing so, transferors of large netblocks will deaggregate their > >> holdings to > > a > >> large degree and transfer off the resulting pieces, resulting in a > >> shortage of larger blocks. Under this view, the transfer policy > > should > >> restrict the degree to which deaggregation is permitted, thereby > >> encouraging transfer of larger blocks instead of smaller ones. > >> > >> In version 1.0 of the proposal, section 8.3.6 Deaggregation when > >> Permitted by ARIN did not exist. Without it, a convincing argument > > was > >> made that supply of small netblocks would be restricted, thereby > > driving > >> up the price of small netblocks and driving down the price > of large > >> ones. To address this, we added section 8.3.6 in version 1.1. > >> > >> > >> > >> So, a few questions to discuss: > >> > >> Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict > > deaggregation > >> of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? > >> > >> If so, what restrictions should be placed on > deaggregation, and what > >> types of deaggregation should be allowed to provide supply > of smaller > >> netblocks? > >> > >> Should any restrictions on deaggregation be written into > the policy, > > or > >> should ARIN staff be given discretion to adjust the > restrictions as > >> needed to best serve the interests of the community > (section 8.3.6)? > >> > >> Thanks, > >> Scott > >> _______________________________________________ > >> PPML > >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed > to the ARIN > >> Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > >> Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > >> http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > >> Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if > > you > >> experience any issues. > > _______________________________________________ > > PPML > > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed > to the ARIN > > Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From arin-contact at dirtside.com Tue Mar 11 14:45:47 2008 From: arin-contact at dirtside.com (William Herrin) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:45:47 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: > If we could all stick to discussing things we know something about, this > list would be a lot more useful. (and 99% quieter) Jo, Who decides which things I get to know something about? You? Do I need to have passed the bar in a dozen states before I'm qualified to discuss the law? Perhaps it's enough that I aced the couple law courses I took in college. No, surely not. Perhaps I need also have worked for years at the DNC, hand in hand with folks who actually write the laws. The list would exceptionally useful (though perhaps not quieter) if interesting questions were met with well-reasoned answers instead of being derided as ignorant and given a cursory response. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 From tedm at ipinc.net Tue Mar 11 14:58:02 2008 From: tedm at ipinc.net (Ted Mittelstaedt) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:58:02 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <000701c883a9$d53b15b0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of Bill Darte > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 11:43 AM > To: Scott Leibrand; Jim Weyand > Cc: arin ppml > Subject: Re: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation > in 2008-2: IPv4Transfer Policy Proposal > > > The risk of being too expressive in giving guidance on how > they may do these the task runs the risk of missing something > necessary or bleeding over into operations...whereas being to > general runs the risk of lack of transparency and perceived fairness. > The goal should not be to try to strike a balance between specific policy and giving ARIN staff their heads. The goal of policy should be to immunize ARIN as much as possible from a successful legal challenge that would destroy ARIN and replace it with some government-run organization that will use the legal system to remake the Internet to it's own ends. That will likely produce policy in some areas that is rather restrictive in what the ARIN staff can do. The recent unpleasantness with Pakistan blocking Youtube over a religious video that the Pakistan government didn't like should have well illustrated the dangers of allowing the world's governments more of a hand in running the Internet. Ted From kkargel at polartel.com Tue Mar 11 15:10:38 2008 From: kkargel at polartel.com (Kevin Kargel) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:10:38 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com><3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com><47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com><3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com><47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <70DE64CEFD6E9A4EB7FAF3A0631410660104F451@mail> The interesting thing to me about the whole "IP as property" concept is that the only way to dictate it is by making an unenforceable rule. The whole concept is almost impossible to police at layer three or higher unless you are going to tie the IP address to a MAC ID or a physical port (route?) or an identity key. Tacking in the overhead to globally route with authorization in every packet would be unfeasible. Making a rule you can't enforce is really bad parenting and tends to destroy your authority. > -----Original Message----- > From: ppml-bounces at arin.net [mailto:ppml-bounces at arin.net] On > Behalf Of William Herrin > Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2008 1:46 PM > To: Jo Rhett > Cc: ppml at arin.net > Subject: Re: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) > > On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: > > If we could all stick to discussing things we know > something about, > > this list would be a lot more useful. (and 99% quieter) > > Jo, > > Who decides which things I get to know something about? You? > > Do I need to have passed the bar in a dozen states before I'm > qualified to discuss the law? Perhaps it's enough that I aced > the couple law courses I took in college. No, surely not. > Perhaps I need also have worked for years at the DNC, hand in > hand with folks who actually write the laws. > > The list would exceptionally useful (though perhaps not > quieter) if interesting questions were met with well-reasoned > answers instead of being derided as ignorant and given a > cursory response. > > Regards, > Bill Herrin > > > -- > William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us > 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA > 22042-3004 _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to > the ARIN Public Policy Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at > info at arin.net if you experience any issues. > From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 15:18:47 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 12:18:47 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> Message-ID: <47D6DB17.6060207@svcolo.com> William Herrin wrote: > The list would exceptionally useful (though perhaps not quieter) if > interesting questions were met with well-reasoned answers instead of > being derided as ignorant and given a cursory response. It *HAS* been given a well-reasoned answer by ARIN's legal counsel. *YOU* are one who is continuing to argue against his professional expertise. To which I owe you nothing, and a cursory response to stick to your own field is certainly not out of line. *blonk* -- Jo Rhett senior geek Silicon Valley Colocation From stephen at sprunk.org Tue Mar 11 15:00:08 2008 From: stephen at sprunk.org (Stephen Sprunk) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 14:00:08 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4Transfer Policy Proposal References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local><47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> Message-ID: <01b401c883ac$ebac2480$5e3816ac@atlanta.polycom.com> Thus spake "Bill Darte" > Policy reliance upon [ARIN staff] to 'do the right thing' is not an > issue of whether they have the talent and ability to do it, but rather > is it appropriate to express policy in that generalized way. > > The risk of being too expressive in giving guidance on how they may do > these the task runs the risk of missing something necessary or bleeding > over into operations...whereas being to general runs the risk of lack of > transparency and perceived fairness. I agree, and it's a tough balancing act. In addition to your points, it's been expressed in the past that being too general makes it difficult for staff to determine the intent of the policy or deny a request that's questionable. A perfect example would be the vague "justification" for IPv6 SWIPs and PI blocks shorter than /48: staff has to approve all requests because they don't have any policy basis to deny any, which was not the intent. S Stephen Sprunk "God does not play dice." --Albert Einstein CCIE #3723 "God is an inveterate gambler, and He throws the K5SSS dice at every possible opportunity." --Stephen Hawking From woody at pch.net Tue Mar 11 15:23:28 2008 From: woody at pch.net (Bill Woodcock) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 11:23:28 -0800 (PST) Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> References: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> Message-ID: On Tue, 11 Mar 2008, Scott Leibrand wrote: > One item that I still think needs further discussion is the question of > whether and how to restrict transferor deaggregation in an IPv4 Transfer > Policy. The question is, should we place restrictions on both the > transferee and transferor to limit deaggregation, or would a more > limited set of restrictions be sufficient? It is not in the interests of the Internet community to put any limitations whatsoever on transferors. Doing so would restrict supply, which we don't want, since, all else being equal, it raises the cost of the addresses. We do want to place restrictions on the tranferees, since doing so restricts demand, which, all else being equal, lowers the cost of the addresses. -Bill From arin-contact at dirtside.com Tue Mar 11 15:24:20 2008 From: arin-contact at dirtside.com (William Herrin) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 15:24:20 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> References: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> Message-ID: <3c3e3fca0803111224u5be00b79w4ddbe911a0cacc33@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 1:53 PM, Scott Leibrand wrote: > Do you think that the IPv4 Transfer Policy should restrict deaggregation > of transferred netblocks? Why or why not? Scott, Yes, the policy should restrict deaggregation. Why? Allow me to spin a hypothetical scenario: ScottNet, an ISP serving the eastern seaboard, goes bankrupt and the pieces get auctioned off by the court. The customer base is sold by locality to a dozen distinct ISPs who agree to honor some portion of the remaining contracts in order to gain the customers. ScottNet held 3 /12's. In its infinite wisdom, it allocated /24's to its individual POPs as needed and then assigned customer prefixes out of those /24's. Without a restriction on deaggregation, the /24's assigned to each POP are transferred to the purchasing ISP for that POP. Those ISPs aggregate where possible but mostly have to announce the individual /24's. The net impact of ScottNet's dissolution is that as many as 12,000 prefixes are added to the DFZ RIB and FIB at a systemic cost that could exceed $74M/year (http://bill.herrin.us/network/bgpcost.html). I think we can all agree that would be an unfortunate outcome. On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 2:05 PM, Bill Darte wrote: > And while you are answering these questions, or just browsing, please > state plainly whether you are 'in favor' of this policy proposal, or > 'opposed'. Opposed at this point, but I do agree that an address market is inevitable and ARIN should act to regulate it intelligently. You're asking good questions and working towards a policy I could support. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 From jrhett at svcolo.com Tue Mar 11 15:26:14 2008 From: jrhett at svcolo.com (Jo Rhett) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 12:26:14 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <000601c883a7$131305d0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> References: <000601c883a7$131305d0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> Message-ID: <47D6DCD6.6070308@svcolo.com> Ted Mittelstaedt wrote: > What you CANNOT have, is your cake and eat it to. You CANNOT have prolonged > IPv4 lifespan without an increase in deaggregation. I don't often find myself 100% agreeing with Ted, but this is one of those cases. I don't believe that preventing deaggregation is plausible. I suspect that attempts to do so with move parties interested in using the transfer policy (if approved) into the black market to avoid dealing with the policy limitations. Note: "I don't believe" and "I suspect" are key to understanding my PoV on this issue. I welcome enlightened argument to the contrary, at the cost of one beer at local pub. If you are an interesting talker, I'll buy the second round ;-) -- Jo Rhett senior geek Silicon Valley Colocation From arin-contact at dirtside.com Tue Mar 11 15:43:24 2008 From: arin-contact at dirtside.com (William Herrin) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 15:43:24 -0400 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: <47D6DB17.6060207@svcolo.com> References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111005x441027ccn679f5bb196d14fb2@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C032.8090307@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111035v1af7d810ob9b75f3c60cae34a@mail.gmail.com> <47D6C510.3050508@svcolo.com> <3c3e3fca0803111145o49c9116enbf32d46988c03312@mail.gmail.com> <47D6DB17.6060207@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <3c3e3fca0803111243x6d3fe407h716bf27d53810964@mail.gmail.com> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 3:18 PM, Jo Rhett wrote: > William Herrin wrote: > > The list would exceptionally useful (though perhaps not quieter) if > > interesting questions were met with well-reasoned answers instead of > > being derided as ignorant and given a cursory response. > > It *HAS* been given a well-reasoned answer by ARIN's legal counsel. Jo, That response is at best premature and at worst flat wrong: "ARIN Counsel [..] has already weighed in on this in an _informal_ way" (Bill Darte) and "If a specific policy proposal comes before the Board, we will seek an in-depth legal review at that time." (John Curran). I understand this to mean that at a quick glance there is probably no legal problem but the matter will be more thoroughly researched once specific policy language passes consensus. This was a satisfactory answer to Michael's question. Your derision was and is not. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin at dirtside.com bill at herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: Falls Church, VA 22042-3004 From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 20:29:42 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 00:29:42 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: > It's possible that you didn't see my response below: We have had > ARIN Counsel look into this possibility per your request, > and it does > not appear to be an issue. If a specific policy proposal > comes before > the Board, we will seek an in-depth legal review at that time. What is it that isn't an issue? We have had at least one suggestion here that once transfers are allowed, ARIN should provide a listing service which quotes all transactions that take place in order to provide market transparency. I can believe that the policy proposal which simply allows transfers doesn't slide into the SEC regulatory area. But real-time listing services just like the NYSE and CBOT? Somewhere there is a line which we should know about so that we don't waste our time pushing the policy in a direction that attracts government regulation. The possibility of FCC regulation has been well and truly put behind us by work that ICANN and the DOC did, but the SEC is a different ballgame. Since we don't have a really clear case-law ruling that IP addresses are not property, even that could change if and when people start buying and selling address blocks. --Michael Dillon From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 11 20:41:22 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 17:41:22 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: <47D6ACC3.6090707@svcolo.com> Message-ID: <47D726B2.6030704@internap.com> Michael, We understand your concern, as does ARIN, the BoT, President, and counsel. Thank you for raising the issue. As others have explained, the way we've been asked to make policy is to first come up with the policy that makes the most sense for the community. ARIN counsel will provide a legal assessment of each policy proposal when it comes before a public policy meeting. If there are areas of particular concern, they will be addressed before any policy proposal is adopted by the BoT. The legal and economic issues surrounding the IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal will be also be discussed at the Denver meeting, so I think that would be the best forum to continue this particular discussion if you wish to do so. -Scott michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: >> It's possible that you didn't see my response below: We have had >> ARIN Counsel look into this possibility per your request, >> and it does >> not appear to be an issue. If a specific policy proposal >> comes before >> the Board, we will seek an in-depth legal review at that time. > > What is it that isn't an issue? > > We have had at least one suggestion here that once transfers are > allowed, ARIN should provide a listing service which quotes all > transactions that take place in order to provide market transparency. > > I can believe that the policy proposal which simply allows transfers > doesn't slide into the SEC regulatory area. But real-time listing > services just like the NYSE and CBOT? Somewhere there is a line > which we should know about so that we don't waste our time > pushing the policy in a direction that attracts government regulation. > The possibility of FCC regulation has been well and truly put > behind us by work that ICANN and the DOC did, but the SEC is a different > ballgame. > > Since we don't have a really clear case-law ruling that IP addresses are > not property, even that could change if and when people start buying > and selling address blocks. > > --Michael Dillon > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 20:46:10 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 00:46:10 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Securities Act 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > P.S. In case you hadn't noticed, I am not a lawyer. > > Then why are you playing one on TV...I mean ppml.... Really? Did I give you legal advice? Did I claim to be a lawyer? Or did I suggest that it would be a wise move to consult expert legal advice in a specific area of law which sounds like it may cover the buying and selling of contracts which bear the right to use a specific IP address block. > I am also not a lawyer, but see nothing in the definition > that comes close to what I see being proposed in the transfer > policy update proposal. During the discussion, others have claimed that the transfer policy is just the first step to enabling an IP address trading market. If such a market would attract SEC regulation, I think that it is a good idea to find out what are the boundaries to ARIN policy, assuming that we do not want to give up our industry self-regulatory regime. If legal advice from a lawyer specializing in SEC Regulations and Title 15 Chapter 2, tells us that there are some real limits and we are close to overstepping them, then people might want to reject the transfer policy entirely and take a different tack. For instance, organizations with a surplus of IPv4 addresses could be required to return them to ARIN, and ARIN could continue to allocate on a needs basis with first-come first-served to decide any supply issues. > And, ARIN Counsel, who is a lawyer has already weighed in on > this in an informal way suggesting a similar opinion that the > SEC is unlikely to take interest. I am assuming, that since ARIN Counsel has been retained for many years by a non-profit organization, that said counsel's expertise is in corporate and general law, not in the specialized area of the SEC and financial markets. To date I have seen no indication that ARIN has consulted with a lawyer whose area of expertise is precisely financial markets. There has been a lot of discussion in which several participants have suggested that the transfer policy is the first step to enabling a market in contracts bearing the right of use of a specific IP address range. Like the New York Stock Exchange or the Chicago commodities markets or NASDAQ etc, etc. That is not ordinary corporate law since ordinary companies do not directly participate in the financial markets, they retain specialists (pension funds, stock brokers, banks) to do it on their behalf. --Michael Dillon From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 20:56:18 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 00:56:18 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> Message-ID: > In addition, I would anticipate that ARIN staff will also be > able to use the prices on the listing service to decide > whether/when to adjust deaggregation thresholds. If the > per-IP price for smaller blocks gets to be higher than that > for larger blocks, for example, that may mean that more > deaggregation needs to be permitted. So, not only will ARIN staff run the registry, and the quotation service, but they will also play a role analogous to the Fed's role in setting the discount rate? And the SEC will just stand by and let you do this because of an untested claim that IP addresses are not property, even though you are now running a market in pseudo-equity derivatives? You do realize that this will all happen at a time when IPv4 address supply will be hard to get which means that some orgs who need addresses will suffer real financial pain either due to inability to get addresses or due to the high price they need to pay for a block. It's almost guaranteed that one or more of these organizations is going to either sue ARIN or file an official complaint with the SEC or lobby Congress to outlaw ARIN. Probably all three. Are you certain that this libertarian/anarchist fantasy market can withstand the test of such legal actions? And that it can be correctly built by a bunch of non-lawyers who so far have not sought expert legal advice? --Michael Dillon From michael.dillon at bt.com Tue Mar 11 20:57:35 2008 From: michael.dillon at bt.com (michael.dillon at bt.com) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 00:57:35 -0000 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: <000601c883a7$131305d0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> References: <47D6C72C.2070604@internap.com> <000601c883a7$131305d0$6fce4b41@tedsdesk> Message-ID: > What you CANNOT have, is your cake and eat it to. You CANNOT > have prolonged > IPv4 lifespan without an increase in deaggregation. > > In any case, I am completely against this transfer policy > proposal, and always have been. For the record, this is also my position. --Michael Dillon From sleibrand at internap.com Tue Mar 11 21:17:09 2008 From: sleibrand at internap.com (Scott Leibrand) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 18:17:09 -0700 Subject: [ppml] Restrictions on transferor deaggregation in 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal In-Reply-To: References: <1582DCBFF968F044A9A910C0AB177C902CE64B@cliff.cdi.local> <47D6D0A1.6010202@internap.com> Message-ID: <47D72F15.7040806@internap.com> Michael, Thank you for your input, and for (separately) clearly registering your opposition to the proposal as written. FWIW, ARIN counsel Steve Ryan provided expert legal advice to the AC when we were formulating this proposal, as did Ben Edelman, an economics professor and lawyer hired by ARIN to consult on these matters. (If you were at ABQ, he was one of the ones on the market panel.) I acknowledge that we are not experts in law or economics, but we are doing our best to engage such experts, and to consider their opinion, as well as that of the community, in formulating, revising, and considering this and other policy proposals. If you have any input as to how the IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal could be made to better serve the needs of the community, I'd love to hear it. If your objections center around legal risk, then I would encourage you to trust (for the sake of policy development) that ARIN will appropriately manage that risk, and address whether the policy would be good or bad for the Internet community, and why. Thanks, Scott michael.dillon at bt.com wrote: >> In addition, I would anticipate that ARIN staff will also be >> able to use the prices on the listing service to decide >> whether/when to adjust deaggregation thresholds. If the >> per-IP price for smaller blocks gets to be higher than that >> for larger blocks, for example, that may mean that more >> deaggregation needs to be permitted. > > So, not only will ARIN staff run the registry, and the quotation > service, but they will also play a role analogous to the Fed's > role in setting the discount rate? > > And the SEC will just stand by and let you do this because of > an untested claim that IP addresses are not property, even > though you are now running a market in pseudo-equity derivatives? > > You do realize that this will all happen at a time when IPv4 address > supply will be hard to get which means that some orgs who need addresses > will suffer real financial pain either due to inability to get addresses > or due to the high price they need to pay for a block. It's almost > guaranteed that one or more of these organizations is going to either > sue ARIN or file an official complaint with the SEC or lobby Congress > to outlaw ARIN. Probably all three. > > Are you certain that this libertarian/anarchist fantasy market can > withstand the test of such legal actions? And that it can be correctly > built by a bunch of non-lawyers who so far have not sought expert legal > advice? > > --Michael Dillon > _______________________________________________ > PPML > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Public Policy > Mailing List (PPML at arin.net). > Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: > http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/ppml > Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info at arin.net if you experience any issues. From kevin at your.org Wed Mar 12 00:50:12 2008 From: kevin at your.org (Kevin Day) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 23:50:12 -0500 Subject: [ppml] Practical alternatives to v6 deaggregation for ISP/NSPs Message-ID: <85724681-B522-428B-BA90-F906D023EC9B@your.org> I've brought this up a long while back, and while we got some interesting discussion... I still don't have a solution to this for our network. Bringing this up to some other operators with similar networks who haven't even begun to deploy v6 has brought out comments like "I'm totally screwed if that's the case, that would require changing my network and/or business model." For simplicity, I'll describe the (slightly modified for simplicity's sake) case of my own network, and I'd love some suggestions for alternatives. I'm pretty much stuck with not being able to deploy v6 any further until I get some kind of resolution to this, so any advice would be appreciated. If policy changes are necessary because situations like this weren't known when some of the original v6 allocation/use policies were created, I'd like to solicit this community's opinions before proposing changes. Some may ask why this is a discussion for ARIN at all. ARIN's policies strongly suggest that v6 space isn't to be deaggregated at all: 6.3.8 "In IPv6 address policy, the goal of aggregation is considered to be the most important." 6.4.3 "RIRs will apply a minimum size for IPv6 allocations, to facilitate prefix-based filtering. The minimum allocation size for IPv6 address space is /32." and most importantly: 6.5.1.1 "advertising that connectivity through its single aggregated address allocation" Based off this (and other RIR's policies) many networks are already filtering on RIR assignment boundaries - meaning if you get a /32, you won't be heard from a sizable chunk of the internet if you announce less than that. Our network: Consists of several unconnected geographically separate Points of Presence. Each POP has peering and transit through different upstreams than the others. There is no single transit provider that has service in all the locations we're in. What we do now in v4: We have a /19. One /24 is reserved for anycast, and announced from all our POPs. One /23 is announced at each POP. This works really well for us. Nearly everyone will accept announcements down to a /24, and for those that don't we announce the full /19 as well. In v6: We have a /32. We cannot deaggregate this at all. This causes the problem that I can't direct incoming traffic to the correct POP. Possible solution #1 - Deaggregate to our upstreams and let them sort it out. Some people suggested that I announce the full /32, and announce deaggregates with no-export set to my upstreams to let them direct inbound traffic to the correct POP. If I had all the same transit providers at every POP, I could announce the /32 to them and announce a /36s per POP. This breaks if you have a transit provider that isn't connected to *every* POP I have. As an example, assume I have transit provider A at my POP in NYC, and transit provider B at my POP in Los Angeles. To Provider A I announce at our connection in NYC: 2001:1234::/32 (covering prefix for my whole space) 2001:1234:1000::/36 (space I'm using only in NYC) To Provider B I announce at our connection in Los Angeles: 2001:1234::/32 (covering prefix for my whole space) 2001:1234:2000::/36 (space I'm using only in Los Angeles) This works until Provider B receives a packet destined for 2001:1234:1000::/36. They haven't received that /36 route (since it's smaller than the /32 RIR boundry, and a network between A and B is filtering it out), so they deliver it to me in Los Angeles because of the /32. That either causes a routing loop between us, or I'm forced to tunnel it back to New York. Possible solution #2 - Get more address space. A few suggested that we get more address space. ARIN policy doesn't allow us to get any additional space until we've reached a 0.94 HD ratio. I'll never reach that amount if I'm only running my network out of one POP. I'd also like to deploy v6 everywhere now. We don't qualify for micro-allocations, despite some suggestions that we might be able to. We're not "critical infrastructure" as much as I'd like to think we are, and "Internal Infrastructure" micro- allocations are intended to be non-routed. The suggestion that we should start multiple corporations and get a / 32 for each one is creative, but I don't see that as a fair solution. Possible solution #3 - Announce the /32 from all of our POPs and haul the bits around ourselves